Blockum v. Fieldale Farms Corp.

• Decision Date: 25 November 2002
• Docket Number: No. S02G0203.,S02G0203.
• Citation: 573 S.E.2d 36,275 Ga. 798
• Parties: BLOCKUM v. FIELDALE FARMS CORPORATION.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

573 S.E.2d 36

275 Ga. 798

BLOCKUM v. FIELDALE FARMS CORPORATION.

No. S02G0203.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

November 25, 2002.

McGriff, Cuthpert, Wyatt & Associates, George W. McGriff, Eric E. Wyatt, Atlanta, for appellant.

Victor Blockum, Athens, pro se.

Alston & Bird, Jay D. Bennett, Paul J. Kaplan, Atlanta, for appellee.

BENHAM, Justice.

In October 1999, appellant Victor Blockum, a black poultry grower in Banks County, Georgia, sued appellee Fieldale Farms ("Fieldale"), a poultry integrator, alleging Fieldale had illegally terminated its contract with Blockum to grow poultry. The trial court granted summary judgment to Fieldale, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment in an opinion issued pursuant to Rule 36 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals. We granted Blockum's petition for a writ of certiorari and expressed particular interest in whether the grant of summary judgment was precluded by the existence of genuine issues of material fact regarding Blockum's claims of racial discrimination, breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of 42 USC §§ 1981 and 1982; and whether the trial court erred when it concluded that Blockum had failed to state a claim under 42 USC § 1982.

In his complaint, Blockum averred that he approached Fieldale about growing poultry for Fieldale at a specified farm and that Fieldale's broiler manager had informed Blockum that Fieldale required Blockum to drop a lawsuit alleging racial discrimination that he had filed against Gold Kist, another chicken integrator, before Blockum would get a Fieldale contract to grow poultry. The Fieldale broiler manager said he would arrange for Gold Kist to pay Blockum $10,000-$15,000 in settlement of the claim and, if Blockum did as he was told, Fieldale would enter into a contract with Blockum to grow poultry on the farm Blockum had suggested. Blockum dropped his Gold Kist claim in exchange for $15,000 and gave a deposition in which he stated he had believed his inability to raise poultry for Gold Kist was due to the company's racial discrimination; that the poultry farmer with whom he was working reinforced that belief; that Blockum had come to realize it was the poultry farmer and not Gold Kist who was the cause of Blockum's lack of opportunity; and that, at the urging of the poultry farmer, Blockum had filed a claim alleging racial discrimination, but was now "pulling out."

After the Gold Kist settlement, Fieldale's broiler manager told Blockum he would give him a poultry contract only if the poultry were raised in "clear-span" chicken houses, causing Blockum to embark on a two-year search for "clear-span" houses. When Blockum returned to the broiler manager to remind him of the promised contract, the broiler manager told him he would arrange for Blockum to lease a nine-house farm. Though only two of the nine houses were "clear-span," the broiler manager assured Blockum that one of Fieldale's owners had said the post houses would not be a problem. Blockum and the owner of the nine-house farm made extensive repairs to the post houses in anticipation of the arrival of poultry. Fieldale's supervisor for the area told Blockum he would provide poultry for only two of the houses at first, and would supply enough for the remaining seven houses shortly thereafter. On April 15, 1997, David Wicker, the Fieldale representative, and Blockum executed a written contract that obligated Blockum to raise poultry to be delivered to him by Fieldale. Fieldale delivered flocks for the two "clear-span" houses and Blockum successfully raised them. When Blockum inquired about flocks for the remaining seven houses, according to Blockum, the representative told him another contract would be signed covering the remaining houses when the poultry for those houses was delivered.

According to Blockum, the Fieldale representative repeatedly declined Blockum's requests for a letter of commitment covering all nine houses. Blockum and the farm owner agreed that Blockum would purchase the two clear-span houses and lease the seven remaining houses from the farm owner, but Fieldale's representative refused to give Blockum the needed letter of commitment. When Fieldale declined to put poultry in the seven "post" houses due to a company policy put in place in January 1995, the only economically viable option for the farm owner was to sell the two "clear-span" houses to a white couple who, after entering into a contract for the purchase of the two-house farm, received a letter of commitment from Fieldale to raise poultry in the two houses.

"To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law." Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991). "On appeal from the grant of summary judgment this Court conducts a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. [Cits.]" Youngblood v. Gwinnett Rockdale &c., 273 Ga. 715, 717-718(4), 545 S.E.2d 875 (2001).

1. The trial court granted summary judgment to Fieldale on Blockum's claim of economic coercion after finding that the applicable statute of limitation expired before suit was filed. Blockum has not contested the trial court's determination of this issue following this Court's grant of his petition for a writ of certiorari; accordingly, we will not review this portion of the trial court's order, and the Court of Appeals' affirmance of it stands affirmed.

2. In granting summary judgment to Fieldale on Blockum's breach of contract claim, the trial court found that the alleged contract between Blockum and the broiler manager could not be enforced because Blockum's consideration for the contract (settlement of his lawsuit against Gold Kist and the giving of false testimony in a deposition conducted by Gold Kist's attorneys) involved the illegal act of false swearing. "If the consideration is illegal in whole or in part, the whole promise fails." OCGA § 13-3-45. "`An illegal consideration consists of any act... which is contrary to law....'" Hanley v. Savannah Bank & Trust, 208 Ga. 585, 586, 68 S.E.2d 581 (1952). Knowingly and willfully making a false statement while under oath constitutes the offense of false swearing. OCGA § 16-10-71(a). Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that the alleged oral contract between Blockum and the broiler manager is void and cannot be enforced. Likewise, Blockum's allegations of fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the oral contract cannot stand because it is not an enforceable contract. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the grant of summary judgment on these issues. However, the same analysis cannot be applied to Blockum's claim for breach of the written contract executed by him and David Wicker, on behalf of Fieldale. "Where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous the court will look to the contract alone to find the intention of the parties." Health Svc. Center v. Boddy, 257 Ga. 378, 380(2), 359 S.E.2d 659 (1987). Within the four corners of the written contract, there is no mention that its execution is the result of illegal consideration. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to Fieldale on the ground that the contract could not be enforced due to illegal consideration, and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming this portion of the trial court's decision.

3. The trial court granted summary judgment to Fieldale on Blockum's claim that Fieldale's actions resulted in the intentional infliction of emotional distress. "`One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.' [Cit.]." Yarbray v. Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 706(2), 409 S.E.2d 835 (1991). It is a question of law whether a claim rises to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. If there is evidence from which reasonable persons can find severe emotional distress resulting from extreme and outrageous conduct, the issue is one for the jury. Id.

Taking Blockum's claims as true for purposes of summary judgment, the trial court acknowledged that Fieldale's actions constituted "extreme and outrageous conduct" and that Blockum had established he suffered from a variety of maladies. The trial court granted summary judgment to Fieldale after concluding that Blockum had not established a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress. The trial court labeled as "self-serving statements" medical reports outlining Blockum's complaints and his connection of them to "a situation hav[ing] begun to occupy his time and psyche more and more," and the physician's advice to "stay away" from the situation while prescribing medication and treatment regimens to alleviate the condition. We disagree with the trial court's determination that Blockum's reports to his physician of his symptoms and their origin cannot constitute evidence from which reasonable persons could find that the severe emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was causally connected to the extreme and outrageous conduct of the defendant. See Sevcech v. Ingles Markets, 222 Ga.App. 221(3), 474 S.E.2d 4 (1996) (plaintiff's testimony sufficient evidence of causal connection to withstand defendant's motion for summary judgment). See also Johnson v. American Red Cross, 253 Ga.App. 587(3), 569 S.E.2d 242 (2002) (...