Blanton v. Housing Authority of City of Norman
| Decision Date | 17 April 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 65963,65963 |
| Citation | 794 P.2d 412,1990 OK 38 |
| Parties | 5 IER Cases 703, 1990 OK 38 Duane H. BLANTON, Appellee, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF NORMAN, A Municipal Authority, Appellant. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court of Cleveland County; Preston Trimble, District Judge.
Former employee of Housing Authority of the City of Norman brought suit for wrongful discharge from employment. Judgment was entered on a general jury verdict in favor of employee. Employee was also awarded attorney fees by the trial court. The Authority appeals from this judgment.
REVERSED.
William P. Bleakley, Linda Maria Meoli, Groves, Bleakley & Tague, Oklahoma City, for appellant.
Terry Guy Shipley, Noble, for appellee.
This is an appeal by the Housing Authority of the City of Norman, hereinafter "Authority", from the District Court of Cleveland County, Oklahoma. Duane H. Blanton, hereinafter "Blanton", brought suit against the Authority for an alleged wrongful discharge from employment. Judgment was entered for Blanton following a jury verdict in his favor. Blanton was awarded $75,000.00 in actual damages and $44,449.00 for attorney fees. The Authority appeals from this judgment.
The function of the Authority is to set policy with respect to the public housing under its jurisdiction. Blanton was hired as the executive director in September of 1981, to administer this policy. He fulfilled this function by performing certain duties, which included hiring and supervising employees, overseeing the operations of Authority projects and reporting the business of the Authority to its Board of Commissioners, hereinafter "Board".
On March 18, 1985, the Board voted to fire Blanton. Blanton alleges his dismissal was without notice and due to malice and ill-will on the part of certain members of the Board. Blanton claims the Authority had agreed that his employment would continue as long as his performance was satisfactory, and that both parties foresaw a long and continuing relationship. Blanton contends the agreement gave him a significant property interest in continued employment and therefore his wrongful termination deprived him of vested property rights without due process of law. In his second cause of action Blanton alleges the firing breached a covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied by law in his contract of employment. A third cause of action against one of the commissioners for defamation was dismissed before trial.
On appeal, the Authority argues it was error for the trial court to overrule its motions at the close of all evidence and to instruct the jury on the issue of good faith and fair dealing. The Authority's specific arguments are threefold: First, the Authority contends that Blanton possessed no interest in continued employment. Second, it contends that because Blanton did not assert a liberty interest issue in either the petition or pre-trial statement, the court should not have considered the issue. Finally, the Authority argues the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Authority further alleges the damages awarded to Blanton for future earnings were contrary to law and the award of attorney fees to Blanton was erroneous.
The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of life, liberty and property. 1 When protected rights are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount. 2 However, the range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite. 3 Property rights are not created by the Constitution, but by independent sources, such as state laws, which also define their dimensions. 4 The commissioners themselves have a three-year property right in their positions pursuant to 63 O.S.1981, § 1058(A). 5 However, while 63 O.S.1981, § 1058(D) allows the Authority to employ an executive director, there is no statute which grants a property interest to the executive director. 6
The commissioners can only be removed for cause and are entitled to a post-termination hearing under 63 O.A.1981, § 1060. 7 Blanton claims he is entitled to the same treatment. At trial Blanton relied on Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 8 which says once a state has conferred an expected interest in an employee through its civil service system, then such an employee can only be fired for cause, and is entitled to due process. 9 Blanton argues because he was told that his employment would continue for as long as his work was satisfactory, a contract was created which implied he could only be fired for just cause and because of this he was entitled to due process.
The Authority claims to have had just cause to fire Blanton, but argues that such an assertion does not act as an admission that they could not fire him without just cause. The Authority further denies the existence of a "just cause only" term in Blanton's employment contract.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Asbill v. Housing Authority of the Choctaw Nation. 10 The court held that if a policy restricts the reasons for discharge of an employee to just cause shown, then the employee has a right to employment until such cause is shown. 11 Blanton attempted to prove there was such a policy from the language of his employment agreement stating he was to continue as directed so long as his work was satisfactory. This contention must fail.
The Asbill court held that unless the employee could prove substantive restrictions on the employing authority's power to discharge her, the employment must be considered to have been terminable at will. 12 Blanton simply has not offered sufficient evidence of a substantive restriction on the Authority's power to discharge him. The only evidence offered by Blanton is his statement about the discussions between him and Board at the time he was hired. Blanton's argument centers around his testimony under direct examination at trial, wherein he states, "as long as my work was satisfactory, why, I would hope to retire from that position." Blanton went on to say that the Board expressed agreement with that view. However, we feel it is clear that discussions which may have occurred at Blanton's interview, without more, cannot be viewed as creating a substantive restriction on the Authority's power to dismiss him.
Absent evidence of a substantive restriction on the Board's power to dismiss Blanton or any statute conferring upon him a property right in continued employment, we hold Blanton's employment contract was terminable at will. As a result, Blanton possessed no constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment and it was error for the trial court to submit the claim to the jury.
The Authority's second proposition of error is that the jury was erroneously instructed on a liberty interest issue which was not asserted in Blanton's petition or pre-trial statement. The Authority contends that property and liberty interests are separate rights which must be pled individually. Because Blanton pled only a deprivation of a property interest, the Authority argues it was without notice to defend the liberty interest issue and it was wrong for the trial court to instruct the jury on the issue under the "umbrella of due process".
The Authority cites the Oklahoma Pleading Code, at 12 O.S.1984, § 2015(B) which governs the procedure to be used when issues are brought up at trial for the first time, and states in pertinent part:
If evidence is objected to at trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings or pre-trial conference order, the court may allow the pleadings or the pre-trial conference order to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be served thereby....
Blanton did not seek to amend his petition or pre-trial statement, but instead argued to the trial court that each interest need not be pled specifically because life, liberty and property interests are included when an allegation of a violation of due process is made. We must agree with this conclusion. Here, the petition filed by Blanton alleges facts which, if proven, would be sufficient to show a violation of his constitutionally protected liberty interest.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents any state from depriving any person of life, liberty and property without "due process" of law. 13 The clause is not capable of technical conception, and cannot be transformed into a fixed formula for strict application by the courts. 14 The interests protected interrelate to form one concept whose definition varies with every situation. Therefore, a plaintiff who pleads a due process violation is not required to plead, individually, the specific protections of life, liberty or property afforded by the due process clause.
The question now becomes what is the nature of such a violation and what kind and degree of evidence is necessary to withstand a motion for directed verdict.
This Court, like the Supreme Court of the United States, recognizes that an employee has a legitimate interest to seek other employment without being unfairly deprived of the liberty to do so. 15 Such an unfair infringement of an employee's liberty interest occurs when the circumstances of his or her discharge result in the publication of information which is false and stigmatizing, and which has the effect of curtailing the employee's future freedom of choice or action. 16
Having found Blanton's pleadings were sufficient to allow the introduction of evidence as to the alleged deprivation of his liberty interest in seeking future employment we must now decide whether that evidence supported the trial court's decision to overrule the Authority's motion for a directed verdict on this issue.
A ...
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...on the employer's power to discharge, the employment must be considered to be terminable at will." Id. (citing Blanton v. Housing Auth., 794 P.2d 412, 415 (Okla.1990)). Vice v. Conoco, Inc., 150 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir.1998). In light of this written agreement, signed by both parties, and after......
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...McLin v. Trimble, Okl., 795 P.2d 1035, 1047 n. 17 (1990) (Opala, V.C.J., dissenting); Blanton v. Housing Authority, Okl., 794 P.2d 412, 418 n. 5 (1990) (Opala, V.C.J., concurring in judgment). The voluntary deference we pay to our circuit's jurisprudence prevents federal law within the Stat......
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...are strong similarities. While the Housing Authority relies on Carnes v. Parker, 922 F.2d 1506 (10th Cir.1991), and Blanton v. Housing Authority, 1990 OK 38, 794 P.2d 412, to argue that no property right exists, Mr. Murdock also stresses that the cases do not contain an affirmative restrict......
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