Satcher v. Satcher

Decision Date19 August 2002
Docket NumberNo. 3541.,3541.
Citation570 S.E.2d 535,351 S.C. 477
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesJames H. SATCHER, III a/k/a Chip Satcher, Appellant, v. Benjamin Wright SATCHER, in his own right and as Personal Representative of the Estate of James H. Satcher, Sr.; James H. Satcher, Jr.; Satcher Realty, Inc; and Judy Livingston, Respondents.

Rebecca G. Fulmer, of Columbia, for appellant.

B. Michael Brackett, of Columbia, respondents.

HEARN, C.J.

James H. Satcher, III (Chip) claims ownership of a farm and residence where he lived with his grandfather, James H. Satcher, Sr. (Grandfather), asserting theories of an oral gift, oral contract to devise, and promissory estoppel. The trial court found Chip failed to prove ownership under any of these theories. We find Chip established entitlement to a portion of Grandfather's property based on promissory estoppel but agree that Chip did not prevail as to the other claimed property. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

FACTS

After Chip's parents separated when he was fourteen years old, he lived with his grandparents. In 1976, when Chip was twenty, his grandparents separated, and Grandfather and Chip moved to a farmhouse on Slide Hill Road (Slide Hill). Chip's girlfriend and later fiancee, Georgianna Vine (Gigi), moved to Slide Hill in 1987.

In February 1990, Chip began working at the Westinghouse Savannah River Plant. In 1993, he was promoted from a general maintenance employee to a power operator, earning $26,520 per year plus benefits. Nevertheless, Chip left Westinghouse in early 1993 to farm Grandfather's land. At trial, several witnesses testified that Grandfather wanted Chip to work the farm and it was their understanding that Grandfather promised Chip that if he came back to the farm, it would be his.

Chip borrowed money to purchase farm equipment and obtain working capital. Until Grandfather's death, Chip planted crops, cleared new land, installed irrigation, and sharecropped with neighboring farmers. During this time, Grandfather sold some of his property and leased other portions.

Grandfather died testate in May 1998. The introductory paragraph of the will specifically named Grandfather's two sons, Ben and James Satcher, and nine grandchildren, but no grandchild inherited under the will. Ben was granted the "`Home Place' in Edgefield County, South Carolina, consisting of the lands on Slide Hill Road, Halford Place, and the Son Jeff Place, all to contain 175 acres, more or less, and also my interest, if any, in the `Johnson Place'. . . ."—all the land to which Chip believed he was entitled.

On June 3, 1998, Chip filed the first of four notices of lis pendens on the property. Later that month, Ben demanded he vacate the property so it could be sold. Chip filed a complaint seeking specific performance for legal title, alleging equitable title passed to him through either a(1) parol gift of the residence and farmland; (2) breach of contract to devise the residence; and (3) promissory estoppel as to the residence and farmland. Lastly, Chip sought a declaratory judgment as to the personal property at Slide Hill; however, this claim was later settled in probate court. Ben answered and asserted various counterclaims including trespass.

A bench trial was held, and the trial court found that Chip had not proved his claim under any of his theories. It also dismissed Ben Satcher's counterclaim for trespass and dissolved Chip's notices of lis pendens. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND BURDEN OF PROOF

Chip seeks specific performance of title in property in which he claims equitable title. This remedy sounds in equity. Ingram v. Kasey's Assocs., 340 S.C. 98, 105, 531 S.E.2d 287, 290 (2000); Wright v. Trask, 329 S.C. 170, 176, 495 S.E.2d 222, 225 (Ct.App.1997). In equity actions, this court may review the record and make findings based on its view of the preponderance of the evidence. Townes Assocs. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86, 221 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1976). However, we are not required to disregard the findings of the trial judge who saw and heard the witnesses and was in a better position to judge their credibility. Tiger, Inc. v. Fisher Agro, Inc., 301 S.C. 229, 237, 391 S.E.2d 538, 543 (1989). To prevail under any of these theories and avoid the application of the Statute of Frauds1, Chip must prove each element by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. South Carolina case law provides a requirement of clear and convincing evidence for proving a parol gift of land and a contract to devise. See Brown v. Graham, 242 S.C. 491, 493, 131 S.E.2d 421, 422 (1963)

(holding contracts to make a will "are regarded with suspicion and will not be sustained unless established by definite, clear, cogent and convincing evidence"); Knight v. Stroud, 214 S.C. 437, 441, 53 S.E.2d 72, 73 (1949) (giving burden of proof required to establish oral gift). With respect to promissory estoppel in real property cases, the burden is less clearly defined. However, we are instructed by Knight that the partial performance exception for an oral gift "is more in the nature of equitable estoppel." 214 S.C. at 442, 53 S.E.2d at 74. We therefore extend this analogy to require the same burden of proof in promissory estoppel cases where real property is claimed.

Clear and convincing evidence is that "degree of proof which will produce in the [fact finder] a firm belief as to the allegations sought to be established. Such measure of proof is intermediate, more than a mere preponderance but less than is required for proof beyond a reasonable doubt; it does not mean clear and unequivocal." Anonymous v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 329 S.C. 371, 374 n. 2, 496 S.E.2d 17, 18 n. 2 (1998).

DISCUSSION
I. Promissory Estoppel

A contract and promissory estoppel are two separate and distinct legal theories. They "are two different creatures of the law; they are not legally synonymous; the birth of one does not spawn the other." Duke Power Co. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 284 S.C. 81, 100, 326 S.E.2d 395, 406 (1985). Our courts recognize a remedy in equity if the claimant can prove:

(1) the presence of a promise unambiguous in its terms; (2) reasonable reliance upon the promise by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) the reliance is expected and foreseeable by the party who makes the promise; and (4) the party to whom the promise is made must sustain injury in reliance on the promise.

Woods v. State, 314 S.C. 501, 505, 431 S.E.2d 260, 263 (Ct.App. 1993). The applicability of the doctrine depends on whether the refusal to apply it "would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of a fraud or would result in other injustice." Citizens Bank v. Gregory's Warehouse, Inc., 297 S.C. 151, 154, 375 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ct.App.1988). Unlike a contract which requires a meeting of the minds and consideration, promissory estoppel looks at a promise, its subsequent effect on the promisee, and in certain cases bars the promisor from making an inconsistent disposition of the property.

A. Slide Hill

Chip argues he should receive title to Slide Hill under the theory of promissory estoppel. We agree and find the record proves Chip is entitled to Slide Hill, described as "Parcel No. 1" in his second amended complaint.2 This tract, as shown on an Edgefield County tax map, contains 83.5 acres and includes a house and pond.

There is ample testimony from several disinterested witnesses that Grandfather promised Slide Hill to Chip. Grandfather's former girlfriend testified that Chip was the favorite grandchild and that Grandfather told her when Chip was working at the Savannah River Plant he wanted Chip "to come back home." After Chip returned, he repeatedly told her that "[t]he house is [Chip's] to do what he wants to do" and when Slide Hill was being remodeled he said, "It doesn't matter to me what they do because it's going to be [Chip's] anyway." Although she could not name with certainty which farmlands Grandfather referenced when describing the property which would eventually be Chip's, she testified that "the land around the house at Slide Hill, we looked at all that. [Grandfather] said he was leaving that to Chip and the house. He said he would be well-fixed." Gigi recalled that Grandfather said on numerous occasions, "It's Chip's house." Chris Harper, Grandfather's fishing partner, testified that Grandfather told him he was trying to get Chip to return to the farm. He stated, "If he comes back, I will give him the land and all." Harper approached Grandfather about selling the pond behind the house, but Grandfather responded to his requests by saying, "Well, that pond belongs to Chip. This is Chip's pond and that's Chip's house." Another friend testified that "Mr. Satcher told me on several occasions the house and the farm was Chip's" and that upon visiting Slide Hill Grandfather said, "This is Chip's place." Grandfather's neighbor testified that Grandfather referred to Slide Hill as Chip's house and when he asked Grandfather about whether he had deeded the house to Chip, Grandfather responded, "Old boy, you know he is going to get that." One witness stated "if [Chip] would come back and run it and live at the place, it would be his one day."

Lanyce Hatcher worked at the Savannah River Plant and farmed with Grandfather. Hatcher testified he worked with Chip at the plant and that Grandfather told him he "should talk to Chip. Chip needed to be on the farm with them . . . . and it was going to be his anyway." Hatcher stated that he told Grandfather, "From Chip's point, . . . you haven't given him anything in his name. He's just taking a chance working for you here."

Q: And what was Mr. Satcher's response to that?
A: He told me, "Aw, Chip knows he won't ever have anything to worry about. I will take care of him. He is going to get everything." I said, "Why don't you go on and give him something now, at least
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