Parkin v. State
| Decision Date | 13 July 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 38747,38747 |
| Citation | 238 So.2d 817 |
| Parties | Mary Julia PARKIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Stallings & Marr and Albert Datz, of Datz & Jacobson, Jacksonville, for petitioner.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
This case arose in the Circuit Court of Duval County, where petitioner Mary Julia Parkin is charged with first degree murder. The District Court of Appeal, First District, certified the question in this case to be of great public interest, affirming the decision of the trial judge. Parkin v. State, 222 So.2d 457 (Fla.App.1st, 1969). We granted petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari. F.A.R. 4.5(c)(6), 32 F.S.A.
Defendant Parkin was indicted for first degree murder in her husband's death. She served notice to rely on the defense of insanity at the time of the alleged offense. F.Cr.P.R. 1.210(b), 33 F.S.A. The trial court appointed two psychiatrists to examine defendant as to her sanity or insanity at the time of the incidents giving rise to the indictment and provided that the State Attorney and the defendant's attorney both should have the right to be present during examination. F.Cr.P.R. 1.210; Fla.Stat. § 909.17, F.S.A.
At the hearing before the court-appointed experts, the defendant, relying on advice of counsel, refused to answer questions regarding her mental status or medical history. She invoked the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Fla.Const., art. I, § 9 (1968), F.S.A.; Fla.Const., Declaration of Rights, § 12 (1885), F.S.A.
The State moved the trial court to compel defendant's cooperation with the psychiatrists, in order that they might formulate opinions as to defendant's mental capacity. The trial court ordered defendant to cooperate with a full psychiatric examination, stating that her own evidence of insanity would be excluded during trial unless she cooperated with the court's experts. Defendant by petition for writ of certiorari secured review by the District Court of Appeal, First District, which affirmed the trial court, holding in essence that the issue of insanity is separate from the issue of guilt, and the defendant by tendering the issue of insanity invited inquiry into her memtal condition.
The District Court then certified, as a question of great public interest, the following question to this Court:
Where a defendant in a criminal case serves notice that she will rely upon a defense of insanity and the Court over her objections, orders her to give testimonial responses to court appointed psychiatrists under pain of forfeiting the testimony of her privately engaged psychiatrist, are the defendant's rights to freedom from self incrimination invaded?
The core question of self-incrimination in hearings to determine mental capacity was answered by this Court long ago. In Blocker v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 110 So. 547 (1926), this Court after careful study held without dissent that such an examination does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. We adopted the view of the State of Nevada, State v. Petty, 32 Nev. 384, 108 P. 934, Ann.Cas.1912D, 223, where examination under procedures similar to those presently held in Florida were found not to violate constitutional rights.
A related question was presented to us in McVeigh v. State, 73 So.2d 694 (Fla.1954), when constitutional challenge was made to Fla.Stat. § 917.02, F.S.A., which provides that experts appointed by the Court to examine a defendant's mental capacity
'(S)hall be summoned to testify at the trial and shall be examined by the court and may be examined by counsel for the state and the defendant.' (p. 697)
This Court reviewed authority from other jurisdictions and concluded without dissent that the procedures established in Florida contain no violation of fundamental right against compulsory self-incrimination. Compare McCullers v. State, 143 So.2d 909 (Fla.App.1st, 1962) in which the Court held that where opinions are offered in testimony based on discussions by a psychiatrist with third parties, the testimony is vulnerable to objections on the ground of hearsay. This has the effect of limiting expert's examination to interviews of the accused, or in-court listening to testimony offered by third persons. Also compare Land v. State, 156 So.2d 8 (Fla.1963), in which this Court upheld testimony where the psychiatrist had talked with third parties, but confined his testimony primarily to opinions formed on basis of discussions with an examination of the defendant.
Authorities of other jurisdiction are in accord with the past decision of this Court. In State v. Myers, 220 S.C. 309, 67 S.E.2d 506, 32 A.L.R.2d 430 (1951), a defendant prosecuted for murder was committed to a state hospital for determination of his mental condition. This procedure was authorized by statute but defendant contended that the action of the Court compelled him to be a witness against himself. In rejecting this contention, the Court said:
(p. 432, 67 S.E.2d 506, p. 507)
An annotation on this subject is contained in 32 A.L.R.2d 437. On pages 444--445, the author of the annotation says:
'One of the principal objections advanced against statutes providing for examination of the defendant by experts appointed by the court or designated by statute has been that such an examination results in the accused being obliged to give evidence against himself, as the result of his participation in the examination.
'In the following cases, attacks on the constitutionality of statutes based on the theory of self-incrimination have been rejected.'
In support of this statement, authorities are cited from Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, South Carolina and Wisconsin.
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in history and principle seems to relate to protecting the accused from the process of extracting from his own lips against his will an admission of guilt. In the better-reasoned cases it does not extend to the exclusion of evidence of his body or of his mental condition as evidence when such evidence is relevant and material, even when such evidence is obtained by compulsion. State v. Grayson, 239 N.C. 453, 458, 80 S.E.2d 387, 310 (1954). See also State v. Coleman, 96 W.Va. 544, 123 S.E. 580 (1924); State v. Riggle, 76 Wyo. 1, 298 P.2d 349 (1956); State v. Spears, 76 Wyo. 82, 300 P.2d 551 (1956).
There is a differentiation of the issue of insanity from that of guilt-in-fact. The insanity plea and the guilty plea raise separate issue on which different kinds of evidece may be introduced. As a general rule, if evidence is admissible on one issue and inadmissible on another, the Court may allow the evidence to come in. However, the trial judge does possess discretion in excluding evidence admissible on one issue if its probative value on that issue is insufficient to outweigh its prejudicial effect on other issues. McCormick, Evidence, § 59 (1954); Adkins v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 193 P. 251 (1920). The Court should prohibit the psychiatrist from testifying directly as to the facts surrounding the crime, where such facts have been elicited from the defendant during the course of a compulsory mental examination.
In other words, the Court and the State should not in their inquiry go beyond eliciting the opinion of the expert as to sanity or insanity, and should not inquire as to information concerning the alleged offense provided by a defendant during his interview; however, if the defendant's counsel opens the inquiry to collateral issues, admissions or guilt, the State's redirect examination properly could inquire within the scope opened by the defense.
This procedure makes available to the psychiatrist such information as he needs to form an opinion as to the ability of the defendant to tell right from wrong, without at the same time opening all information given during such psychiatric examination for use during trial unless it is opened by the defendant. This procedure also places the burden of proving guilt on the prosecution, without opportunity to require a defendant pleading insanity to incriminate himself as to guilt in attempting to establish insanity.
Historically, the protection against self-incrimination is designed to protect against extraction of confessions or evidence by thumbscrews, rack and third degree. The privilege never has required that any Court be deaf to any words a defendant may choose to speak, simply because they may be incriminating. The Constitution does not shield against incrimination by voluntary statements, even if given in pursuit of a collateral issue such as insanity; it does, however, shield against the unfair use of such statements.
A defendant pleading insanity may in the end prove himself guilty while trying...
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