Blonski v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 16 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 18809.,18809.
• Parties: Maribeth BLONSKI v. METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COMMISSION.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

309 Conn. 282

71 A.3d 465

Maribeth BLONSKI

v.METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COMMISSION.

No. 18809.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 13, 2013.

Decided July 16, 2013.

Charles L. Howard, with whom, on the brief, was Sheila A. Huddleston, Hartford, for the defendant (appellant).

Steven D. Ecker, with whom was M. Caitlin S. Anderson, for the plaintiff (appellee).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, EVELEIGH and McDONALD, Js.

ROGERS, C.J.

This appeal requires us to consider the scope of governmental immunity that is afforded to a political subdivision of the state that has been sued for allegedly negligent conduct that is alleged to be connected to the proprietary function of operating a water supply company. After the plaintiff, Maribeth Blonski, was injured when she rode her bicycle into a pipe gate on property maintained by the defendant, the Metropolitan District Commission, she brought this action claiming that the defendant had negligently maintained the gate in an unsafe and dangerous condition. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the trial court rendered judgment accordingly. The questions that we must answer in this appeal ¹ are: (1) whether the defendant was immune from liability pursuant to General Statutes § 52–557n (a)(2)(B)² because the maintenance of the gate to control the recreational use of the property was a governmental function requiring the exercise of discretion or, instead, the defendant was liable under § 52–557n (a)(1)(B) because its conduct was connected to its proprietary function of operating a water supply company; and (2) if the defendant was not entitled to immunity under § 52–557n (a)(2)(B), whether it is entitled to immunity pursuant to the Recreational Land Use Act (act), General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 52–557f et seq.³ We conclude that the defendant was liable pursuant to § 52–557n (a)(1)(B) because the maintenance of the gate was inextricably linked to a proprietary function, and that it is not entitled to immunity pursuant to the act. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant is a specially chartered municipal corporation whose duties include supplying water to residents of certain towns (district).⁴ To this end, the defendant maintains several water reservoirs and water treatment facilities, including a property in West Hartford consisting of 3000 acres of land and five reservoirs. The defendant allows the public to use the property for recreational activities, including walking, running and biking on the numerous trails that run through the property.

In 1976, after experiencing recurring problems on the West Hartford property, including vandalism, theft, litter, water contamination, the sale and use of drugs and alcohol, and frequent motor vehicle accidents, the defendant's board voted to close the roads on the property to public motor vehicles. The defendant installed two gates blocking access to the property's road system from the public parking lot. Each gate consisted of a three inch diameter pipe that was attached at one end to a hinge on a vertical post at the side of the road. When closed, the other end of the pipe could be locked to a vertical post on the other side of the road. The pipes, which were painted yellow, were suspended approximately three and one-half feet from the ground.

The defendant's policy was to keep the gates closed, but workers doing maintenance work on the reservoirs occasionally left them open. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the defendant made a decision to keep the gates closed at all times to protect the water supply from any attempt to contaminate it. On September 28, 2001, the defendant's manager of water treatment sent an e-mail to various personnel directing them to keep the gates closed and locked until further notice.

One of the gates was located at an entrance to Red Road, a paved road that ran through the West Hartford property in a three mile loop. There were markings on Red Road establishing a lane for bicyclists and indicating the direction in which the bicyclists were supposed to travel. On May 16, 2002, the plaintiff went to the reservoir property to videotape a segment on mountain biking for a cable television program that she hosted. After taping the segment, she and a friend went for a bicycle ride. As they headed back to the parking lot at the end of their ride, the plaintiff entered onto Red Road. She was riding with her head down at approximately twenty to thirty miles per hour, in the direction of the closed gate and against the designated direction for bicycle traffic. The plaintiff testified that the pipe gate suddenly appeared in front of her “out of nowhere,” and she attempted to slide underneath it. She was unable to do so and struck her head on the pipe, thereby incurring severe injuries to her cervical spine, including a burst fracture of the last cervical vertebrae, as well as other injuries. As a result of her injuries, the plaintiff was required to undergo numerous surgeries and extensive physical rehabilitation. She suffers from chronic pain, difficulty breathing, a permanent disability in her neck and other ailments.

The plaintiff brought this action alleging that the defendant had negligently maintained Red Road and the gate in a dangerous and defective condition. Specifically, she alleged that the defendant had: “closed [the] pipe gate across [Red Road] in a manner that was unsafe”; “failed to erect barriers that would close the path to vehicular traffic but allow bikes to pass safely through”; and “failed to properly warn of the closure of the [Red Road] pipe gate by signage on the path and markings on the roadway.” The defendant asserted as a special defense that the plaintiff's claims were barred by § 52–557n (a)(2)(B) and General Statutes § 52–557g. After the plaintiff presented her case at trial, the defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict claiming that she had failed to prove that the defendant's actions were connected to its proprietary function and that the defendant therefore could not be held liable under § 52–557n (a)(2)(B). In the alternative, the defendant claimed that, if it was acting in its proprietary function, it was entitled to immunity under § 52–557g. The trial court denied the defendant's motion. Thereafter, the jury found in interrogatories that the defendant had been negligent and that its negligence had an “inherently close connection” to its proprietary function of supplying water to residents of the district. It also found that the plaintiff was 30 percent comparatively negligent. The jury awarded economic damages of $150,000 and noneconomic damages of $2.75 million.⁵ The defendant then filed a motion to set aside the verdict, again claiming that there was insufficient evidence to submit to the jury the question of whether the defendant's conduct was connected to its proprietary function and, in the alternative, that the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury that the defendant was immune pursuant to § 52–557g or to submit that question to the jury. The trial court denied the motion and rendered judgment for the plaintiff. This appeal followed.

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied its motions for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict because no reasonable juror could have found that the alleged negligence had an “ ‘inherently close connection’ ” to the defendant's proprietary function of supplying water. See Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission, 275 Conn. 38, 56, 881 A.2d 194 (2005) (to establish that political subdivision of state is liable under § 52–557n [a][1][B], plaintiff must prove “an inextricable link or inherently close connection between the plaintiff's specific allegations of negligence and the defendants' operation of a water utility” [emphasis in original] ). The defendant further claims that, if this court rejects its claim that, as a matter of law, its negligent conduct was not connected to its proprietary function for purposes of § 52–557n (a)(1)(B), it is entitled to immunity under the act. We address these claims in turn.

At the outset, we set forth the applicable standard of review. “The standards for appellate review of a directed verdict are well settled. Directed verdicts are not favored.... A trial court should direct a verdict only when a jury could not reasonably and legally have reached any other conclusion.... In reviewing the trial court's decision to direct a verdict in favor of a defendant we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.... Although it is the jury's right to draw logical deductions and make reasonable inferences from the facts proven ... it may not resort to mere conjecture and speculation.... A directed verdict is justified if ... the evidence is so weak that it would be proper for the court to set aside a verdict rendered for the other party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coughlin v. Anderson, 270 Conn. 487, 497–98, 853 A.2d 460 (2004).

We next turn to the principles governing the availability of a governmental immunity defense for political subdivisions of the state who engage in proprietary activities. This court held in Considine v. Waterbury, 279 Conn. 830, 844, 905 A.2d 70 (2006), that “§ 52–557n (a)(1)(B) codifies the common-law rule that municipalities are liable for their negligent acts committed in their proprietary capacity....” “It is well established that a proprietary function is an act done in the management of [a political subdivision's] property or rights for its own corporate benefit or profit and that of its inhabitants.... The ... operation of a water utility for corporate profit is a proprietary function.” ⁶ (Citationsomitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission, supra, 275 Conn. at 53, 881 A.2d 194.

In Martel, the plaintiff was injured while...