Bloxham v. Florida Cent. & P.R. Co.
| Decision Date | 19 March 1895 |
| Citation | 35 Fla. 625,17 So. 902 |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
| Parties | BLOXHAM, Comptroller, et al. v. FLORIDA CENT & P. R. CO. |
Appeal from circuit court, Leon county; John F. White, Judge.
Action by the Florida Central & Peninsular Railroad Company against William D. Bloxham, comptroller, and John A. Pearce, sheriff. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Modified.
Syllabus by the Court
1. A claim that the exemption of certain railroad property from taxation, provided for in the eighteenth section of the internal improvement act (chapter 610, Laws Fla.; Acts 1855-56; McClell. Dig. s 21, p. 596), is a continuing exemption; that it is an incident of the property attached to the rem, and follows it into whosesoever hands the same may come,--cannot be maintained.
2. That the right of exemption from taxation which, under the internal improvement act, referred to in the preceding headnote, vested in the original owners and builders of the roads exempted, was a personal privilege, and did not pass with the assignment of the property, is, by the decision to discussion in this state. States, in the case of Railroad Co. v. Palmes, 3 Sup. Ct. 193, 109 U.S. 244, a proposition beyond the reach of cavil or controversy, and is no more onpn to discussio in thisstate.
3. No corporation can be created in this state, since the adoption of the constitution of 1868, or the amendments of 1875 capable of accepting and enjoying the privilege of exemption from taxation provided for in the eighteenth section of the internal improvement act, referred to in preceding headnotes.
4. Railroads built or acquired by corporations coming into existence after the adoption of our constitution of 1868 whether in the hands of the original building corporations or their assignees and successors, were liable to taxation under that constitution in like manner as other property.
5. A state cannot be sued without its consent. The suit in the court below, while against two officers of the state, named as defendants, was, as to one of the objects sought to be accomplished by it, to all intents and purposes a suit against the state for the recovery of money, and a judgment or decree against such officers would have been a judgment or decree against the state. This branch of the suit should have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
6. By saying that a state cannot be sued without its consent, as stated in preceding headnote, it is not meant that no judicial action, under any circumstances whatever, can be taken against the state, but, confining ourselves to the facts of this particular case, that a suit like that before us (a suit for the recovery of money), whether in the form of a bill in equity, or in the nature of an action of assumpsit does not lie against the sovereign state.
7. The constitutions of this state, both of 1868 and 1885, contain a section as follows: 'Provision may be made by general law for bringing suits against the state as to all liabilities now existing of hereafter originating' (Const. art. 5, s 19; Id. art. 3, s 22); but, no such provision having been made by the legislature, these sections were inoperative to change the general principles upon which we hold that the state is not liable to be sued.
8. Appellee claimed that it is entitled to have certain railroad property exempted from taxation, because it and its predecessors contracted and invested their money in the property under a judicial construction, once prevailing in this state, declaring that the exemption from taxation provided for in the eighteenth section of the internal improvement act attached to property of this kind as an incident, without regard to changes in ownership of the same that they relied upon such judicial construction, and invested their money upon faith in the exemption from taxation therein declared. Held, without determining the effect of such judicial construction, that appellee should not have its property declared exempt from taxation by reason thereof, because the more important and vital question as to whether the appellee or its predecessors were such corporations, as, under the constitution of 1868, could avail themselves of such exemption from taxation, had not been determined in this state, and upon the proper determination of this question the property would be liable to taxation in the hands of appellee and its predecessors without reference to the judicial construction referred to. It cannot avail appellee that the property was exempt from taxation if it and its predecessors were such corporations as were prohibited by the constitution from holding the same as exempt.
9. All property in the state ought to bear its just burden of taxation; and there can be no doubt, because it is well established by authority, that if property lawfully liable thereto escapes taxation for any one or more years, it is competent for the legislature to provide for the collection of such taxes in arrears from the owners of the property during the time for which it escaped taxation, or from purchasers of the same whose rights or titles accrued after a lien for such taxes had been acquired by the state, by subjecting the property taxed to the payment of the same.
10. When the time for the assessment and collection of taxes has passed, and the taxing statute affixes no lien to the property, and the state has made no assessment, nor taken any other step to collect the same, real estate cannot be pursued for back taxes when it has gone into the hands of innocent purchasers for value. Railroads, under the statute of this state, are real estate.
11. Under our laws as they existed prior to the adoption of the Revised Statutes, there was no lien upon real estate for its taxes until fixed by an assessment of the same.
12. We hold that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, upon principles of law stated in the next three succeeding headnotes, the appellee was not an innocent purchaser for value of the property sought to be subjected to taxation.
13. A transfer of property subject to taxation by persons in their individual capacity, to themselves as constituting a corporation, does not constitute such corporation an innocent purchaser of said property, so as to defeat the state's claim for taxes thereon.
14. When a new corporation is created by the consolidation of two or more other corporations, and no provision is made by statute or the articles of incorporation for the payment of the debts and liabilities of the constituent corporations, the new corporation assumes all the debts and liabilities of the constituent companies, which follow as an incident of the consolidation; and, under such circumstances, such consolidated corporation is not an innocent purchaser for value of the property of its constituent companies, so as to prevent the state from subjecting the same to payment of taxes thereon.
15. A corporation from whom taxes are due the state cannot defeat the collection thereof by vesting its property subject to taxes in another corporation, of which it remains a constituent part.
16. Lines of railroad which were not in existence during the years 1879, 1880, and 1881 cannot be taxed for those years that passed away before they were built; neither can they be subjected to sale for payment of taxes due upon other railroads by reason of the accidental circumstance that they have become the property of the same corporation that owns the roads liable to taxation.
17. The act of 1885 (chapter 3558, Laws Fla.) is general in its terms, embraces all of a class,--all railroads in a similar condition. It is not a special or local law, for the assessment and collection of taxes, but is of general and uniform operation throughout the state, and is not in conflict with any provision of the state constitution.
18. The courts cannot be influenced in their action by objections which apply, not to the constitutionality, but only to the policy, the justice, and wisdom of the law. The relief from such legislation, if the objections urged are well taken, must come from the legislative, and not the judicial, department of the government. The courts are bound to uphold the statutes, unless they are clearly in conflict with the constitution. The decree of the circuit court is affirmed in part, and reversed in part.
William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for appellants.
John A. Henderson, for appellee. The Florida Central & Peninsular Railroad Company filed its bill in equity in the circuit court of Leon county against William D. Bloxham, as comptroller of the state of Florida, and John A. Pearce, as sheriff of said county.
Omitting the formal parts, the bill of complaint was as follows:
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