Blizzard v. Doe

• Decision Date: 27 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 39774.,39774.
• Citation: 322 P.3d 286,156 Idaho 204
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Janice BLIZZARD, individually and as parent and legal guardian of Colton Blizzard, a minor child; and Tina M. Sarro, Special Administrator of the Estate of Richard Max Blizzard, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. John Paul LUNDEBY, M.D. and Jane Doe Lundeby, husband and wife and the marital community thereof, and Lake City Surgeons, PLLC, an Idaho limited liability company, Defendants–Respondents.

156 Idaho 204

322 P.3d 286

Janice BLIZZARD, individually and as parent and legal guardian of Colton Blizzard, a minor child; and Tina M. Sarro, Special Administrator of the Estate of Richard Max Blizzard, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.John Paul LUNDEBY, M.D. and Jane Doe Lundeby, husband and wife and the marital community thereof, and Lake City Surgeons, PLLC, an Idaho limited liability company, Defendants–Respondents.

No. 39774.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Coeur d'Alene, September 2013 Term.

March 27, 2014.

Winston & Cashett Lawyers, PS, Coeur d'Alene, attorneys for Appellant. Michael T. Howard argued.

Ramsden & Lyons LLP, Coeur d'Alene, attorneys for Respondents. Terrance R. Harris argued.

W. JONES, Justice.

I. Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from a district court order denying Plaintiff's Rule 59(a)(6) Motion for a New Trial in a medical malpractice lawsuit where the jury found that Defendant, Dr. Lundeby ("Dr. Lundeby"), did not breach the standard of care owed to his patient, Rick Blizzard ("Blizzard"). The district court, although finding the jury's verdict was against the clear weight of evidence, denied a motion for a new trial because it could not say the ultimate outcome would be different if a new trial were granted.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 5, 2008, Rick Blizzard went to Kootenai Medical Center for lower abdominal pain. At the time, Dr. Lundeby was on-call as the general surgeon. Dr. Lundeby performed an exploratory surgery after an endoscopy

revealed that Blizzard had a severely obstructed and distended bowel. During the exploratory surgery, Dr. Lundeby removed a portion of Blizzard's colon and created a temporary colostomy.

On June 4, 2008, Dr. Lundeby performed a colostomy

reversal, by which Blizzard's colon was intended to be reattached to his rectum via a circular stapler. This procedure was to create a colorectal anastomosis. The day after Blizzard's discharge on June 11, 2009, Blizzard complained of air and fecal material in his urine. On June 13, 2008, Dr. Lundeby performed a second exploratory surgery where he discovered that Blizzard's bladder had been stapled wrongly "through and through" into the anastomosis, creating a fistula —a passageway between two organs that normally do not connect—which was depositing fecal material into his bladder. Over the course of the next two years, Blizzard underwent eight surgical attempts by specialists to repair his bladder and bowel. Blizzard had no insurance and consequently incurred $852,213 in medical expenses.

On April 13, 2010, Blizzard filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Lundeby and Lake City Surgeons. After expending his savings and retirement, incurring a second mortgage on his home, and enduring frustrations with his condition, Blizzard took his life on July 15, 2010. Blizzard's wife, Janice Blizzard, his son, Colton Blizzard, and his sister, Tina Sarro as Special Administrator, filed an Amended Complaint.¹ The Amended Complaint continued the suit for lost wages and medical expenses under Idaho's survival statute and added a claim for wrongful death.

At a jury trial, as to the relevant standard of care, Plaintiffs offered the expert testimony of Dr. Harris who testified that a reasonable surgeon would have taken additional steps to isolate the anastomosis, sought assistance from another surgeon, or aborted the procedure. Essentially, Dr. Harris testified that the standard of care was for Dr. Lundeby to know what he was stapling before he stapled anything. On the issue of standard of care, Dr. Lundeby offered the testimony of Dr. Liu who testified that the surgery was within the standard of care "because in my 16 years of practice ... I've never seen a bladder attached to the rectum in such a fashion."

The jury was presented with two verdict forms. Special Verdict Form A, dealt with whether Dr. Lundeby negligently performed the June 4, 2008, surgery on Blizzard and whether Dr. Lundeby failed to obtain informed consent. If the jury answered "no" to both questions they were not required to proceed to questions of causation and damages.² The jury returned a verdict finding that Dr. Lundeby did not negligently perform the June 4, 2008, surgery or fail to get informed consent; and as such, they did not proceed to the issues of causation and damages. Judgment was entered on November 16, 2011.

On November 30, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for New Trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. In a decision rendered from the bench on January 31, 2012, the district court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial on the grounds that even though the jury's verdict as to whether Dr. Lundeby negligently performed the June 4, 2008, surgery was not supported by the weight of the evidence, it could not say that a new trial would produce a different result because the jury did not address causation and damages. In other words, it appears the district court could not say Plaintiffs would prevail on causation and damages even if a different jury found Dr. Lundeby negligent. Plaintiffs appeal.

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The parties dispute the standard of review that applies to a review of a district court's denial of a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs argue that the district court's decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Dr. Lundeby argues that this Court should apply a more stringent standard of review. Particularly, Dr. Lundeby maintains that the grant or denial of a motion for a new trial should be upheld unless "the court has manifestly abused the wide discretion vested in it." Dr. Lundeby argues that a manifest abuse of discretion standard should include an added element: that there "be a strong showing that the abuse of discretion was unmistakable, indisputable or self-evident."

We decline Dr. Lundeby's invitation to change the clearly established standard of review for review of a Rule 59(a)(6) motion. A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial. Burggraf v. Chaffin, 121 Idaho 171, 173, 823 P.2d 775, 777 (1991). The test for whether a trial court has abused its discretion is as follows:

(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standard applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. [ (hereinafter "Sun Valley Test") ].

Id. (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991) ); see also Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 782, 25 P.3d 88, 95 (2001).

Dr. Lundeby relies in part on Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 769, 727 P.2d 1187, 1197 (1986), for the proposition that a manifest abuse of discretion standard should apply. It is first worth noting that the Quick case involved a Rule 59(a)(5) motion for a new trial on the basis of excessive damages. Id. This Court noted that "[t]here is a qualitative difference between a trial judge's role in deciding whether a new trial is justified based on the insufficiency of the evidence under Rule 59(a)(6), and whether a new trial is justified based on the amount of the jury's award of damages under Rule 59(a)(5)." Id. at 768, 727 P.2d at 1196. Nonetheless, the abuse of discretion review actually utilized in Quick is consistent with the Sun Valley Test.³ The factors relied on by this Court in Quick are covered by the Sun Valley Test. Dr. Lundeby also points to a concurring opinion in Burggraf v. Chaffin, 121 Idaho 171, 823 P.2d 775 (1991), to support a higher standard of review. However, the majority in Burggraf clearly articulated the appropriate standard of review with respect to a motion for a new trial. Id. at 173, 823 P.2d at 777. After reviewing its decision in Quick, this Court articulated and applied the Sun Valley Test as the appropriate standard of review, which has since been consistently applied by Idaho appellate courts. Id.

V. Analysis

The district court abused its discretion when it denied Plaintiffs' Rule 59(a)(6) motion.

Following the jury's verdict on November 16, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Rule 59(a)(6) motion for a new trial. The district court ruled that the jury's verdict with respect to Dr. Lundeby's negligence was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The district court noted that the only expert who testified on behalf of Dr. Lundeby was Dr. Liu. Dr. Liu testified as follows: "Nobody has ever made the mistake of stapling a bladder to a rectum. That just doesn't happen; therefore, it's within the standard of care." The district court noted that this was the only reason offered by Dr. Liu and that his reasoning was "nonsensical." However, the district court ultimately denied Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial on the basis that it could not say that a new trial would produce a different result. Particularly, the district court noted that the jury made no determination as to causation and damages. The district court found that another jury could have found that Dr. Lundeby's negligence was not the proximate cause of Blizzard's injuries because of an issue with respect to Blizzard's comparative negligence for his drinking and lifestyle choices, which Dr. Lundeby maintains was the true cause of the fistula

.

Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred when it denied their motion for a new trial because the district court went outside the bounds of its discretion when it considered the issue of causation in its ruling. Plaintiffs argue that a court need not determine that the ultimate outcome of a case would be different; rather, a court only needs to consider whether the result, to the extent of the jury's...