Blazek v. North American Life & Casualty Co.

• Decision Date: 19 April 1963
• Docket Number: No. 38709,38709
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: , 99 A.L.R.2d 445 Richard A. BLAZEK, Respondent, Conrad J. Carr, attorney for plaintiff, Appellant, v. NORTH AMERICAN LIFE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Respondent.

Page 339

121 N.W.2d 339

265 Minn. 236, 99 A.L.R.2d 445

Richard A. BLAZEK, Respondent, Conrad J. Carr, attorney for plaintiff, Appellant, v. NORTH AMERICAN LIFE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Respondent.

No. 38709.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 19, 1963.

Syllabus by the Court

The satisfaction of a judgment establishing the right of an insured to receive health and accident benefits as long as he remains disabled, and the subsequent discharge of his attorney, do not foreclose the attorney's right to assert under Minn.St. 481.13(3) a charging lien on monthly payments thereafter accruing, if the contract of retainer contemplates the payment of his fees out of such installments.

Conrad J. Carr, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Jerome V. Blatz, Stuart E. Gale, Johnson & Sands and Maurice C. Lizee, Minneapolis, for respondent.

OTIS, Justice.

Proceedings by appellant-intervenor to impress an attorney's lien on funds payable by defendant-insurer to plaintiff Blazek.

On October 6, 1952, defendant issued plaintiff an accident and health policy which entitled the insured to receive $200 a month during such time as he might be disabled from gainful employment. Plaintiff thereafter asserted a claim for injuries which he alleged incapacitated him on January 14, 1953. Defendant resisted the claim, and the matter was litigated by intervenor in Hennepin County District Court, resulting in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $7,017.95. Defendant appealed to the supreme court and on December 6, 1957, the judgment was affirmed. ¹ Intervenor was paid as a part of his attorney's fees one-third of the amount of the judgment, and for some time thereafter one-third of the $200 plaintiff received each month from defendant on periodic proof of continuing disability. On intervenor's motion, the district court in November 1960 ordered defendant to make the disability checks payable to both plaintiff and intervenor to secure the lien for attorney's fees which intervenor had earned in the litigation. Plaintiff and defendant made motions to vacate, which were granted on January 31, 1962. From that order intervenor appeals. The only issue is whether intervenor continues to have an attorney's lien on monthly payments due plaintiff during his disability.

Plaintiff and defendant have made independent appearances. The essence of their position is (1) that the original adjudication resulted in only a money judgment, and it having been fully satisfied there is now no longer any proceeding on which to impress a lien; (2) that the original agreement for fees did not contemplate payment out of monthly disability compensation; (3) that continuing monthly payments are contingent on factors not adjudicated; (4) that plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial on the issue of intervenor's lien; (5) that there is no showing of an equitable assignment of any part of plaintiff's interest in the contract; (6) that plaintiff has discharged intervenor and has thereby terminated his obligation to pay further attorney's fees; (7) that intervenor is entitled to no further compensation without rendering additional services; and (8) that the agreement for attorney's fees is ambiguous, and plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial on that issue also.

The contract entered by plaintiff and intervenor on August 11, 1954, obligated plaintiff to pay intervenor 'or his heirs One-third (1/3) of all proceeds collected from the North American Life and Casualty Company during the life of the (said) Richard A. Blazek, as a result of any proceedings taken by the said Conrad J. Carr under Part A. subd. (1) of the policy above mentioned.'

The statute which intervenor invokes is Minn.St. 481.13, which provides in part:

'An attorney has a lien for his compensation whether the agreement therefor be expressed or implied:

'(3) Upon the cause of action from the time of the service of the summons therein, or the commencement of the proceeding, And upon the interest of his client in any money or property involved in or affected by any action or proceeding in which he may have been employed, from the commencement of the action or proceeding, and, as against third parties, from the time of filing the notice of such lien claim, as provided in this section.' (Italics supplied.)

The statute further provides that the lien may be established and the amount determined by the court, summarily, in the original action on the application of the lien claimant. § 481.13(6).

The trial court in its memorandum correctly pointed out that there was before it no issue concerning the construction of the agreement for attorney's fees, but noted parenthetically that it questioned the propriety of requiring the payment of further fees after the satisfaction of the judgment. We also decline to adjudicate the validity of the agreement without having the issue properly raised. Unless and until the matter is before us, our decision is confined to an application of the agreement to the presently undisputed facts.

We find untenable the contention of plaintiff and defendant that the judgment which Mr. Carr secured for Mr. Blazek decided nothing except the amount to which plaintiff was entitled at the time of verdict. While it is true that proof of continuing disability is a prerequisite to future payments, the issues laid to rest by intervenor's efforts may not be lightly disregarded. In response to plaintiff's original complaint, defendant interposed an answer asserting the following defenses: (1) That the company received no notice within the time required by the policy; (2) that plaintiff was not disabled within 60 days of the accident; (3) that plaintiff was not under medical treatment as required by the policy; (4) that the period of disability did not continue under any circumstances beyond February 24, 1954; (5) that the policy was terminated by mutual agreement; and (6) that the plaintiff's application contained false and untrue answers concerning prior injuries.

The trial of plaintiff's action against defendant began April 9, 1956, and continued until April 17, 1956, when a verdict for the full amount of plaintiff's claim up to that date was rendered. The prayer in plaintiff's original complaint sought an adjudication that plaintiff was entitled to $200 a month as long as he remained disabled, and implicit in the verdict was a decision granting him such relief and resolving in plaintiff's favor all of the defenses raised...