Bliley v. Kelly, 92-7112

• Citation: 23 F.3d 507
• Decision Date: 20 May 1994
• Docket Number: No. 92-7112,92-7112
• Parties: Hon. Thomas J. BLILEY, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. Sharon Pratt KELLY, Mayor of the District of Columbia, et al.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)

Page 507

23 F.3d 507

306 U.S.App.D.C. 199

Hon. Thomas J. BLILEY, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. Sharon Pratt KELLY, Mayor of the District of Columbia, et al.

No. 92-7112.

United States Court of Appeals,

District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Nov. 9, 1993.

Decided May 20, 1994.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.D.C. No. 92cv00422).

Terence P. Ross, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Theodore B. Olson and Jerry S. Fowler, Jr.

Lutz Alexander Prager, Asst. Deputy Corp. Counsel for the District of Columbia, argued the cause for appellee the District of Columbia. With him on the brief were John Payton, Corp. Counsel for the District of Columbia, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel.

Frederick W. Schwartz, Jr., argued the cause for appellee Committee for Strict Liability.

Before WALD, BUCKLEY, and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge:

The Home Rule Act allows Congress thirty statutory days to review legislation enacted by the Council of the District of Columbia. In December 1990, the Council enacted legislation that would impose strict liability on the manufacturers, dealers, and importers of any assault weapon that caused a bodily injury or death in the District. The legislation was presented to Congress for its review in January 1991; but before the statutory thirty-day review period had elapsed, the Council initiated repeal measures that were ultimately frustrated by a referendum vote. The question presented to us is whether the congressional review period was suspended as a result of the Council's action. We hold that it was. But because Congress failed to disapprove the legislation within thirty statutory days following the expiration of a temporary "repeal" measure, we conclude that the District's strict liability legislation is now law.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Legal Framework

Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the Constitution empowers Congress to "exercise exclusive Legislation" over the District of Columbia. In 1973, Congress delegated the bulk of this authority to the District by passing the Home Rule Act, Pub.L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified as amended at D.C.Code Secs. 1-201 et seq.). This delegation is subject to specific limitations and reservations, two of which are here relevant: Congress retains the authority to enact "legislation for the District on any subject ... including legislation to amend or repeal any law in force in the District ... and any act passed by the [District of Columbia] Council." D.C.Code Sec. 1-206. It has also reserved the right to veto legislation enacted by the District in accordance with the following procedure:

[T]he Chairman of the Council shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President of the Senate, a copy of each act passed by the Council and signed by the Mayor.... [S]uch act shall take effect upon the expiration of the 30-calendar-day period (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, and any day on which neither House is in session because of an adjournment sine die, a recess of more than 3 days, or an adjournment of more than 3 days) beginning on the day such act is transmitted by the Chairman to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, or upon the date prescribed by such act, whichever is later, unless during such 30-day period, there has been enacted into law a joint resolution disapproving such act.

Id. Sec. 1-233(c)(1).

In sum, the Home Rule Act allows Congress a layover period of thirty statutory days to review legislation submitted by the D.C. Council. If Congress fails to pass a joint resolution of disapproval within that period, the legislation becomes law. The Home Rule Act contains two express exceptions to this provision. First, emergency legislation enacted by the Council need not be presented for congressional review. Id. Sec. 1-229(a). Such legislation, however, expires no more than ninety days after its enactment. Id. Second, should an act that is awaiting congressional review become the subject of a petition for a voter referendum, it must be returned to the Council pending the outcome of the referendum. Id. Sec. 1-282(b)(1).

B. Facts

In December 1990, the D.C. Council passed, and the Mayor signed, the Assault Weapon Manufacturing Strict Liability Act of 1990 ("Liability Act"). D.C. Act 8-289, 37 D.C.Reg. 8482 (1990). This legislation would render manufacturers, dealers, and importers of assault weapons strictly liable for all bodily injuries and deaths that resulted from the firing of such weapons. On January 11, 1991, the Chairman of the D.C. Council transmitted the Liability Act to Congress for review. Under the terms of the Home Rule Act, Congress had until March 6, 1991--thirty statutory days--to consider the legislation.

The Liability Act met with immediate opposition in Congress; and on January 18, 1991, Congressman Thomas J. Bliley, ranking minority member of the House Committee on the District of Columbia, introduced a resolution of disapproval in the House of Representatives. Shortly thereafter, District leaders, who were seeking additional funding, entered into negotiations with Congress in which a political understanding was reached: "Congress gave assurances that funds would be appropriated for the District if the Liability Act was repealed. The District officials were agreeable." Bliley v. Kelly, 793 F.Supp. 353, 354 (D.D.C.1992).

Pursuant to this agreement, on February 5, 1991, the D.C. Council enacted the first of three acts that were designed to carry out the District's side of the bargain in a manner consistent with its legislative procedures. See Atkinson v. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 597 A.2d 863, 864 n. 3 & 865 n. 5 (D.C.1991). Three days later, on February 8, Congressman Bliley asked the House Committee to suspend consideration of his resolution.

The first of these acts was styled the "Assault Weapon Manufacturing Strict Liability Act of 1990 Emergency Repealer Act of 1991" ("Emergency Repealer"), D.C. Act 9-1, 38 D.C.Reg. 1457 (1991). Because it was an emergency measure, it could remain in effect for no longer than ninety days and was exempt from congressional review. See D.C.Code Sec. 1-229(a). On March 15, the Council passed the second act, which "repeal[ed the Strict Liability Act] on a temporary basis." See D.C. Act 9-8, 38 D.C.Reg. 1962 (1991) ("Temporary Repealer"). The Temporary Repealer was subject to the thirty-day congressional review period and, on its terms, was to "expire on the 225th day of its having taken effect, or upon the effective date of the [yet-to-be-enacted] Assault Weapon Manufacturing Strict Liability Act of 1990 Repealer Act of 1991, whichever occurs first." Id. at 1963. Consequently, the Liability Act remained in a statutory limbo after the Emergency Repealer's ninety-day period had expired.

Finally, on May 17, 1991, the Council enacted the "Assault Weapon Manufacturing Strict Liability Act of 1990 Repealer Act of 1991," D.C. Act 9-32, 38 D.C.Reg. 3380 (1991) ("Permanent Repealer"); and on May 23, the Chairman of the Council duly submitted the Permanent Repealer to Congress for review. Five days later, on May 28, a proposed referendum measure was submitted to the District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics. The Board designated it as "Referendum Measure No. 006" and titled it "Referendum on the Assault Weapon Manufacturing Strict Liability Act Repealer Act of 1991." The petition in support of the referendum was filed with the Board on July 12, before the congressional review period for the Permanent Repealer had expired. Upon being advised of the referendum petition, Congress returned the measure to the Council, as required by the Home Rule Act. D.C.Code Sec. 1-282(b)(1). On November 5, 1991, the District's electors voted to reject the Permanent Repealer. The Temporary Repealer, however, remained in effect until December 25, 1991--the 225th day following its adoption.

Congressman Bliley and three other members of the House of Representatives brought this action on February 19, 1992, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2201 and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Up to that time, Congress had taken no action with respect to the Liability Act. The specific purpose of their suit was to secure a judgment requiring the Council to resubmit the Act to Congress and declaring that the Act had not taken effect and could not take effect until it had been resubmitted for review pursuant to section 1-233(c)(1). See Amended Complaint at 12-13. They argue that the adoption of the Emergency and Temporary Repealers had removed the Liability Act from congressional consideration, thereby requiring a new submission. The district court disagreed; and because it concluded that the Act had taken effect in March 1991 on the expiration of the statutory review period initiated by the Act's transmission to Congress, it granted the District's motion to dismiss appellants' claim. Bliley v. Kelly, 793 F.Supp. 353 (D.D.C.1992). We review this decision de novo. Danielsen v. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., 941 F.2d 1220, 1230 (D.C.Cir.1991).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

The District begins its defense by raising two jurisdictional arguments. It first urges that the district court abused its discretion by hearing this suit. It maintains that under the doctrine of equitable discretion, the court should have dismissed the Congressmen's claim. This argument stems from our decisions in Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C.Cir.1987), and Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C.Cir.1981). We stated in Melcher that "if a legislator could obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators through the legislative process itself, then it is an abuse of discretion for a court to entertain the legislator's action." 836 F.2d at 565 (footnote omitted); see also Riegle, 656 F.2d at 881. The...