Blankenship v. Watson

Decision Date13 July 1984
Citation672 S.W.2d 941
PartiesRaymond Douglas BLANKENSHIP, Administrator of the Estate of Nicky Junior Blankenship; Raymond Douglas Blankenship, Individually, and Daisy Louise Blankenship, Appellants, v. Charles A. WATSON and Jeff Watson, Appellees.
CourtKentucky Court of Appeals

David E. Arvin, Hopkinsville, for appellants.

Wendell H. Rorie, Hopkinsville, for appellees.

Before HAYES, C.J., and COMBS and GUDGEL, JJ.

COMBS, Judge.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment of the Caldwell Circuit Court dismissing appellants' complaint for damages for the wrongful death of their seventeen year old son, Nicky Blankenship. Nicky was employed by appellees as a farm laborer. On October 8, 1980, at the direction of appellees, Nicky drove one of their large grain trucks to a grain elevator at Henderson. Though Nicky had driven similar trucks from the fields to the bins, he had very little experience in driving the heavily loaded grain trucks on the roads of Webster and Caldwell counties.

On the morning of the 8th, Nicky was driving a loaded truck on Kentucky 132 in Webster County. The truck ran off the shoulder of the road, wrecked and burned. Nicky was trapped inside the vehicle and burned to death. The father qualified as the personal representative and instituted this action on behalf of the estate. Pursuant to KRS 411.130, he sought to recover $250,000 from appellees for the destruction of his son's earning power. Pursuant to KRS 411.133, he sought an additional $100,000 for the pain and suffering endured by his son prior to death. Additionally, both the father and the mother, Daisy Louise Blankenship, sought an additional $25,000 for the loss of the affection and companionship of their son, pursuant to KRS 411.135.

As a basis of their negligence claim, the appellants asserted that appellees failed to instruct the decedent in the safe and proper operation of the loaded farm truck in permitting him to drive upon the public highways without ascertaining his qualifications and experience for such an undertaking, that the truck was overloaded and that the grain bed of the truck was too long, that the size of the bed as well as the overload made the vehicle rather dangerous for an inexperienced driver, particularly over strange and unfamiliar roads.

By way of answer, the appellees denied any negligence on their part, plead the contributory negligence of the decedent as well as his sole negligence, and unavoidable accident.

It appears from the evidence that Nicky and his older brother had never been over this route before, but had made one trip earlier that morning. The record is not clear as to whether their first trip was on Kentucky 132, the road on which Nicky's fatal accident occurred. Nicky had left prior to his older brother to make the second trip, and his brother did not travel on Route 132. It could be argued that Nicky had gotten lost and went on a different route the second trip than he did on the first trip.

According to the evidence, the shoulder of Kentucky Route 132 at and near the accident site was narrow and extremely hazardous. While passing an oncoming vehicle, the tires on the right side of the truck went off the road causing the fatal accident. This tragic accident occurred in Webster County, where the suit was originally filed.

On October 17, 1981, appellees filed a motion for change of venue requesting the case to be transferred from Webster County to Caldwell County because it would be a more convenient forum to the parties, their witnesses and counsel.

On November 19, 1981 the Judge of the Webster Circuit Court, entered an order changing the venue from Webster County to Caldwell County, because "it would provide a more convenient forum for the parties, the witnesses and the attorneys."

Appellants' counsel objected to the transfer and thereafter sought unsuccessfully to set aside the order of transfer.

Discovery depositions were taken by the parties. At that time, it was developed that appellants had filed a claim before the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Board of Claims against the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Highways, seeking damages for their son's death. The Board awarded them damages in the sum of $50,000, its limit. The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Highways, appealed to the Webster Circuit Court, where the Board's award was affirmed. The case was finally settled for a total sum of $40,000 in May of 1983.

Though knowing of the settlement, appellees failed to plead it affirmatively as is required by CR 8.03. Instead, they used it as a basis for their motion for summary judgment. The Caldwell Circuit Court, relying upon the case of Bach v. Bach, Ky., 288 S.W.2d 52 (1956), sustained appellees' motion, and dismissed the complaint.

On appeal, the appellants argue that the trial court erred in changing the venue from Webster to Caldwell county, and that it also erred in granting the summary judgment dismissing their complaint. We agree and reverse.

KRS 452.030 sets forth the procedure for seeking a change. The motion must contain the reasons and grounds therefor. It requires that the Court shall have a hearing for the presentation of evidence and arguments for and against the motion. KRS 452.050 deals with the order providing a change. Once the court has determined from the motion and the evidence that a change is required, then it is to consider the matter of convenience of the parties, the witnesses and attorneys. Even this statute prohibits the court from doing so if there has been a valid objection, such as was interposed here. The order granting the change simply provided, "because it would provide a more convenient forum for the parties, the witnesses and the attorneys ..."

Venue is purely a legislative matter and the Legislature has very plainly and succinctly spoken by enacting KRS 452.010. Appellees' motion is completely void of any grounds...

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5 cases
  • CUNNINGHAM v. ABBOTT
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • February 4, 2011
    ...was the main issue set forth. It is well-settled that convenience is insufficient to justify a change of venue. See Blankenship v. Watson, 672 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. App. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Dept. of Educ. v. Blevins, 707 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1986). Further, counsel indicated at a hear......
  • Department of Educ. v. Blevins
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • April 10, 1986
    ...Deutsch v. Shein, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 141 (1980). Appellants cite certain dicta from the Court of Appeals' decision in Blankenship v. Watson, Ky.App., 672 S.W.2d 941 (1984), which appear to characterize an award of damages to parents for loss of affection and companionship of an infant son as a......
  • Ridgeway Nursing & Rehab. Facility, LLC v. Collins
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • May 5, 2017
    ...to support a change in venue. The procedure governing a change in venue is governed by KRS 452.030. Unlike in Blankenship v. Watson, 672 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Ky. App. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Dep't of Educ. v. Blevins, 707 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1986), Hilltop does not argue that the motio......
  • Copass v. Monroe County Medical Foundation, Inc., 94-CA-1577-MR
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • June 30, 1995
    ...At the outset, we note that venue is purely a legislative matter, and the judiciary may not rewrite the statutes. Blankenship v. Watson, Ky.App., 672 S.W.2d 941, 944 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, Dept. of Educ. v. Blevins, Ky., 707 S.W.2d 782, 785 The Copasses ask this Court to harmonize ......
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