Blocker v. State
| Decision Date | 12 November 1926 |
| Citation | 92 Fla. 878,110 So. 547 |
| Parties | BLOCKER v. STATE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Dade County; H. F. Atkinson, Judge.
L. S Blocker was convicted of second degree murder, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court
Objections to testimony, if not apparent, must be made apparent by record, to justify reversal for admission of evidence over objection. Objections to testimony in the trial of cases, if not apparent, must be made apparent by the record, in order to justify a reversal of a judgment of a trial court upon an assignment of error for the admission of evidence over objection.
Evidence tending to show insanity of defendant renders material and relevant state's evidence tending to show sanity. Evidence tending to show the insanity of the defendant, in a criminal case, makes material and relevant evidence tending to establish his sanity, when offered by the state in rebuttal.
Showing presence of counsel or notice is not necessary to admitting evidence of examination of defendant to determine his sanity examination to determine defendant's sanity ought not to be surreptitious or clandestine, but must be fairly and impartially made. It is not necessary to the admission of evidence about the examination of a defendant in a criminal case, for the purpose of ascertaining his sanity or insanity to show the presence of his counsel or notice to him. Such an examination ought not to be surreptitious or clandestine, but must be fairly and impartially made.
Examination of defendant to ascertain sanity does not deprive him of constitutional rights; examination of defendant to ascertain sanity does not require him to give evidence against himself. An examination of a defendant to ascertain his mental condition is not a deprivation of his constitutional rights nor does such an examination require him to give evidence against himself.
Allenist who has examined person as to sanity may express opinion without first disclosing extent or course of examination; alienist testifying as to sanity may be cross-examined by opposite party. It is the privilege of a litigant to have an alienist, who has made an examination as to the sanity of a certain person, express his opinion on such question without first disclosing the extent or course of such examination. And it is the privilege of the other side to cross-examine him.
Nonexpert witness may express opinion as to sanity only after stating facts on which opinion is based. A nonexpert witness may express his opinion as to the sanity of another only after stating the facts on which his opinion is based.
Court's caution as to value of expert testimony or of opinion of expert on insanity, in answer to hypothetical question, if favorable to defendant, is not harmful error. It is not required that a court caution a jury as to the value of expert testimony or as to the value of the opinion of an expert on insanity when given in answer to a hypothetical question, but, when it is given and its tendency was favorable to the defendant in the case at bar, it is not harmful error.
If evidence raises reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity, he should be acquitted. It is a correct principle of law that, where, in a criminal case, the defense is that of insanity, and the evidence raises and maintains in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to his sanity, he shold be acquitted.
Evidence held to sustain conviction of second degree murder. The evidence in the case at bar examined and adjudged to be sufficient to sustain the verdict.
Second finding of jury on question of fact is more persuasive than first verdict. The second finding of a jury on a question of fact is more persuasive than a first verdict.
Guilt of person laboring under partial delusions, not otherwise insane, must be considered as if facts, with respect to which delusion exists, were real; one laboring under partial delusions is criminally responsible for homicide committed to avenge an injury, real or supposed, if he had sufficient mind to know his act was wrong. The rule in McNaughten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 20, again approved by this court.
Bart A. Riley, of Miami, for plaintiff in error.
J. B. Johnson, Atty. Gen., and Roy Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for thE state.
The plaintiff in error was indicted for murder in the first degree by a grand jury of Dade county, Fla., was tried and convicted of murder in the first degree, with a recommendation to mercy. This conviction was not allowed to stand in this court because of errors of law in charging the jury as to defense of insanity. Blocker v. State, 87 Fla. 128, 99 So. 250. The defense of insanity was vouched for by this court as having been made in good faith. There was another trial of the plaintiff in error for murder in the first degree, as a result of which the defendant, in the court below, and hereinafter called the 'defendant,' was convicted of murder in the second degree, and from the judgment of the circuit court imposing the minimum penalty this appellate proceeding was instituted.
The homicide in question was committed by the defendant, in anger, without mitigating circumstances, deliberately, and because of a real or an imaginary wrong of the deceased at, towards, and against the defendant. A finding that the defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree would have been upheld by the courts upon the state's evidence in chief. The defendant relied upon the defense of insanity in both trials, calling to his aid, as witnesses, men of prominence, courage, and integrity--two of them ex-circuit judges, many of them members of the bar, court officials, business associates, and acquaintances, with members of his own family--and from this evidence the jury could have found that the defendant was not guilty because of insanity. The jury likely concluded that there was something wrong with him at the time of the homicide, else the conviction would have been of the higher offense. The state's rebuttal consisted of the testimony of two expert witnesses and the jailer, having the custody of the defendant since the commission of the homicide. One of these expert witnesses examined the defendant on two occasions, and the other one three occasions. The writer sat in this court in this case, and appreciated the able argument of counsel for defendant, and has been requested to prepare this opinion.
The case is here and now before the court, with the assertion that there was error in the court below in three main particulars:
I. The record discloses that Dr. Smith was called, qualified as an expert, and testified, among other things, that he examined the defendant in March, 1923, and again on the day before he gave testimony, and was asked:
'What condition did he find the defendant in mentality?'
This was objected to because irrelevant and immaterial, and further that, when defendant was examined in 1923, the defendant's counsel was not present, because counsel was not invited to be present, at an examination (by a physician employed by the state, in the absence of his counsel, is a deprivation of the defendant's constitutional rights), and because there was no sufficient predicate laid for the testimony.
These objections, to my mind, may be disposed of by saying that the evidence sought is relevant to the issue tendered by the defendant. There is no rule of law requiring the presence of or an invitation to a defendant's attorney to be present on such an occasion, nor is there any basis, in fact, of record to support the objections on the point or that the alienist was employed by the state, but a discussion of the general question involved will, it seems to me, dispose of that part of the case.
It is the duty of the parties to a case to prove facts in issue, and it is the duty of courts to admit evidence thus presented. The issue of insanity was tendered to the state by the defendant's evidence on his first trial. It is apparent that he had full opportunity to cross-examine the alienists, and he did so. There is nothing to indicate anything but a painstaking examination of the accused by the alienists, and, from this examination, under the law, it was the privilege of the parties to have such experts express their opinion as to the sanity of the defendant, and this without first detailing the circumstances or the course of such examination. The opinion of an expert witness as to the sanity of a person may, under the law, be given, subject to such cross-examination as is proper. Underhill on Criminal Evidence (3d Ed.) § 266, is authority for the statement here made:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Tibbs v. Florida
...of insufficiency of conflicting evidence to support a verdict when the finding has been made by two juries." Blocker v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 893, 110 So. 547, 552 (1926) (en banc). The weight of the evidence rule, moreover, often derives from a mandate to act in the interests of justice. See......
-
State v. Smith, 17210
...248 Ala. 217, 27 So.2d 186; People v. Strong, 114 Cal.App. 522, 300 P. 84; Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 22 P.2d 1109; Blocker v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 110 So. 547; Noelke v. State, 214 Ind. 427, 15 N.E.2d 950; State v. Genna, 163 La. 701, 112 So. 655; Commonwealth v. Millen, 289 Mass. 441,......
-
Parkin v. State
...core question of self-incrimination in hearings to determine mental capacity was answered by this Court long ago. In Blocker v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 110 So. 547 (1926), this Court after careful study held without dissent that such an examination does not violate the privilege against self-in......
-
State v. Grayson
...172 S.E. 415; State v. Cash, 219 N.C. 818, 15 S.E.2d 277; State v. Rogers, 233 N.C. 390, 64 S.E.2d 572, 28 A.L.R.2d 1104; Blocker v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 110 So. 547; People v. Krauser, 315 Ill. 485, 146 N.E. 593; Commonwealth v. Millen, 289 Mass. 441, 194 N.E. 463; State v. Nelson, 162 Or. ......
-
Self-incrimination - what can an accused person be compelled to do?
...made "with and by the consent of the defendant." In this connection consider the concurring opinion of Justice Strom in Blocker v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 110 So. 547 (1926), a case in which a psychiatric examination was made of an accused without his attorney's knowledge, although apparently w......