State v. Glatzmayer
Decision Date | 03 May 2001 |
Docket Number | No. SC00-602.,SC00-602. |
Citation | 789 So.2d 297 |
Parties | STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Brian L. GLATZMAYER, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Celia A. Terenzio, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner.
Michael Salnick, West Palm Beach, Florida; and Ian J. Goldstein, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.
We have for review Glatzmayer v. State, 754 So.2d 71 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), wherein the district court certified the following question:
When suspects who are considering waiving their Miranda rights ask law enforcement officers if they should invoke the right to counsel, what does Almeida require of the officers?
Glatzmayer, 754 So.2d at 74. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer as explained below and quash Glatzmayer.
The relevant facts are set forth in the trial court's order denying Glatzmayer's motion to suppress:
(Emphasis added.)
The taped statement was admitted at trial and Glatzmayer was convicted of first-degree felony murder and attempted robbery without a firearm and was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and twelve years imprisonment, respectively. The district court reversed the convictions based on this Court's then-recent decision in Almeida v. State, 737 So.2d 520 (Fla.1999)1, which was unavailable to the trial court at the time of the suppression hearing.2 The district court certified the above question.
Suppression issues are extraordinarily rich in diversity and run the gamut from (1) pure questions of fact,3 to (2) mixed questions of law and fact,4 to (3) pure questions of law.5 Reviewing courts must exercise care when examining such issues, for while the issues themselves may be posed in broad legal terms (e.g., whether a suspect was "in custody," whether conduct by police constituted "interrogation"), the actual ruling is often discrete and factual (e.g., whether police did in fact tell a suspect he was free to go, whether police did in fact ask a suspect if he committed the crime). Appellate courts cannot use their review powers in such cases as a mechanism for reevaluating conflicting testimony and exerting covert control over the factual findings. As with all trial court rulings, a suppression ruling comes to the reviewing court clad in a presumption of correctness as to all fact-based issues,6 and the proper standard of review depends on the nature of the ruling in each case.7 The law in Florida governing custodial utterances has undergone significant change in recent years:
This Court in Long v. State, 517 So.2d 664, 667 (Fla.1987), held that if in the course of custodial interrogation a suspect makes an utterance that may be an attempt to invoke his or her rights, police may "continue questioning for the sole purpose of clarifying the equivocal request." Subsequent to Long, the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 [, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362] (1994), held that if a suspect initially waives his or her rights, the suspect thereafter must clearly invoke those rights during the ensuing interview.... This Court was then faced in State v. Owen, 696 So.2d 715 (Fla.1997), with the issue of whether to adopt the Davis rationale in Florida.
Almeida, 737 So.2d at 522-23 (citations omitted). The particular statements at issue in State v. Owen, 696 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1997), were equivocal utterances8 and the Court concluded that to require police to stop an interview and clarify such statements "places too great an impediment upon society's interest in thwarting crime." Owen, 696 So.2d at 719. The Court followed Davis:
Thus, we hold that police in Florida need not ask clarifying questions if a defendant who has received proper Miranda warnings makes only an equivocal or ambiguous request to terminate an interrogation after having validly waived his or her Miranda rights.
Subsequently, the Court in Almeida v. State, 737 So.2d 520 (Fla.1999), was faced not with an equivocal utterance but with a clear question concerning the suspect's rights after the suspect earlier had waived his rights:
Almeida, 737 So.2d at 522. The Court examined the legal interests at stake and concluded that no valid reason exists for not answering such a question:
No valid societal interest is served by withholding such information. Indeed, both sides can only benefit from disclosure: Disclosure ensures that any subsequent waiver will be knowing and intelligent, and it reaffirms those qualities in a prior waiver. Nondisclosure, on the other hand, is doubly harmful: It exacerbates the inherently coercive atmosphere of the interrogation session, and it places in doubt the knowing and intelligent nature of any waiver—whether prior or subsequent.
Almeida, 737 So.2d at 525 (footnote omitted). The Court ruled thusly:
Accordingly, we hold that if, at any point during custodial interrogation, a suspect asks a clear question concerning his or her rights, the officer must stop the interview and make a good-faith effort to give a simple and straightforward answer.
Almeida, 737 So.2d at 525. To the extent that officers may be uncertain how to respond to a particular question, they may— where appropriate—readvise the suspect of his or her rights.9
Although the trial court below did not have the benefit of Almeida when it decided the suppression issue, this Court generally applies the law as it exists at the time the Court conducts its review.10 Almeida thus controls the present case. Application of the legal standard announced in Almeida to the trial court's findings of historical fact presents an issue that is amenable to de novo analysis by this Court.11
During the suppression hearing, officers Flynn and Brand testified for the State concerning the circumstances surrounding Glatzmayer's utterance. Flynn testified as follows on direct examination:
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