Blonner v. State, 0-2004-1175.

Decision Date05 January 2006
Docket NumberNo. 0-2004-1175.,0-2004-1175.
Citation2006 OK CR 1,127 P.3d 1135
PartiesRicardo Virgo BLONNER, Appellant v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Craig Corgan, Mary Bruehl, and Janet Chesley, Norman, OK, Attorneys for Defendant at evidentiary hearing.

Fern Smith, Greg Mashburn, Asst. District Attorneys, Oklahoma City, OK, Attorneys for the State at evidentiary hearing.

Janet Chesley, Capital Defense Counsel Norman, OK, Attorney for Appellant on appeal.

Fern Smith, Asst. District Attorney, Oklahoma City, OK, Attorney for Appellee on appeal.

OPINION AFFIRMING ORDER OF TRIAL COURT ON CLAIM OF MENTAL RETARDATION AND ESTABLISHING PROCEDURE FOR THE RESOLUTION OF FUTURE MENTAL RETARDATION CLAIMS

C. JOHNSON, Judge.

¶ 1 Appellant, Ricardo Blonner, is currently charged with First Degree Murder in Oklahoma County District Court, Case No. CF 1999-6416. Following this Court's decision in State ex. rel. Lane v. Bass, 2004 OK CR 14, 87 P.3d 629, Appellant filed a Motion to Quash Bill of Particulars due to mental retardation and requested an evidentiary hearing on the issue. The Honorable Jerry Bass, District Judge, conducted an evidentiary hearing on October 12th-14th, 2004. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Bass found Appellant had not met his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is mentally retarded, pursuant to the definition of mental retardation adopted by this Court in Murphy v. State, 2002 OK CR 32, 54 P.3d 556. The trial court's written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were filed in the District Court and in this Court on November 17, 2004. Thereafter, Appellant filed this appeal.

¶ 2 In his sole proposition of error, Appellant claims the trial court erred in concluding Mr. Blonner had not met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally retarded pursuant to the definition set forth in Murphy v. State, 2002 OK CR 32, 54 P.3d 556. After thorough consideration of this proposition, the record before us, the transcripts, exhibits, briefs and arguments of the parties, we have determined the trial court's ruling should be affirmed.

¶ 3 In Murphy v. State, 2002 OK CR 32, 54 P.3d 556, we adopted the following definition for mental retardation for individuals who allege they are not death penalty eligible for use in capital trials:

A person is "mentally retarded": (1) If he or she functions at a significantly sub-average intellectual level that substantially limits his or her ability to understand and process information, to communicate, to learn from experience or mistakes, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others; (2) The mental retardation manifested itself before the age of eighteen (18); and (3) The mental retardation is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication; self-care; social/interpersonal skills; home living; self-direction; academics; health and safety; use of community resources; and work.

It is the defendant's burden to prove he or she is mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence at trial. Intelligence quotients are one of the many factors that may be considered, but are not alone determinative. However, no person shall be eligible to be considered mentally retarded unless he or she has an intelligence quotient of seventy or below, as reflected by at least one scientifically recognized, scientifically approved, and contemporary intelligent quotient test.

This standard shall be used at all future and pending capital trials, until such time as it may be replaced by a suitable legislative enactment.

Murphy, 2002 OK CR 32, ¶ 31, 54 P.3d at 567. When a defendant seeks to have the issue of mental retardation resolved prior to his or her capital trial, the trial court "shall determine whether the Defendant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is mentally retarded." State ex. rel. Lane v. Bass, 2004 OK CR 14, ¶ 14, 87 P.3d 629, 633. Either party may appeal from the trial court's ruling and this Court will apply the preponderance of the evidence standard on appeal and conduct a de novo review of the trial court's factual findings. Id., 2004 OK CR 14, ¶ 15, 87 P.3d at 633.

¶ 4 Applying that standard and looking at the evidence de novo, we find the trial court's ruling should be affirmed. While Appellant presented some evidence suggesting he suffers from mental retardation, he did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that he met all three prongs of the definition for mental retardation. Murphy v. State, 2003 OK CR 6, ¶ 13, 66 P.3d 456, 458.

¶ 5 In response to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), this Court attempted to structure a procedure to resolve capital defendants' claims that they cannot be executed because they are mentally retarded. This Court diligently worked to create a fair system that adequately protected the rights of the accused and the interests of the state. Now that we have seen the model adopted in Murphy and its progeny implemented and appealed, we see ways in which to improve the resolution of these claims. This Court, therefore, adopts the following procedure to be utilized to resolve future Atkins claims. To the extent the procedure set forth in this Opinion is inconsistent with or in conflict with State ex.rel. Lane v. Bass, 2004 OK CR 14, 87 P.3d 629 and Murphy v. State, 2002 OK CR 32, 54 P.3d 556, those cases are overruled and their procedures are superceded by the procedure outlined below.

¶ 6 In future capital trials, where the defendant claims mental retardation as a bar to the imposition of the death penalty, the defendant shall file his or her Notice of Intent to Raise Mental Retardation as a defense to the imposition of the death penalty and Motion to Quash Bill of Particulars due to Mental Retardation within sixty (60) days from the date the State of Oklahoma files its Bill of Particulars or from the date of arraignment, whichever is later. The Notice must be accompanied by an averment that the defendant has at least one I.Q. test showing a score of 70 or below, within the margin of error, setting forth the score and date of testing, in order for the defendant to be eligible to raise the issue of mental retardation. If the defendant fails to set forth this information meeting the eligibility requirement the trial court should make a finding on the record that the defendant has not met the threshold for establishing mental retardation, and deny the Motion to Quash Bill of Particulars. After complete discovery on the issue is afforded both parties and within sixty (60) days from the date the Notice and Motion to Quash is filed, the trial court shall schedule a jury trial on the issue. If additional time to prepare for the trial on mental retardation is required, the trial court may schedule the trial later upon good cause shown.

¶ 7 If the defendant personally and affirmatively waives his or her right to a jury determination of mental retardation on the record, the issue may be tried to the bench and the hearing shall be conducted as set forth in State ex.rel. Lane v. Bass, 2004 OK CR 14, ¶ 14, 87 P.3d 629. The decision of the trial court following the bench trial shall be made in open court and memorialized by written Order Granting or Denying the Motion to Quash Bill of Particulars on grounds of mental retardation, filed in the District Court within ten (10) days, setting forth Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

¶ 8 Jury trials on the issue of mental retardation will be conducted pursuant to the dictates of Okla. Const. Art. II, § 191. The trial court shall impanel a jury composed of twelve (12) jurors, summoned to determine the sole question of mental retardation. The court shall proceed to the selection of the jury in the manner provided by law, and the parties shall be afforded nine (9) peremptory challenges each, pursuant to 22 O.S.2001, § 655. The potential jurors should not be death qualified, because the sole issue to be determined is whether the defendant is mentally retarded. The jurors shall receive fees for attendance and mileage as is allowed by law.

¶ 9 It is the defendant's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she is mentally retarded, as defined in Murphy v. State, 2002 OK CR 32, ¶ 31, 54 P.3d 556, 566:

A person is "mentally retarded": (1) If he or she functions at a significantly sub-average intellectual level that substantially limits his or her ability to understand and process information, to communicate, to learn from experience or mistakes, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others; (2) The mental retardation manifested itself before the age of eighteen (18); and (3) The mental retardation is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication; self-care; social/interpersonal skills; home living; self-direction; academics; health and safety; use of community resources; and work.

It is the defendant's burden to prove he or she is mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence at trial. Intelligence quotients are one of the many factors that may be considered, but are not alone determinative. However, no person shall be eligible to be considered mentally retarded unless he or she has an intelligence quotient of seventy or below, as reflected by at least one scientifically recognized, scientifically approved, and contemporary intelligent quotient test.

Because it is the defendant's burden to prove he/she is mentally retarded, the defendant shall open first, present evidence first, and have the opportunity to present the first and last closing arguments to the jury. Each party may present witnesses relevant to determination of the...

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  • Hooks v. Workman
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma
    • 26 février 2010
    ...and work. Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 567-68 (Okla.Crim.App.2002)(footnote omitted), overruled in part in Blonner v. State, 127 P.3d 1135, 1139 (Okla.Crim.App.2006).4 The state court held that it is the defendant's burden to prove he or she is mentally retarded by a preponderance of the e......
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