Blocker v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 January 1975
• Citation: 232 Pa.Super. 111,332 A.2d 476
• Parties: Nadine BLOCKER v. AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 476

332 A.2d 476

232 Pa.Super. 111

Nadine BLOCKER v. AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Jan. 8, 1975.

Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 1, 1975.

James K. Thomas, Metzger, Hafer, Keefer, Thomas & Wood, Harrisburg, for appellant.

Richard C. Angino, Harrisburg, for appellee.

Before WATKINS, President Judge, and JACOBS, HOFFMAN, CERCONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT and SPAETH, JJ.

VAN der VOORT, Judge.

By this appeal and after re-argument our court is called upon once again to review the issue of the 'stacking' or multiplication of insurance coverages. The plaintiff-appellee was a guest passenger in a car operated by an individual insured by the defendant-appellant. The car was involved in a collision with an uninsured motorist, and the plaintiff was injured and suffered damages in excess of $20,000. In addition to the insured car which was involved in the collision, the defendant insured a second car owned by the host driver, which car was not involved in the accident. Both cars were insured under the same policy and both were covered by uninsured motorist insurance in the amount of $10,000. The host driver paid a separate premium to the defendant for each car described in the policy for uninsured motorist coverage.

The plaintiff has sought to recover the amount of $20,000 for her damages, in effect, 'stacking' the uninsured motorist coverages for the two cars owned by the host driver and allegedly covered by the defendant's policy. The defendant maintains that such 'stacking' is improper. Pursuant to the terms of the policy, the plaintiff sought arbitration of this dispute under the provisions of the Pennsylvania Arbitration Act of April 25, 1927, P.L. 381, No. 248, 5 P.S. §§ 161--181. One arbitrator was selected by each party and the two arbitrators then jointly selected a third arbitrator. The arbitrators, after receipt of testimony, briefs and arguments by both parties, ruled unanimously that plaintiff-appellee was entitled to recover $20,000, the total of the two coverages discussed above. Again pursuant to the Arbitration Act of 1927, the defendant-appellant sought, and was granted an appeal by the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County. That court, composed of a five-judge panel sitting en banc, after receipt of briefs and hearing of arguments, unanimously held in favor of plaintiff-appellee in the same amount and under the same dual coverage as had been awarded by the arbitrators.

In the consideration of the present appeal, it is pertinent to note that our court has been aided by the assistance of able arguments by all counsel, excellent briefs from both parties, and a thoroughly reasoned and well written opinion by the court in Dauphin County. In addition, we are confronted by a plethora of legal precedents from not only the courts of our own Commonwealth, but from appellate courts in many other jurisdictions.

The single issue for our determination will of course be resolved by our analysis of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy issued by the appellant. This analysis of an insurance policy, like the interpretation of any other written contract, is a question of law for the court. Bole v. New Hampshire Fire Insurance Company, 159 Pa. 53, 28 A. 205 (1895). The policy must be read in its entirety; it should be construed according to the plain meaning of the words used, so as to avoid ambiguity while at the same time giving effect to all of its provisions. Masters v. Celina Mutual Insurance Company, 209 Pa.Super. 111, 224 A.2d 774 (1966); Galvin v. Occidental Life Insurance Company, 206 Pa.Super. 61, 64, 211 A.2d 120, 122 (1965). If it is determined that the language of a policy prepared by an insurer is either ambiguous, obscure, uncertain or susceptible to mroe than one construction, we must construe that language most strongly against the insurer and accept the construction most favorable to the insured. Patton v. Patton, 413 Pa. 566, 573, 198 A.2d 578, 582 (1964); Flynn v. Allstate Insurance Company, 50 Pa.D. & C.2d 195, 199--200 (1970). Of course, we may not rewrite an insurance contract or construe clear and unambiguous language to mean other than what it says. Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Insurance Company v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Insurance Company, 426 Pa. 453, 233 A.2d 548 (1967); Holliday v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Company, 153 Pa.Super. 59, 33 A.2d 449 (1943). In light of the above, our inquiry narrows to the real issue of whether the policy, clearly, and without ambiguity, precludes the double coverage sought by the plaintiff-appellee. The appellant and appellee have both cited the following policy language in support of their arguments:

(1) The 'Limits of Liability' Clause.

'The limits of liability for Uninsured Motorists Coverage stated in the declarations as applicable to 'each person' is the limit of the Company's liability for all damages . . . because of bodily injury sustained by one person as the result of any one accident . . ..'

(2) General Provisions--Condition 4.

'When two or more automobile are insured hereunder, the terms of this policy shall apply separately to each . . ..'

The 'declaration' sheet of the Policy provides, in the column entitled 'limits of liability', that the amount of coverage on each car is ten thousand ($10,000) dollars for each person and twenty thousand ($20,000) dollars for each accident.

In the relatively recent case of Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Ealy, 221 Pa.Super. 138, 289 A.2d 113 (1972) our court dealt with a similar appeal involving 'stacking' of uninsured motorist coverage. In a thorough opinion in that case, Judge Jacobs pointed out that the insurers' policy provision which 'expressly excluded from uninsured motorist coverage the other vehicles owned by Ealy' ws not in contravention of Pennsylvania's uninsured motorist law, Act of August 14, 1963, P.L. 909, as amended, 40 P.S. § 2000(a). The Ealy case followed the cases of Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 241 A.2d 112 (1968) and Bankes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 216 Pa.Super. 162, 264 A.2d 197 (1970), in which our courts had voided other insurance policy limitations of liability provisions as repugnant to the aforementioned Act.

The appellee claims that unlike the policy in Ealy, the limits of liability clause of the appellant's policy does not expressly exclude from uninsured motorists' coverage the other vehicle owned by the host driver. We could not discover such an express exclusion in any other part of the policy. Further, the policy, as quoted above, does contain a provision which requires that the terms of the policy be applicable separately to each of two or more cars covered by the policy. Thus, the appellee argues, as it did before the arbitrators and the court below, that the ten thousand ($10,000) dollar policy coverage limits on each car should be applied separately to allow the recovery of twenty thousand ($20,000) dollars. As was discussed Supra the appellee cites several cases which have allowed stacking in this situation. The appellant likewise cites numerous cases in support of its position that the policy must be construed to allow the recovery of only ten thousand ($10,000) dollars.

Mindful of all of the above, we have concluded that the policy in question is clearly susceptible to two reasonably arguable interpretations. The large volume of cases, in this jurisdiction and others, cited by both parties to this appeal in support of their directly contradictory arguments, lends great weight to this conclusion. In this situation, in which it cannot be maintained that ambiguity is non-existent, precedent requires that we must resolve the ambiguity in favor of the insured, and against the insurance company which prepared the policy. See Patton v. Patton, Supra; Flynn v. Allstate Insurance Company, Supra.

In Harker v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Insurance Company, 219 Pa.Super. 485, 281 A.2d 741 (1971), it was held that an arbitrator who allowed 'stacking' in a similar situation would not be reversed by our Courts, under the common law, since he has not been involved in 'fraud, misconduct, corruption or other such irregularity which caused (him) to render an unjust, inequitable and unconscionable award'. While we did not review the Merits of the arbitrators decision in that case, and while the instant situation involves statutory, rather than common law arbitration, that case pointed out that policy provisions similar to the ones involved herein are susceptible to more than one interpretation. Moreover, in the Flynn case, supra, cited by our Court in Harker, supra, the Common Pleas Court in Allegheny County interpreted another similar policy to allow stacking in the exact same manner here sought by appellee. In light of these precedents, if we were to find in favor of appellant we would have to find that the is...