Metro. Dist. v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities

• Decision Date: 27 March 2018
• Docket Number: AC 39371
• Citation: 184 A.3d 287,180 Conn.App. 478
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: The METROPOLITAN DISTRICT v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

180 Conn.App. 478

184 A.3d 287

The METROPOLITAN DISTRICT

v.COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

AC 39371

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 30, 2017

Officially Released March 27, 2018

Jeffrey J. Mirman, with whom, on the brief, was Amy E. Markim, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Emily V. Melendez, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).

Sheldon, Elgo and Mihalakos, Js.

ELGO, J.

In this civil action, the plaintiff, The Metropolitan District,¹ appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiff's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff is a municipal entity that was created in 1929 by a special act of the General Assembly "for the purpose of water supply, waste management and regional planning." Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission , 275 Conn. 38, 41, 881 A.2d 194 (2005) ; see also Rocky Hill Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. Metropolitan District , 160 Conn. 446, 450–51, 280 A.2d 344 (1971). The commission is a state agency whose "primary role ... is to enforce statutes barring discrimination ...." Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. City of Hartford , 138 Conn. App. 141, 144 n.2, 50 A.3d 917, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 929, 55 A.3d 570 (2012). With respect to certain nondiscrimination statutes, the legislature expressly has deemed the plaintiff "to be a state agency" within the jurisdiction of the commission. General Statutes § 46a–68 (a).

In late December, 2015, the plaintiff commenced this action seeking a declaratory judgment against the commission, as well as injunctive relief and a writ of mandamus. In its complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the commission, "as a matter of practice," assumes and retains jurisdiction over complaints without conducting a proper merit assessment review and makes improper reasonable cause determinations, in contravention of its statutory and regulatory obligations. More specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the commission routinely fails to comply with the strictures of General Statutes § 46a–83 and §§ 46a–54 –42a (a) and 46a–54 –49a (b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.² By so doing, the commission allegedly has engaged in improper rulemaking and has violated the plaintiff's due process rights, as secured by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Those allegations are predicated in part on the commission's conduct in five specific proceedings in which the plaintiff was the respondent.³ The complaint also alleges that the commission lacks jurisdiction over complaints made by independent contractors against the plaintiff.

The request for relief in the plaintiff's complaint is primarily declaratory in nature. The plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the commission has engaged in improper rulemaking by engaging in certain "routine practices"⁴ and has "violated the procedural and substantive due process rights of the [plaintiff] by engaging in [those] practices." The complaint also seeks a declaratory judgment "that General Statutes § 46a–71⁵ does not apply to the [plaintiff], and that the [commission] does not have jurisdiction over complaints filed by independent contractors against the [plaintiff]." (Footnote added.)

Apart from such declaratory relief, the complaint requests a permanent injunction "enjoining the [commission] from engaging in improper rulemaking ... and requiring [it] to follow its statutory mandate to engage in proper merit assessment reviews, to dismiss complaints during the merit assessment review process where no reasonable cause exists, to engage in proper substantive review during the early legal intervention process, and to refrain from attempting to assume jurisdiction over matters outside the jurisdiction of the agency."⁶ The complaint further requests a writ of mandamus ordering the commission "to review all of its files regarding complaints of discriminatory employment practices since 2011" to determine whether the commission engaged in any of the routine practices enumerated in its complaint. See footnote 4 of this opinion.

In response, the commission filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiff's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies.⁷ Following the filing of memoranda of law by the parties, the court heard argument on the motion. In its subsequent memorandum of decision, the court concluded that the plaintiff had adequate administrative remedies that it failed to exhaust prior to commencing this action. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and this appeal followed.

As a preliminary matter, we note that "[i]n an appeal from the granting of a motion to dismiss on the ground of subject matter jurisdiction, this court's review is plenary. A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When ... the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.... Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power [of the court] to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.... A court has subject matter jurisdiction if it has the authority to adjudicate a particular type of legal controversy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Francis v. Chevair , 99 Conn. App. 789, 791, 916 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 283 Conn. 901, 926 A.2d 669 (2007). "When a ... court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light.... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bellman v. West Hartford , 96 Conn. App. 387, 393, 900 A.2d 82 (2006). Further, in addition to admitting all facts well pleaded, the motion to dismiss "invokes any record that accompanies the motion, including supporting affidavits that contain undisputed facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Henriquez v. Allegre , 68 Conn. App. 238, 242, 789 A.2d 1142 (2002).

This appeal concerns the proper application of the exhaustion doctrine. "The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well established in the jurisprudence of administrative law.... Under that doctrine, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that seeks a remedy that could be provided through an administrative proceeding, unless and until that remedy has been sought in the administrative forum.... In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dismissed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Republican Party of Connecticut v. Merrill , 307 Conn. 470, 477, 55 A.3d 251 (2012) ; see also Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. , 303 U.S. 41, 50–51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938) ("no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted").

The exhaustion doctrine is rooted in both prudential and constitutional considerations. As our Supreme Court has explained, "separation of powers principles [underlie] the exhaustion doctrine, namely, to foster an orderly process of administrative adjudication and judicial review, offering a reviewing court the benefit of the agency's findings and conclusions. It relieves courts of the burden of prematurely deciding questions that, entrusted to an agency, may receive a satisfactory administrative disposition and avoid the need for judicial review.... Moreover, the exhaustion doctrine recognizes the notion, grounded in deference to [the legislature's] delegation of authority to coordinate branches of [g]overnment, that agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs that [the legislature ] has charged them to administer .... Therefore, exhaustion of remedies serves dual functions: it protects the courts from becoming unnecessarily burdened with administrative appeals and it ensures the integrity of the agency's role in administering its statutory responsibilities." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopez v. Board of Education , 310 Conn. 576, 598–99, 81 A.3d 184 (2013) ; see also McKart v. United States , 395 U.S. 185, 194, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed. 2d 194 (1969) (exhaustion doctrine an expression of executive autonomy); American Federation of Government Employees v. Resor , 442 F.2d 993, 994 (3d Cir. 1971) ("[f]or the courts to act prematurely, prior to the final decision of the appropriate administrative agency, would raise a serious question regarding the doctrine of separation of powers, and in any event would violate a [legislative] decision that the present controversy be initially considered by the [agency]"); Pet v. Dept. of Health Services , 207 Conn. 346, 351–52, 542 A.2d 672 (1988) ("[A] favorable outcome [in an administrative proceeding] will render review by the court unnecessary as ... [a] complaining party may be successful in vindicating his rights in the administrative process. If he is required to pursue his administrative remedies, the courts may never have to intervene." [Internal quotation marks omitted.] ). Accordingly, "[i]t is a settled principle of administrative law that, if an adequate administrative remedy exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction to act in the matter."...