Blount v. Cnty. of Onondaga
| Decision Date | 18 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | 5:20-CV-0937 (GTS/TWD) |
| Parties | SAYVION D. BLOUNT, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF ONONDAGA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
SAYVION D. BLOUNT
Plaintiff, pro se
Fishkill Correctional Facility
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 19, 2020, this Court granted Sayvion D. Blount's (“Plaintiff”) motion to proceed in forma pauperis and recommended his Complaint brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983, against the City of Syracuse, the County of Onondaga, the Hon. Mary Anne Doherty, Timothy Roulan, Joseph Centra, Janelle N. Ecker, Hon. Thomas J. Miller, Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) Colin Lynch, Ian Duquette, and Andrew Torrance be sua sponte dismissed in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); and that Plaintiff's claims against Judge Doherty, Judge Miller, and ADA Lynch be dismissed with prejudice based on the doctrine of absolute immunity; and that Plaintiff's remaining Section 1983 claims be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 8.) It was further recommended that the District Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. Id. Plaintiff filed objections to the Report- Recommendation and an “Amendment to the Complaint.” (Dkt No. 13, 14.)
By Decision and Order entered March 15, 2021, the Honorable Glenn T. Suddaby, Chief United States District Judge, accepted and adopted the Report-Recommendation in its entirety, and Plaintiff's “Amendment to the Complaint” was rejected and stricken from the docket. (Dkt. No. 15.) Plaintiff was afforded thirty (30) days to file an Amended Complaint that cured the pleading defects identified in that Decision and Order (and the Report-Recommendation). Id. It was further ordered that failure to do so would result in Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims being sua sponte dismissed with prejudice (and his state law claims would be dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court within the governing time period). Id.
Plaintiff's timely-filed Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 16) has been referred to this Court for review of its pleading sufficiency pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). (Dkt. No. 15.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 16) be sua sponte dismissed in its entirety and without further leave to amend for failure to state a claim. II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that when a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).[1]
Likewise, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court must review any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity” and must “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth the general rules of pleading, “does not require detailed factual allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Id. In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
A pro se litigant's pleadings are held to a less strict standard than attorney drafted pleadings. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) (“Even in the formal litigation context, pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.”). Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her pleadings “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). However, this “does not exempt a [pro se litigant] from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983). Moreover, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “without giving leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 16.) To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the challenged conduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law and that such conduct “deprived [him] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010). “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993).
After carefully reviewing the Amended Complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to cure the pleading defects identified in Judge Suddaby's Decision and Order (and the ReportRecommendation). As a threshold issue, the Amended Complaint fails to comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Chief Judge Suddaby's Decision & Order. Plaintiff was previously advised that “[a] party not named in the caption of the complaint is not a party to the action.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 5 n.4.) See also Bloodywone v. Bellnier, No. 9:18-CV-0615 (GTS/DJS), 2018 WL 10550308, at 5 n.8 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2018) (); Whitley v. Krinser, No. 06-CV-0575, 2007 WL 2375814, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2007) (). The Amended Complaint lacks a caption and a demand for relief. Plaintiff was “respectfully reminded that such an Amended Complaint must be a complete pleading that does not incorporate by reference his original Complaint.” (Dkt. No. 15 at 8, emphasis added.) He was “also respectfully advised that he should use numbered paragraphs to separate each alleged occurrence as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b)[, ]” yet largely failed to do so. See id. Construed liberally, the Amended Complaint lists six “claims.” (Dkt. No. 16 at 67.[2]) The Court addresses each in turn.
In the First Claim, Plaintiff alleges Judge Doherty “acted outside her judicial capacity violating [his] 8th and 14th Amendment right to due process in a criminal proceeding[.]” (Dkt. No. 16 at 8.) As set forth above, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Judge Doherty were “sua sponte DISMISSED with prejudice based on absolute immunity and failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A[.]” (Dkt. No. 15 at 8.) Consequently, any such claims against Judge Doherty are not properly before the Court.
In any event, the factual allegations of the Amended Complaint, like the original Complaint, plausibly suggest that, at the time of the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims, Judge Doherty was acting within the scope of her judicial capacity (however much he disagrees with her actions) and, therefore, she is entitled to absolute immunity. (See Dkt. No. 16 at 1, 2, 8.) Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint attempts to bring Section 1983 claims against Judge Doherty, the Court again recommends dismissal with prejudice based on absolute immunity and failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
In his Second Claim, Plaintiff alleges Ian Duquette and Andrew Torrance, identified as private citizens and not members of the Syracuse Police Department, “acted under color of state law” and violated his constitutional rights “when acting in tandem with the...
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