Blanchfield v. State

• Decision Date: 31 March 1980
• Citation: 427 N.Y.S.2d 682,104 Misc.2d 21
• Parties: Timothy BLANCHFIELD, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York.
• Court: New York Court of Claims

Page 682

427 N.Y.S.2d 682

104 Misc.2d 21

Timothy BLANCHFIELD, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York.

Court of Claims of New York.

March 31, 1980.

Richard T. Horigan, Amsterdam, for claimant; Timothy Horigan, Amsterdam, of counsel.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., for the State; John B. Garrity, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel.

DECISION

JEROME F. HANIFIN, Judge.

This is a claim for damages for false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution arising out of the arrest of claimant by New York State Troopers in Poughkeepsie, New York on the morning of March 22, 1977, and his subsequent incarceration in the Dutchess County Jail.

After carefully reviewing all of the testimony and exhibits before it, the Court makes the following findings:

On March 21, 1977, claimant was visiting a friend, Richard Roe, at his home in Arlington, Town of Poughkeepsie, New York. That evening, claimant drove to a bar on Main Street in Arlington with Richard Roe and another friend, Edward Denault, in Denault's car. Claimant testified on cross-examination that he smoked some marijuana on the way to the bar.

After consuming some beer at the Arlington bar, claimant drove with his friends to a bar in Highland, across the Hudson River, in order to rendezvous with two women they had met at the Arlington bar. Unable to engage the interest of the women, the trio left the Highland bar and returned to Arlington sometime after midnight. Once again, claimant drove the car.

On the morning of March 22, 1977, Trooper Ackley and his partner, Trooper Woodcock, were on a regular tour of duty and at around 1:30 to 2:00 a. m. were in Arlington proceeding in their patrol car to a residence on Forbes Street. Forbes Street ran in an east/west direction and intersected Raymond Avenue which ran north/south. While stopped at the light at the intersection of Raymond Avenue and Main Street (near Forbes Street), Trooper Ackley first noticed claimant operating Denault's car. Trooper Ackley proceeded to the Forbes Street residence and saw claimant for a second time driving towards Raymond Avenue.

After having been parked at the Forbes Street residence for approximately 10 to 15 minutes, Trooper Ackley sighted claimant for a third time driving towards Raymond Avenue. This time Trooper Ackley followed claimant and directed him to pull over his vehicle at the intersection of Raymond Avenue and Main Street near where Ackley first sighted claimant.

Trooper Ackley approached claimant in the vehicle and requested his license and registration. Claimant produced the vehicle registration, but not his license. He testified that he told the trooper that his license was at his friend's house. At that point, Trooper Ackley smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from the car.

Claimant and his two friends were directed to get out of the car and empty their pockets. The troopers searched the three men and, upon finding marijuana in the pocket of Richard Roe, placed him under arrest.

After the arrest of Roe, Trooper Ackley called in by radio to the Millbrook Trooper Barracks and requested a validation check on claimant's license. Upon receiving a teletype computer printout from Albany, the radio dispatcher at Millbrook informed Trooper Ackley that claimant's license was revoked. ¹ Trooper Ackley arrested claimant for violation of section 511 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. ²

Claimant testified that he told the arresting officers that his license had been revoked because of a computer error but that it was subsequently reinstated. This, in fact, was the case. It appears that claimant's license was reinstated some days prior to the arrest (claimant contends on February 14, 1977) and that the teletype printout relied on by Trooper Ackley in effecting the arrest was in error. Trooper Ackley could not recall whether claimant told him that his license had been renewed but he testified that such a statement would have made no difference to him because he had to rely on the printout.

Claimant was handcuffed and transported to the Troop K barracks in Millbrook where he was taken inside and handcuffed to a desk.

After being detained at the Millbrook barracks for approximately two to three hours, claimant was brought before a Town Justice and arraigned on the charge of driving with his license revoked. Claimant pled not guilty; bail was set at $500 and claimant was remanded to the Dutchess County Jail in lieu of bail. The Town Justice testified that he had no recollection of claimant or his arraignment.

Claimant remained incarcerated until approximately 7:00 p. m. on the evening of March 23, 1977. He testified that prior to his second appearance before the Town Justice and his release, officers at the County Jail showed him a copy of a printout of his driving record. According to claimant, the printout indicated that his license had been revoked and that immediately following that entry a second entry indicated that claimant's license had been reinstated. This testimony was somewhat suspect because Trooper Ackley testified that the printout would not have stated that claimant's license had been reinstated, rather this fact would be indicated by the symbol GO. In any event, there was no showing that the printout claimant saw was the printout relied on by Trooper Ackley.

The tort of false arrest is essentially the same as the tort of false imprisonment (Budgar v. State of New York, 98 Misc.2d 588, 414 N.Y.S.2d 463; Houghtaling v. State of New York, 11 Misc.2d 1049, 175 N.Y.S.2d 659). Every false arrest is itself a false imprisonment, with the imprisonment commencing at the time of the arrest (Budgar v. State of New York, supra; Baisch v. State of New York, 76 Misc.2d 1006, 351 N.Y.S.2d 617).

In order to establish a cause of action for false imprisonment, claimant must show: (1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the claimant was conscious of the confinement, (3) the claimant did not consent to his confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged (Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310, cert. den. sub nom. Schanbarger v. Kellogg, 423 U.S. 929, 96 S.Ct. 277, 46 L.Ed.2d 257). It is undisputed that the first three elements of this cause of action have been made out by claimant. Therefore, the Court must determine whether the confinement was privileged.

A claimant's obligation to show that the confinement was not otherwise privileged is rarely a problem for him whenever there has been an arrest or imprisonment without a warrant, since a presumption arises that such arrest and imprisonment were unlawful (Broughton v. State of New York, supra). In such case, the burden is on the State to prove that the arrest was otherwise privileged or justified and that burden may be met by showing that probable cause existed at the time of the arrest (Broughton v. State of New York, supra). A police officer is justified in arresting a person without a warrant for "(a) Any offense when he has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed such offense in his presence; and (b) A crime when he has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed such crime, whether in his presence or otherwise" (CPL 140.10, subd. 1). The term "reasonable cause" has been equated with "probable cause" as that term is used in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (People v. Lombardi, 18 A.D.2d 177, 239 N.Y.S.2d 161, affd. 13 N.Y.2d 1014, 245 N.Y.S.2d 595, 195 N.E.2d 306).

Had claimant been stopped for a lawful traffic check, the Court would agree with the State's contention that Trooper Ackley had probable cause and therefore the arrest was privileged. While there is some authority that failure to exhibit a license on request creates a presumption of illegal operation which alone may suffice as probable cause (cf. Burden v. City of Niagara Falls, 44 A.D.2d 754, 354 N.Y.S.2d 42), certainly when the results of the computer validation check of claimant's license were reported to Trooper Ackley he could reasonably have believed that claimant was driving in violation of section 511 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The fact that the arresting trooper relied on an erroneous computer report would not alter this result (cf. Romano v. State of New York (Court of Claims, SILVERMAN, J., May 8, 1979); Infurno v. State of New York (Court of Claims, ORLANDO, J., May 3, 1978)).

Nonetheless, the question remains whether the arrest of claimant was privileged when the initial stop of the vehicle for a traffic check was constitutionally impermissible. In 1975, the Court of Appeals in People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 330 N.E.2d 39, clarified the circumstances under which police officers may stop a motor vehicle on a public highway: "an arbitrary stop of a single automobile for a purportedly 'routine traffic check' is impermissible unless the police officer reasonably suspects a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law." (p. 419, 369 N.Y.S.2d p. 74, 330 N.E.2d p. 43) (emphasis supplied) "(M)ere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity" (p. 420, 369 N.Y.S.2d p. 74, 330 N.E.2d p. 44) is not enough.

In Ingle, the defendant was observed driving a 1949 Ford in excellent condition, which apparently caught the eye of a State Trooper. Although he had no information concerning the defendant or the car, the trooper decided to make what he described as a " 'routine traffic check' " (p. 415, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 330 N.E.2d 39). Following the stop, marijuana was discovered in the car. In holding that the defendant's conviction should be vacated and the evidence suppressed, the Court of Appeals stated that the stop was an "illegal seizure of defendant's automobile and the evidence obtained by that seizure may not be used as evidence against him." ( p. 421, 369 N.Y.S.2d p. 75, 330 N.E.2d p. 44).

Like the State Trooper in Ingle, Trooper Ackley had no information concerning claimant or his vehicle. Trooper Ackley testified that he was "curi...