Blair v. State

• Decision Date: 16 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. S01A0055.,S01A0055.
• Citation: 543 S.E.2d 685,273 Ga. 668
• Parties: BLAIR v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

543 S.E.2d 685

273 Ga. 668

BLAIR v. The STATE.

No. S01A0055.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

February 16, 2001.

Reconsideration Denied April 6, 2001.

John L. Kimmey, III, C. David Turk, III, Germano & Kimmey, P.C., Dawsonville, for Appellant.

Peter J. Skandalakis, Dist. Atty., LaGrange, Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Daniel Garland Ashburn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paula K. Smith, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Atlanta, Kevin Wayne Drummond, Asst. Dist. Atty., Carrollton, for Appellee.

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

Shannon Eliga Blair was convicted of felony murder and arson arising out of the stabbing death of Bobby Payton.¹ Finding no reversible error by the trial court, we affirm.

1. The jury was authorized to find that Blair had worked for the victim at a sandwich shop for four years and had engaged in occasional sexual acts with the victim over that four year period. On the day of the crimes, Blair, who was twenty years old, entered Payton's trailer home, to which he had the key, and woke the sleeping victim. They argued and the victim told Blair, "I don't want you no more." Blair initially left the home then returned to the kitchen where the victim advanced on Blair while "look[ing] mean at me, angry." Blair grabbed a kitchen knife and stabbed the victim 37 times, 23 in the back. Blair then set fire to the body and the trailer, burning himself in the process. Clothing items found in an area from which Blair was seen leaving had blood from the victim and a hair matching Blair's. In several voluntary statements Blair made to police, he stated that he loved the victim and did not indicate that their relationship was not consensual. There was evidence that Blair was a gambler, that the victim had helped Blair with his gambling debts before, and that Blair was the exclusive beneficiary of the victim's life insurance.

It was a question for the jury whether the circumstances justified Blair's use of a deadly weapon against the victim. See Akins v. State, 269 Ga. 838(1), 504 S.E.2d 196 (1998). We find the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Blair did not act in self-defense when he stabbed the victim and that he was guilty of felony murder and arson. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Blair contends the trial court erred by improperly restricting defense counsel's opening statement. However, opening statements were not transcribed. "With neither an original transcript nor one prepared from recollection, we must presume that the trial court did not commit reversible error in controlling the content of defense counsel's statement. [Cits.]" Houston v. State, 217 Ga.App. 279(3), 456 S.E.2d 766 (1995).

3. Blair contends error in the exclusion of specific acts committed by the victim which Blair argues were relevant to his justification defense in that the evidence showed that the victim sought out and sexually assaulted young men and boys. See Barber v. State, 268 Ga. 156(2), 486 S.E.2d 353 (1997).

"As a general rule, a victim's character is not relevant or admissible in the murder trial. There is an exception when the defendant claims justification and offers evidence that the deceased was the first aggressor." [Footnote omitted.] Under this exception, a defendant may present evidence of the victim's specific acts of violence against the defendant and third persons. [Footnote omitted.] "Such evidence is admissible to show the victim's character for violence or tendency to act in accordance with his or her character as it relates to the defendant's claim of justification." [Footnote omitted.]

Owens v. State, 270 Ga. 199, 201(2), 509 S.E.2d 905 (1998). Even assuming, arguendo, that Blair sufficiently established that the victim was the aggressor, the proffered evidence excluded by the trial court failed to reflect "specific acts of violence." The proffered evidence consisted of testimony by two witnesses and a videotape. The first witness, Bryant, was a sandwich shop employee who would have testified that he declined the victim's repeated social invitations, told the victim that he (Bryant) "wasn't queer," and was subsequently fired. The second...