Blizzard v. Quillen, Civ. A. No. 81-576 MMS.

• Decision Date: 07 February 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 81-576 MMS.
• Citation: 579 F. Supp. 1446
• Parties: Gary Edward BLIZZARD, Plaintiff, v. Captain Nelson QUILLEN, Warden John Ellingsworth, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

579 F. Supp. 1446

Gary Edward BLIZZARD, Plaintiff, v. Captain Nelson QUILLEN, Warden John Ellingsworth, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 81-576 MMS.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

February 7, 1984.

Gary Edward Blizzard, pro se.

Susan H. Kirk-Ryan, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, Del., for defendants.

OPINION

MURRAY M. SCHWARTZ, District Judge.

The Magistrate held an evidentiary hearing in this prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). He issued a Report and Recommendation proposing that judgment be rendered in favor of Warden John Ellingsworth of the Sussex Correctional Institution ("SCI") and recommending entry of judgment in the amount of $500 against a second defendant, Captain Nelson Quillen. Quillen filed objections¹ to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation. Plaintiff responded to Quillen's objections but did not object to the Magistrate's dismissal of the case against Ellingsworth.

A district court must conduct de novo review of any portion of a magistrate's report issued under section 636(b)(1)(B) to which objections have been made. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 723 F.2d 1077 at 1085 (3d Cir.1983); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If no objection is filed, the district court need only review the "face of the record" for clear error. 28 U.S.C. § 636, advisory committee note. Thus, in addressing those aspects of the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation to which defendant Quillen objected, this Court has made a de novo determination after reviewing the entire record. The Court has listened to the tape recordings of Blizzard's evidentiary hearing and has read all submissions by the parties. Based on this independent review of the evidence, the court will adopt the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation in its entirety.

A short recitation of the facts will suffice. In May, 1980, plaintiff Gary Blizzard cooperated in a Governor's Task Force investigating corruption and other problems in the Delaware Department of Correction. For protection against retaliation by other inmates, Blizzard was housed at the Kent Correctional Institution. He was later released on supervised custody. In August, 1981, however, Blizzard was reincarcerated and placed in the Delaware Correctional Center for violating a curfew rule. Through the efforts of Blizzard's mother, who was concerned for her son's safety, plaintiff was transferred to SCI. At first SCI officials housed Blizzard in the Evaluation Tier where he was isolated from other inmates. Then, on August 14, 1981, Blizzard was transferred to the C-2 tier. Blizzard alleges that he objected to this transfer because on the C-2 tier he would come into contact with other inmates.² Within hours of the transfer five inmates assaulted Blizzard, breaking a bone in his hand and producing a cut on his head that required four stitches.

The Magistrate found that Warden Ellingsworth was not personally involved in Blizzard's transfer and thus could not be liable. Defendant Quillen, on the other hand, was found responsible. The Magistrate determined that Quillen authorized Blizzard's transfer despite his knowledge of Blizzard's involvement with the Task Force and his knowledge that Blizzard had received several threats against his life in retaliation for his association with that investigation. The Magistrate further found that Quillen ordered Blizzard's transfer to the C-2 tier over Blizzard's explicit objections. Accordingly, the Magistrate held, Quillen acted in reckless disregard of Blizzard's safety and in violation of Blizzard's clearly established constitutional rights.

Defendant Quillen objects to the Magistrate's report on three grounds. First, he contends that the Magistrate incorrectly evaluated the evidence; the evidence, defendant argues, did not show that Quillen knew Blizzard was threatened because of his involvement with the Task Force or that Blizzard objected to his transfer to the C-2 tier. Second, Quillen argues that even if the Magistrate's factual findings are correct, Quillen cannot be held liable because he did not know of any threats made by the specific individuals who attacked Blizzard. Third, Quillen contends he is entitled to good faith immunity because the law was not clearly established at the time of Blizzard's transfer that prison officials were required to protect prisoners without knowledge of threats by specific inmates.

The Court disagrees with all three objections.

I. Weight of the Evidence

Defendant's first objection revolves around a question of credibility. The Magistrate assessed the testimony as follows:

Turning to defendant Quillen, the testimony presented at trial convinces me that he knew Blizzard would be in danger if he was placed with other inmates and that he moved plaintiff from the Evaluation Tier to C-2 Tier without regard for his safety. Quillen knew of Blizzard's connection with the Task Force. He knew of the danger generally to Blizzard as a result of that connection. He even knew that Blizzard had already received threats against his life since his arrival at SCI because he was viewed as a snitch. Despite this knowledge and plaintiff's protests, Quillen ordered plaintiff moved to C-2 Tier. On C-2 Tier Blizzard was exposed to other inmates and within hours of his arrival was attacked by those inmates.

Mag.Rep. at 5 (footnote omitted).

If a district judge resolves a credibility dispute differently than the magistrate, Article III and the due process clause usually require the court to conduct a fresh evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 680 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2415 n. 7, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980); Garcia v. Boldin, 691 F.2d 1172, 1179 n. 13 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Hrdlicka, 520 F.Supp. 403, 404 (W.D.Wis.1981); Fair v. Cuyler, 506 F.Supp. 1088, 1091 (E.D.Pa. 1981). But if the court on de novo review agrees with the Magistrate's credibility assessment, it need not hold an additional hearing. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 680-81, 100 S.Ct. at 2414-15; United States v. Veteto, 701 F.2d 136, 140 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 3548, 77 L.Ed.2d 1396 (1983). The case law has not clearly defined what weight, if any, a district court should afford to the magistrate's credibility assessments that are based on his personal observations of witnesses' demeanor. Compare United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 680, 100 S.Ct. at 2414, and Calderon v. Waco Lighthouse For The Blind, 630 F.2d 352, 356 (5th Cir.1980), with Vekamaf Holland B.V. v. Pipe Benders, Inc., 696 F.2d 608, 611 (8th Cir.1982), and United States v. Hrdlicka, 520 F.Supp. at 406. I believe that implicit in Raddatz is a recognition that the credibility findings of a magistrate, who personally observed and listened to the testimony of live witnesses, may be accepted unless the district judge, in his de novo review, finds reason to question the magistrate's assessment of the evidence.

Upon independent review of the tape recordings, the Court agrees with the Magistrate's assessment of credibility. After listening to the complete recording of Blizzard's evidentiary hearing, I find Blizzard's testimony more coherent and internally consistent than that given by the defense witnesses who displayed a poor recollection of the details of Blizzard's transfer hearing. Blizzard testified consistently that he objected to his transfer on the ground that he was in danger of retributive attacks by the general prison population. Quillen, on the other hand, spoke contradictorily as to whether he knew of Blizzard's involvement in the Task Force or the danger he was under as a "snitch." Quillen and another prison guard did testify that Blizzard never objected to his transfer, but their recollection of this matter was far from clear. Upon review of the record, I am confident that the Magistrate's findings are correct and I find no reason to order a new hearing or take additional evidence. I therefore find that Quillen, knowing of Blizzard's participation in the Task Force and of Blizzard's reputation as a squealer, and knowing of the danger posed to Blizzard by a transfer, moved Blizzard to the C-2 tier over Blizzard's specific objection.

II. Duty to Protect Inmate From Attacks

Defendant's second contention is also without merit. As the Magistrate stated, it is well settled that "when a prison official or guard has reason to know that an inmate is in danger he must take `... reasonable care to provide reasonable protection from such unreasonable risk of harm.'" Mag.Rep. at 6, quoting Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849, 101 S.Ct. 136, 66 L.Ed.2d 59 (1980). See also Holmes v. Goldin, 615 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir.1980); Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932, 98 S.Ct. 1507, 55 L.Ed.2d 530 (1978); Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995, 94 S.Ct. 2409, 40 L.Ed.2d 774 (1974); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.1971); Schaal v. Rowe, 460 F.Supp. 155 (S.D.Ill.1978). Other courts have recognized that when prison officials know of a special danger posed to a specific prisoner, even though that danger comes from the general prison population and not a specifically named attacker, the officials must take reasonable steps to protect the threatened prisoner. See Gullatte v. Potts, 654 F.2d 1007, 1013 (5th Cir.1981) (prison official liable if knew or should have known that danger was posed to "snitch" placed in general prison population and it did not take reasonable steps to protect prisoner from danger); West v. Rowe, 448 F.Supp. 58, 59-60 (N.D.Ill.1978) (plaintiff stated cause of action against defendants for unreasonably failing to protect him from assault by inmate after plaintiff wrote letters to defendants stating that his life was in danger); Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir.1974) (defendants liable if failed to protect plaintiff when...