Blanton v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 19 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-00811-CV-W-BP,19-00811-CV-W-BP |
| Citation | 540 F.Supp.3d 866 |
| Parties | Nathan BLANTON, Plaintiff, v. The KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Michael T. Blotevogel, Charles W. Armbruster, III, Armbruster, Dripps, Winterscheidt & Blotevogel, LLC, Maryville IL, for Plaintiff.
Sean Paul Hamer, Paula L. Brown, Scharnhorst Ast Kennard Griffin, PC, Kansas City MO, for Defendant.
ORDER AND OPINION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff has asserted various claims of negligence against Defendant, The Kansas City Southern Railway Company. Defendant seeks summary judgment on several independent grounds. The Court agrees that undisputed facts in the Record establish that Plaintiff's claims are barred by Missouri's Worker Compensation Law, ("the Act"), so the Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 54), is GRANTED on that basis.
Defendant owns the Richards-Gebaur International Freight Center ("the IFC") in Grandview, Missouri.2 A regular part of Defendant's operations at the IFC involves operating locomotives and moving and positioning rail cars. In April 2000, Defendant entered a contract with In-Terminal Services, ("ITS"). Pursuant to this contract (referred to by the parties as "the Switching Agreement"), ITS was to perform certain switching services for Defendant. "Switching services" involved switching railcars between and among tracks at the IFC. The Switching Agreement also specifically provides that ITS would arrange for Workmen's Compensation Insurance for ITS's employees providing services pursuant to the Switching Agreement. (Doc. 55-2, pp. 6-7 (Switching Agreement, ¶ 5.1(b).))
At the time relevant to this suit Plaintiff was a locomotive engineer employed by ITS, and his job duties involved switching railcars pursuant to ITS's obligations under the Switching Agreement. On October 7, 2012, Defendant's dispatcher directed Plaintiff to enter the industrial lead track at the IFC, but Plaintiff was not advised there were railcars on the track ahead of him. Unfortunately, Plaintiff was unable to stop his locomotive in time and collided with the other cars on the track and suffered injuries as a result. Plaintiff filed for worker compensation benefits with ITS's worker compensation carrier, and that claim was settled.
Plaintiff has now asserted claims of negligence against Defendant. Defendant contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff was its statutory employee under the Act and Plaintiff was covered by (and received benefits from) ITS's worker compensation insurance, so he is precluded from asserting his negligence claims. Plaintiff presents several arguments opposing summary judgment. The Court resolves the parties' arguments below.
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment on a claim only upon a showing that "there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See generally Williams v. City of St. Louis , 783 F.2d 114, 115 (8th Cir. 1986). "[W]hile the materiality determination rests on the substantive law, it is the substantive law's identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Thus, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Wierman v. Casey's Gen. Stores , 638 F.3d 984, 993 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). In applying this standard, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, giving that party the benefit of all inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Tyler v. Harper , 744 F.2d 653, 655 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied , 470 U.S. 1057, 105 S.Ct. 1767, 84 L.Ed.2d 828 (1985). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not simply deny the allegations, but must point to evidence in the Record demonstrating the existence of a factual dispute. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1) ; Conseco Life Ins. Co. v. Williams , 620 F.3d 902, 909-10 (8th Cir. 2010).
The Act provides the exclusive remedy employees may assert against employers for injuries suffered on the job. E.g. , MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120.2 ; Missouri Alliance for Retired Americans v. Department of Labor & Indus. Relations , 277 S.W.3d 670, 679 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). It applies to all such instances "except those exclusively covered by any federal law." MO. REV. STAT. § 287.110.1. The term "employer" includes any person or entity "using the service of another for pay" and specifically includes any person, corporation or entity "operating a railroad...." Id. § 287.030(1).
To prevent an employer from circumventing the Act by employing only independent contractors, the Act provides that so-called "statutory employers" are deemed to be employers. Id. § 287.040.1.3 Statutory employment exists when three elements are met: (1) the work is performed pursuant to a contract; (2) the injury occurs on or about the premises of the alleged statutory employer; and (3) the work is in the usual course of business of the alleged statutory employer. Tullman v. St. Louis Sci. Ctr. Found. , 34 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 287.040.1 ). Based on the uncontroverted facts in the Record, Plaintiff was Defendant's statutory employee: Plaintiff was performing work pursuant to a contract between ITS and Defendant,4 the injury occurred on Defendant's premises, and the work was performed as part of the usual course of Defendant's business.
Ordinarily, a statutory employee may assert a worker compensation claim against the statutory employer, e.g., Fisher v. Bauer Corp. , 239 S.W.3d 693, 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007), but the statutory employee cannot assert other claims (including common law claims) against the statutory employer. The statutory employee's options can be further limited if he has (as Plaintiff does in this case) a more direct, or immediate, employer. Here, ITS was Plaintiff's immediate employer, and a statutory employer such as Defendant shall not be liable "if the employee was insured by his immediate or any intermediate employer." MO. REV. STAT. § 287.040.3. And as stated earlier, Plaintiff received worker compensation benefits from ITS's insurer, which is significant because "[t]he liability of the immediate employer shall be primary, and that of the others secondary in their order, and any compensation paid by those secondarily liable may be recovered from those primarily liable, with attorney's fees and expenses of the suit." Id. § 287.040.3 ; see also Anderson v. Steurer , 391 S.W.2d 839, 844-45 (Mo. 1965) (); Thornsberry v. Thornsberry Investments, Inc. , 295 S.W.3d 583, 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) ().
Thus, § 287.040.3 establishes that (1) the immediate employer's liability is primary and the statutory employer's liability is secondary and (2) a claim cannot be asserted against the statutory employer if the immediate employer has insurance. Plaintiff does not seriously dispute this characterization of the law but contends that he is still permitted to assert common law claims against Defendant.
Plaintiff first argues that the Act permits him to assert negligence claims against Defendant despite § 287.040.3's provisions because Defendant did not have worker compensation insurance.5 He relies on § 287.280.1, which requires every employer "on either an individual or group basis" to insure its liability. That section further provides that if an "employer or group of employers fail to comply with" this requirement, an employee may (1) file a civil suit (in which case the employer loses the Act's protection from common law claims), (2) pursue a worker compensation claim, or (3) file a request for payment from the Second Injury Fund. But the context of this case, § 287.040.3 – and its specification of when claims against statutory employers are barred – controls.
When a federal court is required to ascertain the content of state law, decisions from the state's highest court are binding; decisions from intermediate appellate courts are "persuasive authority" but are not binding. E.g., Brown v. CRST Malone, Inc. , 739 F.3d 384, 390 (8th Cir. 2014) ; United Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Garvey , 328 F.3d 411, 413 (8th Cir. 2003). And, the Court finds the Missouri Court of Appeals' decision in Augur v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. , 154 S.W.3d 510 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005), to be persuasive.6 In that case the plaintiff was employed by Freight Consolidation Services, Inc., ("FCS"), and was a statutory employee of Norfolk Southern Railway. The plaintiff was injured on the job and received benefits from FCS's worker compensation carrier, then filed suit against Norfolk Southern. Augur , 154 S.W.3d at 512. Norfolk Southern argued the case had to be dismissed because the claims were barred by the Act, and the plaintiff argued that Norfolk Southern was not an employer subject to the Act because claims against railroads are preempted by the Federal Employer's Liability Act, ("FELA"), so Norfolk Southern could not claim the Act's immunity from common law claims. Id. at 514-15. The Missouri Court of Appeals disagreed with the plaintiff and held that (1) if the plaintiff's claims were covered by FELA they had to be...
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