Blankenship v. Douglas

• Decision Date: 01 January 1862
• Citation: 26 Tex. 225
• Parties: DAVID BLANKENSHIP v. WILLIAM E. DOUGLAS AND ANOTHER.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

26 Tex. 225

DAVID BLANKENSHIP

v.WILLIAM E. DOUGLAS AND ANOTHER.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1862.

It seems to be well settled that a judgment lien on the land of a debtor is subject to every equity which existed against the land in the hands of the judgment debtor at the time of the rendition of the judgment; and that courts of equity will protect such equities against the legal lien, and will limit that lien to the actual interest which the judgment debtor has in the estate.

The above doctrine is qualified by the registration laws of particular states, prescribing the effect of unrecorded conveyances and mortgages upon the rights of purchasers and creditors.

A resulting trust is beyond the contemplation of our statute of registration respecting the rights of creditors, and will be protected against the legal lien of a judgment creditor or his assignees, although they had no notice of the trust; as they are not in this respect entitled to the preferences over prior equities accorded to bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration without notice.

A purchaser at sheriff's sale under execution, who, at the time of the sale, had notice of outstanding equities which existed against the property at the time the judgment was rendered, takes the property subject to such equities and acquires only such rights as the defendant in execution possessed. The opinion is intimated but not authoritatively expressed, that a purchaser at sheriff's sale under execution, without either actual or constructive notice of an unregistered deed or subsisting equity outstanding against the property, would take the property discharged of all claims arising under such deed or equity.

The court is not bound to give an instruction where the effect of it would be to cause the jury to attach too great importance to evidence too meagre to sustain a verdict upon the principle involved in the instruction.

Possession, to be equivalent to registration, or in other words to amount to actual notice or reasonable information of the claim of the party in possession, must be open and visible, or at the least, must not be of such a character as is calculated to deceive the public.

APPEAL from McLennan. Tried below before the Hon. John Gregg.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

McCall & Alexander, and R. N. Goode, for appellant.

M. D. Herring, for appellees.

BELL, J.

This suit was instituted by the appellees to recover from the appellant and others a certain lot of ground, with the improvements thereon, in the town of Waco.

It appears from the transcript of the record that at the fall term, A. D. 1856, of the district court for McLennan county, one James H. Mullins recovered a judgment for the sum of three hundred and twenty-seven dollars and fifty cents, besides interest and costs, against John J. Blankenship, who was a defendant in this present suit, in the court below. Execution issued on this judgment on the 15th day of December, A. D. 1856; which execution was levied on the lot in controversy on the 13th day of January, A. D. 1857, and the lot was sold on the 3d day of March, A. D. 1857, when Mullins became the purchaser. The appellees, Douglas and Herring, purchased from Mullins in the month of September, A. D. 1857. It also appears that John J. Blankenship executed a deed for the lot in controversy to David Blankenship, the appellant, on the 7th day of November, A. D. 1856, which appears to have been previous to the rendition of the judgment in favor of Mullins against John J. Blankenship.

This deed, from J. J. Blankenship to the appellant, was proven for registration by one of the subscribing witnesses, on the 7th day of January, A. D. 1857 (which was previous to the levy of Mullins' execution), and was recorded on the 16th of January, A. D. 1857. It is also shown that the lot of land in question was conveyed to John J. Blankenship by one J. W. McCown on the 12th day of March, A. D. 1856; and there was some evidence to the effect that the lot and the improvements thereon were purchased from McCown by John J. Blankenship for the appellant, David Blankenship, with the property and funds of David Blankenship, although the deed from McCown was executed to John J. Blankenship. The building upon the lot in controversy was occupied by John J. Blankenship for the usual purposes of merchandising, until about the time of the rendition of the judgment in favor of Mullins, when he sold his stock of goods to another person; and there was some slight evidence of acts of ownership over the property by the appellant while it was in the possession of John J. Blankenship. This evidence was introduced, of course, for the purpose of showing a possession by David Blankenship, which would amount to “reasonable information” to Mullins of his (David Blankenship's) claim to the property.

In this aspect of the case, the judge below instructed the jury as follows: “If you believe from the testimony that the judgment rendered in favor of Mullins against John J. Blankenship was rendered before the deed from John J. Blankenship to David Blankenship was recorded, the judgment was a lien on the land in...