Blackwell v. State

• Decision Date: 21 November 1973
• Parties: William H. BLACKWELL, Jr. v. STATE of Maine.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 536

311 A.2d 536

William H. BLACKWELL, Jr. v. STATE of Maine.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Nov. 21, 1973.

Cushman D. Anthony, Portland, Cumberland Legal Aid Clinic, William S. Brodrick, Peter J. DeTroy, Student Attorney's, for appellant.

Joseph E. Brennan, County Atty., Donald G. Lowry, Asst. County Atty., Portland, for appellee.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEATHERBEE, POMEROY, WERNICK, and ARCHIBALD, JJ.

POMEROY, Justice.

This matter was originated by a petition for writ of habeas corpus (post-conviction), pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 5501 et seq., and comes before us on report, upon an amended agreed statement of facts.

Petitioner was charged in District Court with violation of 29 M.R.S.A. § 897 (Duty upon striking unattended vehicle), to which he originally entered a plea of not guilty.

Subsequently, he changed his plea to guilty, whereupon he was convicted, released upon personal recognizance bail, and afforded two weeks' time to raise a $100 fine which the Court indicated it would impose as sentence, pursuant to the general penalty provisions of 29 M.R.S.A. § 2303. ¹

At the end of the two-week period, petitioner failed to present himself for formal sentencing. He did appear two days later, however, at which time, according to the agreed statement of facts, he '. . . reported his failure to accumulate $100.00 for the fine.'

Upon his failure to pay the fine the petitioner was committed to the County jail pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 1904. ²

When first addressing this cause in Law Docket #463, March 22, 1972, we noted discrepancies in the agreed statement of facts, and remanded to the Superior Court for corrections to comport to the actual facts as reflected in District Court records. Certain corrections have now been made.

However, we still find the agreed statement of facts so meagre that we must discharge the report and, for the following reasons, remand the cause for further findings.

It is the long-established policy of this Court,

'* * * to decline to pass upon the question of constitutionality of a statute unless this is entirely necessary to a decision of the cause in which it is raised.' Johnson v. Maine Wetlands Control Board, Me., 250 A.2d 825, 827 (1969).

We find here, as we did in Johnson, that,

'(T)he few facts agreed upon . . . fail to demonstrate that a determination of the constitutionality of the statute is necessary to a decision in the case. We conclude that the matter has been reported to us prematurely.' Id. at 827.

The agreed statement recites:

'Petitioner was jailed solely because he was unable to pay the $100.00 fine in a lump sum.'

The statement also recites:

'Petitioner failed to appear in District Court on June 16, 1971. Instead, he appeared in District Court on June 18, 1971, and reported his failure to accumulate $100.00 for the fine . . ..'

We are unable to determine whether the District Court Judge, at the time of petitioner's appearance on June 18, found that petitioner's failure to raise the fine resulted from his willful neglect or indifference, or whether petitioner had made reasonable and diligent, but nonetheless unsuccessful efforts to secure the money.

There may well be inherent in the case issues as to whether there have been procedural due process violations, substantive due process violations or equal protection violations depending upon what facts are found.

There has developed a clear trend in both federal and state case law indicating growing judicial disenchantment with the practice of jailing indigents for nonpayment of fines imposed for criminal violations.

Thus, constitutional infirmities have been detected in cases in which the period of incarceration for nonpayment of fines exceeds the statutory maximum jail sentence provided for the offense charged, WILLIAMS V. ILLINOIS, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.CT. 2018, 26 L.ED.2D 586 (1970)³; Lucas v. United States, D.C.App., 268 A.2d 524 (1970); Schreck v. State, Fla.App., 240 So.2d 873 (1970); where the incarceration for nonpayment deprived the defendant of the benefits of a statute granting 'credit' for prison time served in lieu of fine payment, Arthur v. Schoonfield, 315 F.Supp. 548 (D.C.Md.1970); and where immediate payment was required, or no reasonable opportunities to pay the fine were accorded the defendant, Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971); Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 90 S.Ct. 2232, 26 L.Ed.2d 773 (1970); State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A.2d 137 (1971); State v. Bender, Del.Super., 283 A.2d 847 (1971).

The Tate, Williams and Morris trilogy underscores the United States Supreme Court's disapprobation of economic classifications in the criminal process, as first signaled by Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956).

The decisions do not, however, dictate that a person who is sentenced to pay a fine imposed for criminal conduct can never be imprisoned when in default of payment of such fine.

In his concurring opinion in Morris, for example, Mr. Justice White places Williams in what we regard to be the proper perspective:

'As I understand it, Williams v. Illinois does not mean that a State cannot jail a person who has the means to pay a fine but refuses or neglects to do so. Neither does it finally answer the question whether the State's interest in deterring unlawful conduct and in enforcing its penal laws through fines as well as jail sentences will justify imposing an 'equivalent' jail sentence on the indigent who, despite his own reasonable efforts and the State's attempt at accommodation, is unable to secure the necessary funds. But Williams means, at minimum, that in imposing fines as punishment for criminal conduct more care must be taken to provide for those whose lack of funds would otherwise automatically convert a fine into a jail sentence.' (Emphasis supplied). 399 U.S. 508, 509, 90 S.Ct. 2232, 2233, 26 L.Ed.2d 773, 774.

Tate v. Short, we believe, is also self-limiting.

The petitioner in Tate was convicted on nine traffic offenses which, under Texas statute, were punishable by fines only. He was unable to pay the fines imposed, totaling $425, and was ordered to prison for 85 days (at a 'credit' rate of $5 a day). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed a denial of his petition for habeas corpus, rejecting the constitutional claim upon which the Supreme Court, by certiorari, reached its decision to reverse and remand. Expressing the view of seven members of the Court, Mr. Justice Brennan found the same 'unconstitutional discrimination' as in Williams, based upon the imposition of punishment in excess of that provided by statute:

'Since Texas has legislated a 'fines only' policy for traffic offenses, that statutory ceiling cannot, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, limit the punishment to payment of the fine if one is able to pay it, yet convert the fine into a prison term for an indigent defendant without the means to pay his fine. Imprisonment...