Black v. Town of Springfield

• Decision Date: 04 August 1950
• Docket Number: 16394.
• Citation: 60 S.E.2d 854,217 S.C. 413
• Parties: BLACK v. TOWN OF SPRINGFIELD.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

60 S.E.2d 854

217 S.C. 413

BLACK v. TOWN OF SPRINGFIELD.

No. 16394.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

August 4, 1950

T. B. Bryant, Jr., Orangeburg, for appellant.

Brown & Jefferies, Barnwell, for respondent.

TAYLOR, Justice.

This appeal comes to this Court from an order of the Court of Common Pleas for Orangeburg County affirming an award by the South Carolina Industrial Commission to the respondent for death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Code 1942, § 7035-1 et seq.

Respondent's husband, Furman Black, was employed by the Town of Springfield, South Carolina, as Chief of Police for some time prior to his death on January 8, 1948. While riding on the side of a fire truck, owned by the Town, on its way to extinguish a grass fire, he fell and received injuries from which he shortly died.

The Hearing Commissioner, after several hearings, rendered an award in favor of the claimant, which was affirmed by the majority of the Commission. Thereafter, an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court, where the Honorable M. M. Mann, the Presiding Judge, passed an order, dated November 11, 1949, affirming the opinion and award of the Full Commission.

Appellant now comes to this Court contending first that the South Carolina Industrial Commission lacked jurisdiction for the reason that it does not appear that the said Town employed as many as fifteen people.

The record discloses that the Town of Springfield had at the time in question fewer than fifteen employees. This question was not presented either before the Commission or upon appeal to the Circuit Court, but is presented here to this Court for the first time. The jurisdiction of a Court of the subject matter of an action depends upon the authority granted to it by the Constitution and laws of the State and is fundamental. Objection to such jurisdiction may be made at any time during the progress of the action and cannot be waived or conferred by consent. We are therefore of the opinion that the question of jurisdiction is properly before this Court even though it was raised here for the first time. Senn v. Spartanburg County, 192 S.C. 489, 7 S.E.2d 454; Ladshaw v Hoskins, 204 S.C. 346, 29 S.W.2d 480; Rosamond v Lucas-Kidd Motor Co., 182 S.C. 331, 189 S.E. 641; American Agriculture Chemical Co v. Thomas, 206 S.C. 355, 34 S.E.2d 592, 160 A.L.R. 594.

Section 7035-2 Subsection (a) of the 1942 Code of Laws for South Carolina provides: 'The term 'employment' includes employment by the State and all political subdivisions thereof, and all public and quasi-public corporations therein and all private employments in which fifteen or more employees are regularly employed in the same business or establishment except agriculture and domestic service.'

Section 7035-8 provides: 'Neither the State nor any municipal corporation within the State, nor any political subdivision thereof, nor any employee of the State or of any such corporation or subdivision, shall have the right to reject the provisions of this article relative to payment and acceptance of compensation, and the provisions of sections 7035-5, 7035-6, 7035-17, 7035-18 and 7035-19 shall not apply to them. Any employee of the State or any political subdivision, or any department thereof, or of any county or any municipal corporation shall be entitled to bring suit against his said employer for the recovery of the benefits to which he may be entitled, under the terms and provisions of this article; and consent to such suit or suits is hereby expressly given.'

Considering these two sections in conjunction, the one with the other, it is apparent that the legislature intended to set up two classes of employers: (1) the State and all political subdivisions thereof, including quasi-public corporations; (2) all private employment in which fifteen or more regular employees are employed. In the latter class employers and employees are given the express right to elect whether or not they shall come under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but no such right is given those falling within the first group. It is contended that the 'quasi-public corporations' do not fall within that group designated as 'the State and all political subdivisions thereof.' With this we cannot agree. Had a comma been placed after the words 'quasi-public corporations', there would be no question of what the legislature meant thereby. However, construing this section in conjunction with section 7035-8 of the act, we are of the opinion that the legislature intended that municipal corporations and their employees are subject to and bound by the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act regardless of the number of employees employed by the municipality.

This question was touched upon but not decided in the case of Brown et al. v. Town of Patrick, 202 S.C. 236, 24 S.E.2d 365. However, the identical question was before the North Carolina Supreme Court in the case of Rape v. Town of Huntersville, 214 N.C. 505, 199 S.E. 736, and that Court arrived at the same conclusion expressed here.

It is also contended that there is no evidence to support the finding of the Industrial Commission that the deceased, Furman Black, died as a result of injuries which arose out of and in the course of his employment. This necessitates reviewing the testimony and in doing so, this Court is of course cognizant of the well-founded rule of law that the Industrial Commission being the fact-finding body and this Court and the Circuit Court both being appellate Courts in Workmen's Compensation matters, this and the Circuit Courts can only review the facts to determine whether or not there is any competent evidence to support the findings of the fact-finding body. If there is, the Courts are without power to pass upon the force and effect of such evidence. An award may of course be reversed if there is an absence of any competent evidence to support it, but in Workmen's Compensation cases the Courts are not the triers of facts. If the facts proved are capable as a matter of law of sustaining the inference of fact drawn from them by the Industrial Commission, its findings are conclusive in the absence of fraud and neither this Court nor the Court of Common Pleas is at liberty to interfere with them. Schrader v. Monarch Mills, 215 S.C. 357, 55 S.E.2d 285; Hewitt v. Cheraw Cotton Mills, S.C., 59 S.E.2d 712.

Respondent quotes in her brief the following testimony to support her contention that the deceased received injuries which arose out of and in the course of his employment from which he died:

'Mr. Bennett:

'Q. Was it one of the jobs of a police officer to direct traffic at fires? A. Sure.

'Q. Was it one of the duties to see that nobody got hurt? A. Yes, sir.

'Attention is also invited to the testimony of Mr. Jim Jumper.

'Q. What were the duties in regard to fires? A. Turn the alarm on, assist in taking care of the hose at a fire. That has been a habit.

'Q. I am asking if you ever assisted the policemen in the Town of Springfield fight fires? A. I have assisted the fire department. I couldn't say that I assisted the police.

'Q. You have assisted yourself? A. I have.

'Mr. J. E. Cannon, the night policeman, testified as follows:

'Q. Mr. Cannon, have you ever fought a fire while you were a member of the Police force? A. Yes, sir, I helped with one fire, sent in the alarm, opened the doors of the fire house, sent in the alarm and assisted Mr. Jumper with the reel in the truck. I helped connect the hose right close to the fire house and I was standing there and watched those men and got wringing wet.

'Q. State whether you helped hold the hose? A. I helped connect it up and turned it over to the boys and came out.

* * *

* * *

'Q. State whether or not you said you fought fire? A. I did. And when the boys came I handed it over to them and went against them just like Mr. Black did.'

Referring more fully to the testimony of witnesses Bennett and Cannon, mentioned above, we find that Mr. Leonard Bennett, Mayor of the Town of Springfield until January 5, 1948, testified that four or five months before he went out of office a new fire truck was purchased, and we herewith reproduce a portion of his testimony:

'Q. Mr. Bennett, did you as Mayor of the Town of Springfield give any orders to the policemen in the Town of Springfield with reference to the fire truck when it was bought? A. I did.

'Q. Did you give an order to Mr. Furman Black? A. I did.

'Q. Tell the Commissioner what your instructions were? A. When they delivered the truck to the Town of Springfield they sent a man to show how to operate it and I was coming from the house one night and the truck going down the street with the fire fighters on it to practice and Mr. Black was on it and the thing popped in my mind, I said: 'My God, there is old man Black riding on the fire truck.' I called him off and said: 'Mr. Black, you should not ride on that fire truck.' He was a large man weighing about two hundred pounds and even for a young man it is dangerous. And at Council meeting I told them.

'Q. Had the truck been delivered and installed? A. No, sir, they brought it and we were to accept it after they learned to operate it.

'Q. When you saw Mr. Black that night you went to him and told him immediately? A. I followed the truck to tell him.

'Q. What were your reasons for that? A. He was a very large man and more or less clumsy.

'Q. What was his age? A. He wasn't very old, probably fifty-five, but very...