Families First v. Gooden

Decision Date22 November 1993
Docket NumberA93A0931,Nos. A93A0930,s. A93A0930
Citation439 S.E.2d 34,211 Ga.App. 272
PartiesFAMILIES FIRST v. GOODEN et al. MARVE v. FAMILIES FIRST.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Bauer, Deitch & Raines, Henry R. Bauer, Jr., George R. Ference, White, Smith, Howard & Ajax, Williston C. White, for Families First.

H & M Johnson, Mereda D. Johnson, Eddie D. Jones, Richard A. Coleman, for Gooden and Marve.

Jeanney M. Kutner, James B. Outman, amici curiae.

JOHNSON, Judge.

The complexity of these companion cases warrants a detailed review of the underlying facts and a brief introduction of the parties involved. Families First is a non-profit adoption agency. Vanessa Gooden is the biological mother of the child placed with Families First for adoption. Roderic Ball was Gooden's boyfriend prior to and after the birth of the child. Gerald Marve is Gooden's husband. Marve and Gooden were married in 1987. Marve was in the U.S. Navy and stationed in California during the period from before the conception until after the birth of the child. Gooden lived in Georgia at all times relevant to this action.

During her pregnancy, Gooden decided to place her baby for adoption through Families First. When the baby was born, however, Gooden changed her mind and took him home with her from the hospital. Several days later Gooden changed her mind again, deciding that she would give the child up for adoption after all. She and Ball, whom she claimed to be the child's father, took the child to Families First. Both Gooden and Ball executed the surrender of parental rights and acknowledgment of surrender of parental rights forms required by OCGA § 19-8-4 in the form prescribed by OCGA § 19-8-26(a) and (g). Gooden also executed the mother's affidavit in the form prescribed by OCGA § 19-8-26(h). On the mother's affidavit form, Gooden swore under oath that she was divorced, and she identified Ball as the child's father. She left blank spaces on the affidavit form showing her date of marriage, her spouse's address, and the date and place of her divorce.

Families First immediately placed Gooden's child in foster care pending final adoption. Three months later, Families First received the child's birth certificate from the State of Georgia. The birth certificate listed Marve as the child's father. When Families First asked Gooden about this, she admitted for the first time that she and Marve had never divorced and were still married. She continued to insist that Ball was the father of the child, however, and informed Families First that Marve had agreed to sign the necessary surrender documents. Gooden gave Families First an address for Marve, and he was contacted. Marve, having been told by his wife that she had miscarried, knew nothing about the birth of the child or the adoption. When he learned of the placement from Families First, he informed the agency that he wanted to keep the child.

Based upon all these factors, Families First filed the underlying declaratory judgment action against Gooden, Marve and Ball to determine if it had the right to consent to the adoption of the child, and to determine paternity of the child insofar as resolution of that issue was critical to its ability to satisfy its obligations under Georgia's adoption statutes. Marve filed an answer, a counterclaim, and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate custody of the child. Gooden and Marve appeared together at the habeas hearing, and informed the court that they wanted to raise the child. After hearing the habeas petition, the trial court ordered Families First to release the child to Marve pending the receipt of blood test results. 1 Marve, Gooden and Ball agreed to submit to HLA blood tests. The results of these blood tests established that neither Marve nor Ball was the father of the child. Marve requested and submitted to an additional blood test conducted by a different laboratory. The results of this test also excluded any possibility that Marve is the biological father of the child.

Gooden filed an amended answer and counterclaim raising, among other things, the claim that the mother's surrender documents were void because part of the mother's affidavit was incomplete. Ball moved to dismiss the suit against him on the grounds that the blood test proved that he was not the father of the child and asserting that he was therefore not a proper party to the litigation. The trial court granted Ball's motion.

Families First, Gooden and Marve filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Marve on the issue of paternity, holding as a matter of law that he is the presumptive father and that he had not surrendered his parental rights. Summary judgment was also granted to Gooden and Marve on the issue of the invalidity of the surrender documents. Summary judgment was granted to Families First on the issue of whether it is a charity. The trial court denied summary judgment to Families First on the issues of the validity of the surrender documents as well as on the claims for damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages filed by Gooden and Marve. The trial court also denied summary judgment to Families First and Gooden on the issues of duress and mental incapacity. Thus, the only issues which were not decided by summary judgment were the claims by Gooden and Marve for punitive damages and for damages for emotional distress, Gooden's claims of duress and mental incapacity, and the extent of Families First's immunity from liability. Families First, Gooden and Marve appeal the adverse rulings.

Case No. A93A0930

1. Gooden and Marve filed a motion to dismiss Families First's appeal based on the contention that this is an appeal of a paternity case and therefore subject to the discretionary appeal procedures set forth in OCGA § 5-6-35. We do not agree that this is an appeal of a paternity case. While one issue involves paternity, it is ancillary to more significant issues in this appeal, including concerns about the validity of surrender of parental rights documents and the interpretation of the Georgia adoption code. Adoption cases do not fall under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2). Moore v. Butler, 192 Ga.App. 882, 883(1), 386 S.E.2d 678 (1989). Nor do other issues as to which summary judgment was granted. Therefore, the trial court's decisions are directly appealable pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56(h). The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.

2. Families First contends that the trial court erred in holding that the surrender documents executed by the mother were invalid as a matter of law solely because the mother's affidavit contained some blank spaces. We agree and reverse.

The surrender of rights form, acknowledgment of surrender of rights form and the mother's affidavit are separate documents with distinct purposes. As stated on the surrender of rights form, its purpose is to effect a surrender of all of the parent's rights, title and claim to the child. As stated on the acknowledgment of surrender form, its function is to show that the parent has read and understands the accompanying surrender of rights document. Both these documents would have to be properly executed for there to be a valid surrender. Johnson v. Smith, 251 Ga. 1, 2(2), 302 S.E.2d 542 (1983); Nelson v. Taylor, 244 Ga. 657, 261 S.E.2d 579 (1979). In this case, it is undisputed that the surrender of rights form and the acknowledgment of surrender form were properly executed.

On the other hand, the purpose of the mother's affidavit, as stated on the form itself, is to gather information to be used by the agency in notifying and determining the rights of the father. 2 It does not purport to protect or otherwise affect the rights of the mother. Fathers are not even required to execute such an affidavit. The form itself provides that the mother does not have to answer all of the questions. In fact, it expressly states that the mother has "the right not to disclose" information about the biological father. The form also contains many sections which would be inapplicable in certain situations and would, of necessity, remain blank. Thus, even if Gooden had accurately completed all spaces applicable to her spouse, due to the nature of the form prescribed by the statute entire sections of the form would still be left blank. Accordingly, given the nature of the affidavit as well as the separate and distinct purposes of the documents, we hold that failure to accurately complete the mother's affidavit does not affect the validity of the mother's surrender of parental rights.

Consider the adverse effect that invalidating a surrender due to the mother's failure to accurately complete the mother's affidavit would have on the integrity of the adoption process in Georgia. Here, the mother left some spaces blank and put false information in others in what she admitted was a deliberate attempt to deceive the adoption agency into completing the adoption. She shall not now be allowed to use her deliberate omissions and misrepresentations to invalidate an otherwise valid surrender. We will not invalidate a surrender in which all other requirements of surrender have been met solely because of omissions from or inaccuracies in what is nothing more than an information-gathering device facilitating the satisfaction of the agency's legal obligations as to the rights of the biological father.

3. Families First also claims that the trial court erred in granting Gooden and Marve's motion for summary judgment on the issue of paternity. We agree that summary judgment was improperly granted on this issue. While a child born in wedlock is presumed to be the legitimate child of the husband, that presumption can be overcome by clear evidence to the contrary. OCGA § 19-7-20; Black v. Prince, 176 Ga.App. 465, 466(1), 336 S.E.2d 318 (1985). Here, there is clear evidence to the contrary....

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