Blackmore v. City of Council Bluffs
| Decision Date | 23 February 1920 |
| Docket Number | 32879 |
| Parties | STINA ANDERSON BLACKMORE, Guardian, Appellee, v. CITY OF COUNCIL BLUFFS, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
REHEARING DENIED JULY 6, 1920.
Appeal from Pottawattamie District Court.--J. B. ROCKAFELLOW, Judge.
ACTION to recover for injuries received by a fall upon one of defendant's sidewalks. The opinion states the facts. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Henry Peterson, for appellant.
Mayne & Green, for appellee.
This action was begun June 21, 1915, and was brought for and in behalf of Anna Anderson, a minor, to recover for injuries alleged to have been sustained by her through a fall on an icy street crossing near the corner of Broadway and Second Street in defendant city. The injury occurred on the 11th day of March, 1915. The action is brought by her guardian.
The usual issues were tendered, together with a claim that the action is barred by reason of a failure to serve the defendant with written notice of the injury, as required by Section 3447 of the Code of 1897. The cause was tried to a jury, and a verdict returned for the plaintiff. Judgment being entered on the verdict, defendant appeals.
It is contended that the plaintiff cannot maintain the action; that it is barred by the provisions of Section 3447 of the Code of 1897, which provides:
The contention that the action is barred is bottomed on the thought that it was not brought within 90 days from the happening of the injury, and that notice of the injury is insufficient to avoid the bar, because it did not state the time when the injury occurred.
On the 17th day of March, 1915, notice of the injury was served on the defendant city in the following words:
It will be observed that this notice does not state the time of the injury. The petition was dismissed on that ground. Thereafter, the petition was amended, and, as amended, stated that, on the 22d day of March, the city council held its first meeting after receiving the above notice. The matter of plaintiff's claim was called to the consideration of the city council, and the minutes of the meeting show the following:
"A communication from Anna Anderson by Mayne & Green, her attorneys, notifying the city of injuries received while walking along the north side of Broadway near the corner of Second Street, by falling upon ice which had been allowed to accumulate at this point, stating that she was seriously and permanently injured and had been damaged in the sum of $ 5,000, was presented to the council, read, and on motion of same was referred to the judiciary committee and the city solicitor."
Immediately after the reference of said claim to the judiciary committee and said attorney, as above set out, a further and additional notice was served upon the defendant, by serving it on one of the members of said judiciary committee, to which said claim was referred. This notice was in words and figures as follows, to wit:
A demurrer was filed to the petition as amended, challenging the sufficiency of the notices to take the case out of the operation of the bar of the statute. This demurrer was overruled. This is assigned as a reversible error.
The object of the notice is to inform the city of the time, place, and circumstances of the injury. This, for the purpose of enabling the city to make full and thorough investigation of the injuries and the accident complained of within 60 days, and for the further purpose of enabling the city to investigate and determine for itself whether there was a defect at the time and at the place when the injured party claims to have received injury. In Howe v. Sioux County, 180 Iowa 580, 163 N.W. 411, a case involving the construction of this particular statute, this court held that the purpose of the notice is to enable the officers of the county sought to be charged, to make investigation, and that the notice must specifically state the time of the injury, the place where the same happened, and the circumstances surrounding the transactions. With this information, the board of supervisors or other officers of the county (or municipality) are enabled to investigate and determine whether the county (or municipality) is liable, and, if so, what course to pursue with reference to the matter of making settlement, or preparing to make defense to any suit that may be brought against it. In Neeley v. Incorporated Town of Mapleton, 139 Iowa 582, 117 N.W. 981, it was held that the tendency of courts is to construe the limitations of the statute liberally, provided it is made to appear that the notice already given has accomplished the purpose for which it is required, and that the purpose of the notice is to convey to the town council, within the time limit, information as to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury, so that an investigation may be had while the facts are fresh. While the statute should be liberally construed, no construction should be indulged in that emasculates it, or deprives the city of the notice which it is the intent of the statute that it should have, to wit, notice of the time, place, and circumstances of the injury. This notice, the statute provides, shall be in writing. It does not designate the particular officer of the city on whom service shall be made. The notice is, therefore, sufficient if it conforms to the statute as to time, place, and circumstances, and is in writing, and is served on any officer of the city whose relation to the city is such that notice to him of matters affecting the interest of the city is notice to the city. It follows, therefore, that notice to one charged with a duty to the city, with respect to the matters concerning which the notice is given, is notice to the city. The city acts through its officers. All the information that comes to it must come through officers charged with the duty of acting for and in behalf of the city. It will be noted that the second notice was in writing, and served on the members of the city council appointed by the council to act for the city as a judiciary committee in the investigation of this particular matter. While acting for the city and charged with the duty of investigating this matter, these officers of the city received this additional notice in writing, in which is given the time when and the place where the injury occurred. Though the second notice was not signed by the injured party, it was served by one authorized to act for her. In Neeley v. Incorporated Town of Mapleton, 139 Iowa 582, 117 N.W. 981, there was no signature to the notice at all, and yet the notice was held good. See, also, Pardey v. Town of Mechanicsville, 112 Iowa 68, 83 N.W. 828. If the notice is in writing, and contains information...
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