BLUDSAW v. State, 2D01-3574.

• Decision Date: 28 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2D01-3574.,2D01-3574.
• Citation: 837 So.2d 1188
• Parties: Horace BLUDSAW, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

837 So.2d 1188

Horace BLUDSAW, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D01-3574.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

February 28, 2003.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Kevin Briggs, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

STRINGER, Judge.

Horace Bludsaw seeks review of the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress cocaine seized during a search conducted after his vehicle was stopped for traffic violations. Bludsaw argues that the trial court erred in determining that the police had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that would justify his detention after the initial traffic stop. We agree and reverse.

On November 15, 2000, at about 10 p.m., Detective Charles Massucci and Officer Kevin Schoolmeesters conducted surveillance on a Days Inn. Massucci had received a citizen's complaint about nonspecific drug activity at the hotel. Minutes after arriving at the hotel, Massucci and Schoolmeesters observed Bludsaw pull into the parking lot with his wife and two children. Bludsaw got out of his vehicle and disappeared from sight for a few minutes.

When Bludsaw returned to his vehicle, Officer Schoolmeesters followed him. Shortly thereafter, Schoolmeesters stopped Bludsaw for three traffic violations: operating with a defective brake light, failing to stop at a stop sign, and running a traffic light. Detective Massucci was also present at the stop.

Detective Massucci told Bludsaw that the traffic violations provided a basis for the stop, but he believed Bludsaw had engaged in drug activity at the Days Inn. Detective Massucci asked Bludsaw if he could search his vehicle, but Bludsaw refused to consent. In response to the detective's accusations about drug activity, Bludsaw offered the explanation that he had gone to the hotel to visit someone named "E." but that "E." was not available. Detective Massucci testified,

Based on a situation totally separate of this, I know E. I know he's a drug dealer. I know he stays at hotel rooms. My level of suspicion, which is already high, went to the point in my mind, as a police detective, he had purchased drugs. At that point I advised him that I was going to detain him and call for a K9 unit.

Detective Massucci then patted down Bludsaw and escorted Bludsaw to the patrol car to wait for the K9. The detective explained, "There's a potential—[I] put him in the back seat unhandcuffed because at that point if I do find drugs with a K9, he can't run anywhere."

After being in the back of the patrol car for about five to ten minutes, Bludsaw agreed to reveal the location of the drugs if Massucci would not involve his family. Detective Massucci found narcotics in the driver's side door, where Bludsaw told him to look. A complete search of the vehicle revealed a second package of cocaine.

Appellate review of a motion to suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. The trial court's findings of fact will be sustained if they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So.2d 297, 301 n. 7 (Fla. 2001). The trial court's application of the law to the factual findings, however, is reviewed de novo. Id.

The police officers' initial stop of Bludsaw was legal based on the evidence that Bludsaw committed several traffic infractions. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). The fact that Detective Massucci's true motivations for conducting the stop were suspect does not render the stop illegal...