Blackmon v. Lira
| Decision Date | 30 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | 2004-UP-595 |
| Parties | W.M. Blackmon and Linda K. Blackmon, Respondents, v. Luciano Lira, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
Heard October 12, 2004
Appeal From Sumter County, Jack D. Howle, Special Referee
Warren S. Curtis, of Sumter, for Appellant.
William W. Wheeler, III, and Jacob H. Jennings, both of Bishopville, for Respondents.
W.M Blackmon and Linda K. Blackmon brought this action for ejectment against Luciano Lira. Lira appeals the special referee's order finding that Lira did not own the property at issue and was not entitled to compensation for improvements he made to the property. We affirm.
The land on which Lira is living is a 57.5-acre tract conveyed by Linda Blackmon's father, Watt Keels, to Mrs. Blackmon and her first husband, Lloyd Mixon. Mixon and Mrs. Blackmon owned the property as tenants in common for life and upon the death of either of them, to the survivor in fee simple. [1] Prior to 1994, Lira began working for Mixon. In July 1994 Mixon permitted Lira to move into a mobile home on the land. Mixon died on January 26, 2000. Mrs. Blackmon later married W.M. Blackmon and the property at issue was deeded to the Blackmons by survivorship deed. Mr. Blackmon died during the course of this litigation; therefore, Mrs. Blackmon is the sole owner of the property.
The Blackmons commenced this action in the Sumter County Magistrate's Court by filing an affidavit for ejectment of Lira. On October 31, 2001, an order and rule to vacate or show cause was issued ordering Lira to vacate immediately or show cause within ten days why he should not be ejected. On November 8, 2001, Lira filed a return to the rule in which he alleged his ownership of the property as a defense to the ejectment. The parties consented to transfer the case to the Court of Common Pleas. After the transfer, Lira filed an answer and counterclaim in which he argued he is the owner of the property by virtue of a grant from Mixon prior to his death. In the alternative, Lira alleged that if he is not the true owner, he is due compensation for improvements he made to the premises. The Blackmons replied to Lira's counterclaim, denying Lira's ownership interest in the property or any entitlement to compensation for improvements.
On March 18, 2002, the case was referred to a special referee. After the August 19, 2002 trial, the special referee took the matter under advisement and allowed both parties to submit memoranda outlining their positions. In his brief, Lira argued each of his claims and raised the issue of promissory estoppel based on a recent case. On December 23, 2002, the special referee entered his order ruling in favor of the Blackmons on both the title and ejectment issues and ruling against Lira on the issues raised in his counterclaim. Specifically, the special referee found Lira did not meet his burden of proving a parol gift by clear and convincing evidence. Additionally, the special referee held Lira was not entitled to relief under the Betterments Statute [2] because he failed to prove his good faith belief in his title to the property and failed to prove any damages that would be recoverable. Finally, the special referee concluded Lira failed to prove any damages were recoverable under the theory of quantum meruit given there was no evidence the work was performed by Lira for the benefit of the owners.
Subsequently Lira filed motions for a new trial and a stay of the effect of the order. The special referee denied both of these motions. In his appeal, Lira moved for this court to grant a stay so that he could remain on the property during the appeal. We remanded the matter to the special referee to set an appeal bond. Lira appeals.
In an appeal from the final judgment of a special referee, the reviewing court has the same scope of review as if the appeal had been from the circuit court without a jury to the Supreme Court. Tiger, Inc. v. Fisher Agro, Inc., 301 S.C 229, 237, 391 S.E.2d 538, 543 (1989) ().
This case involves both actions at law and at equity. A case with legal and equitable issues presents a divided scope of review. When legal and equitable actions are maintained in one suit, each retains its own identity as legal or equitable for purposes of the applicable standard of review on appeal.” Kuznik v. Bees Ferry Assocs., 342 S.C. 579, 589, 538 S.E.2d 15, 20 (Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted).
Parol transfer of title, promissory estoppel, and quantum meruit are all equitable causes of action. See Columbia Wholesale Co. v. Scudder May N.V., 312 S.C. 259, 261-62, 440 S.E.2d 129, 130-31 (1994) (); Knight v. Stroud, 212 S.C. 39, 42-43, 46 S.E.2d 169, 170 (1948) (); Satcher v. Satcher, 351 S.C. 477, 482, 570 S.E.2d 535, 538 (Ct. App. 2002) (). In an action sounding in equity, tried by the judge alone, the appellate court may review the record and make findings based on its own view of the evidence. Townes Assocs. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86, 221 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1976). However, this court is not required to disregard the findings of the special referee who saw and heard the witnesses and was in a better position to judge their credibility. Dorchester County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Miller, 324 S.C. 445, 452, 477 S.E.2d 476, 480 (Ct. App. 1996).
In contrast, the issues involving the extinguishment of a property interest and compensation under the Betterments Statute are actions at law. See Wigfall v. Fobbs, 295 S.C. 59, 60, 367 S.E.2d 156, 157 (1988) (); Hammond v. Lindsay, 277 S.C. 182, 184, 284 S.E.2d 581, 582 (1981) (The construction of a clear and unambiguous deed is a question of law for the court.); Rogers v. Nation, 284 S.C. 330, 333, 326 S.E.2d 182, 183 (Ct. App. 1985) (). In an action at law referred to a special referee with direct appeal to the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, the appellate court will correct errors of law, but must affirm the special referee's factual findings unless there is no evidence to support the findings. Crary v. Djebelli, 329 S.C. 385, 388, 496 S.E.2d 21, 23 (1998); King v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 317 S.C. 385, 388-89, 453 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1995).
Lira argues the special referee erred in holding that no parol transfer of title occurred from Mixon to Lira. We disagree.
A parol gift of land can be established only by clear and convincing testimony, and unless possession of the land is delivered or taken in pursuance of the gift thereby taking such parol gift out of the statute of frauds, evidence of the parol gift is inadmissible. Id. at 441-42, 53 S.E.2d at 74. Furthermore, mere possession and the making of some improvements do not dispose of the requirement of showing distinct proof that a gift actually occurred. Id. at 442, 53 S.E.2d at 74.
Lira has not produced clear and convincing evidence of a parol gift. It is not clear from the record Lira took possession in pursuance of a gift, or the improvements were induced by a promise to give the land. Lira never testified that he moved onto the land because of a promise by Mixon to give him the land. In fact, he gave no reason at all as to why he moved onto the land. Although Lira testified as to the improvements he made on the land, [3] he did not testify that he made any improvements due to a gift. While there was testimony offered from Lira's friend, Santos Alvarado, that he witnessed Lira give Mixon $5, 000 in cash and overheard Mixon telling Lira don't worry about [the money], you know, the land [is going to] be yours, Furthermore, as the special referee found and Lira acknowledged at oral argument, the Blackmons had title to the mobile home, which was the most significant improvement relied upon by Lira. Lira also lived rent-free and did not pay the taxes on the property.
Additionally, there is evidence in the record tending to show Lira actually did not believe he owned the land. In response to a letter Lira received ordering him to vacate the property, Lira wrote a letter asking for an extension of time in which to vacate. He did not assert his ownership anywhere in the letter. Instead, he asked only for an extension to vacate. During this same time, Lira also inquired about the new owner of the property apparently in an effort to acquire the land. For the foregoing reasons, we find the special referee properly found the evidence did not support a parol transfer of title.
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