Bloomfield v. Mayo
| Decision Date | 12 April 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. B-346,B-346 |
| Citation | 119 So.2d 417 |
| Parties | Lloyd P. BLOOMFIELD, doing business as Hari-Karl Distributing Company, Petitioner, v. Nathan MAYO, as Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Fuller Warren and Kenneth L. Ryskamp, Miami, for petitioner.
Wm. C. Pierce, Tampa, for respondent.
Petitioner seeks review by certiorari of a purported judgment denying certiorari in a proceeding instituted by it in the Circuit Court of Leon County.
Petitioner manufactures a pesticide product marketed under the tradename of Hari-Kari Lindane Dry Vaporizer. It applied to the Commissioner of Agriculture for registration of this product as required by the statutes of this state. 1 The application was processed and disposed of in accordance with that provision of the statute which reads as follows:
2
Following submission of its formal application, petitioner was advised that the pesticide technical committee would meet at a stated time and place to consider, among other things, the toxicity of Lindane vapors and the safety of Lindane vaporizers for use in homes. The notice advised petitioner that the information presented at the meeting would be used in deciding what recommendation would be made to the Commissioner of Agriculture in reference to the registration of such products. Petitioner was invited to attend the meeting and present any information which it may have concerning the subjects of the inquiry. Pursuant to this notice petitioner attended a meeting of the committee at which petitioner furnished certain information concerning the manufacture and use of its product. The meeting was informal in nature, and bore none of the characteristics of a judicial hearing. No witnesses were called nor sworn, nor was the proceeding reported. Some forty days thereafter the committee addressed a letter to the Commissioner of Agriculture which in substance recommended against the registration of petitioner's product for home use. The committee's recommendation contained no findings of fact, nor did it express any conclusion of law with respect to petitioner's right to registration of its product under the controlling provisions of the statute. Petitioner was subsequently advised by the supervising inspector of the Department of Agriculture that his office had been advised by the state chemist that the Commissioner of Agriculture had refused registration of petitioner's product. It was further advised that stop sale notices had been issued against this product. There is no evidence that the Commissioner himself ever entered an order setting forth his findings and conclusions with respect to petitioner's right to registration of its product, or formally denying registration.
Following receipt of the foregoing notice petitioner filed a complaint for declaratory relief in the Circuit Court of Leon County. By its complaint petitioner averred the foregoing facts, and alleged that it is in doubt as to the authority of the Commissioner of Agriculture to deny registration of its product upon the recommendation of the committee, and is in doubt as to the authority of the Commissioner of Agriculture, under the circumstances of the case, to deny registration or issue a stop sale notice to all retailers handling petitioner's product. The complaint sought a decree determining the rights, status and other equitable and legal remedies of the plaintiff and for an injunction restraining the Commissioner from further action under his stop sale notice. The complaint further prayed for a decree declaring that plaintiff's product is entitled to registration and ordering that it be registered by the Commissioner as eligible for sale in Florida.
To the complaint the Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the order refusing registration was reviewable only by common law certiorari, and was not subject to collateral attack by a suit for declaratory relief. The trial judge deferred ruling on the Commissioner's motion and ordered that an answer to the complaint be filed. The answer denied the material allegations of the complaint with respect to petitioner's right to registration of its product, and alleged that the evidence before the committee fully warranted its recommendation that registration be denied. Upon the issues thus made by the complaint and answer, extensive testimony was taken.
Upon consideration of the evidence the court rendered a final judgment in the form of a memorandum decision setting forth its findings and conclusions. In its judgment the court found that the proceeding was one by which plaintiff was attempting to review by petition for declaratory relief a quasi-judicial order entered by the Commissioner. The chancellor thereupon granted the Commissioner's motion to dismiss the complaint, and proceeded to consider the complaint as constituting a petition for writ of certiorari. The court then held that the documents offered and received in evidence, together with testimony adduced in the proceedings, would substantially constitute what would be the record of the matters which were before and considered by the committee as a basis for its recommendation. The court considered the record before it as the record of the proceedings before the committee, and treated the Commissioner's answer as an attack on the petition for certiorari. The court found on the basis of the evidence that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the committee had acted arbitrarily or abused its discretion in recommending that plaintiff's product not be registered. Upon reaching this conclusion the relief prayed for was denied and the action dismissed.
By its first point on appeal petitioner challenges the correctness of the trial court's judgment dismissing its petition for declaratory relief and treating it as a petition for writ of certiorari. The applicable rule of appellate procedure provides that all appellate review of the rules of any commission or board shall be by certiorari. 3 A literal reading of the rule might lead to the conclusion that certiorari is the only permissible method of reviewing any order entered by a board or commission regardless of whether the order in question was quasi-judicial in character, or was merely an executive, legislative or administrative order entered in a proceeding having none of the characteristics or artributes of judicial or quasi-judicial function. We think, however, that this question has been conclusively answered by the Supreme Court in the Furen case. 4 That decision leads to the inescapable conclusion that the type of certiorari to review administrative orders contemplated by Rule 4.1 is common law certiorari in which the scope of review is narrowly limited to a...
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...the writ of certiorari, and not legislative, discretionary, or ministerial acts. FERRIS, supra, at 181-82. See also Bloomfield v. Mayo, 119 So.2d 417, 421 (Fla.App.1960) ("It is settled in this state that common law certiorari is limited only to review of judicial or quasi-judicial orders o......
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...So.2d 302, 306 (Fla.1st DCA 1969); Dickinson v. Judges of the District Court of Appeal, 282 So.2d 168, 169 (Fla.1973); Bloomfield v. Mayo, 119 So.2d 417 (Fla.1st DCA 1960); DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 So.2d 912 (Fla.1957); West Flagler Amusement Co., Inc. v. State Racing Comm'n, 122 Fla. 222, ......
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...Commission v. Zucker, Fla.App.1959, 116 So.2d 642; Florida State Board of Architecture v. Seymour, Fla.1952, 62 So.2d 1; Bloomfield v. Mayo, Fla.App.1960, 119 So.2d 417; De Groot v. Sheffield, Fla. 1957, 95 So.2d 912; Teston v. City of Tampa, Fla.1962, 143 So.2d 473. This reasoning does no ......
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Redefining "quasi-judicial": the diminishing role of quasi-judicial determinations in local government personnel actions.
...to exhaust all available administrative remedies before appealing to the state's court system. Two years later, in Bloomfield v. Mayo, 119 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960), De Groot was again applied by the court to block declarations under the state's Declaratory Judgments Act. For agencies ......