Blum v. Schrader
| Decision Date | 06 November 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. S06A1766.,S06A1766. |
| Citation | 281 Ga. 238,637 S.E.2d 396 |
| Parties | BLUM et al. v. SCHRADER et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Emmet J. Bondurant, David Gregory Hill Brackett, Jason James Carter, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, LLP, Atlanta, Irwin W. Stolz Jr., Winburn Lewis & Stolz, LLP, Athens, for Blum.
Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Dennis R. Dunn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jane A. Range, Hulsey Oliver & Mahar LLP, William H. Blalock Jr., Stewart, Melvin & Frost, LLP, Gainesville Michael Curtis Pruett, Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, P.C., William C. Berryman Jr., Athens, Norman J. Slawsky, Jacobs Slawsky & Barnett, Kirby G. Atkinson, Ekonomou Atkinson & Lambros LLC, Atlanta, Billy Irvan Daughtry Jr., Elberton, for Schrader.
In 2006, the General Assembly enacted S.B. 386, which redrew three state senate districts in the Athens area. Appellant-plaintiffs, who are voters in the newly drawn districts, initially brought an action in federal court attacking the enactment on both constitutional and statutory grounds. However, their claims were found to be meritless. Kidd v. Cox, 2006 WL 1341302 (N.D.Ga. 2006). Appellants then filed this state action, in which they challenged the constitutionality of the enactment and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They alleged that the statute violates Art. III, § II, Par. II of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, which provides:
The General Assembly shall apportion the Senate and House districts. Such districts shall be composed of contiguous territory. The apportionment of the Senate and of the House of Representatives shall be changed by the General Assembly as necessary after each United States decennial census.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court found no merit in the constitutional challenge and dismissed their complaint. Appellants appeal from that order.
1. Appellants acknowledge that, under the Georgia Constitution of 1976, the General Assembly had the discretionary authority to redraw the districts whenever it wished. However, they maintain that that discretionary power was the result of wording which was not carried forward into present Art. III, § II, Par. II. In relevant part, Art. III, § II, Par. I of the former Constitution provided that
[t]he General Assembly may create, rearrange and change Senatorial Districts as it deems proper. . . . The apportionment of the Senate shall be changed by the General Assembly, if necessary, after each United States decennial census becomes official.
According to Appellants, since present Art. III, § II, Par. II no longer provides that the General Assembly "may" reapportion itself "as it deems proper," it lacks the discretionary power to do so more frequently than once every ten years.
Thomas v. MacNeill, 200 Ga. 418, 424, 37 S.E.2d 705 (1946). The former constitutional provision did not specify that the General Assembly could reapportion the districts "whenever" it chose to do so. Instead, it provided that the General Assembly "may create, rearrange and change" the districts "as it deems proper." In their ordinary meaning, the words "create, rearrange and change" do not implicate any concept of time. Instead, they are verbs which are expressive of the act of engaging in a transformative undertaking. Thus, under the former constitutional provision, the General Assembly was authorized to fashion and configure reapportioned districts in any manner or form "as it deem[ed] proper." Appellants may be correct that the General Assembly no longer has that discretionary power. Under present Art. III, § II, Par. II, any district created, rearranged or changed by the General Assembly must be composed of contiguous territory, and not simply "as it deems proper." Insofar as the frequency of reapportionment is concerned, however, the former and present constitutional provisions are essentially identical. Both specify that the General Assembly "shall" reapportion itself when the census renders that act "necessary."
2. Appellants urge that, even if the failure to carry forward the "as it deems proper" language from 1976 Constitution is not a relevant factor, the language of present Art. III, § II, Par. II, standing alone, nevertheless shows that the General Assembly lacked the constitutional authority to enact S.B. 386.
Lowry v. McDuffie, 269 Ga. 202, 206(3), 496 S.E.2d 727 (1998). Service Employees Intl. Union v. Perdue, 280 Ga. 379, 380, 628 S.E.2d 589 (2006).
34;Where the natural and reasonable meaning of a constitutional provision is clear and capable of a `natural and reasonable construction' ([cit.]), courts are not authorized either to read into or read out that which would add to or change its meaning." [Cit.]
Service Employees Intl. Union v. Perdue, supra at 382, 628 S.E.2d 589. Applying these rules of construction here demonstrates that, just as its 1976 counterpart, Art. III, § II, Par. II, does not contain any express temporal limitation on the General Assembly's exercise of its authority to reapportion itself. The first sentence simply provides that the General Assembly "shall apportion the Senate and House districts." This is an obvious general grant of plenary reapportionment power, and not a prohibition on the exercise of that power as often as the General Assembly might choose. As previously noted, the second sentence restricts only the manner or means by which the General Assembly can exercise its reapportionment power, by specifying that the districts "shall be composed of contiguous territory." The third and final sentence does address the timing of reapportionment, by providing that the districts "shall be changed by the General Assembly as necessary after each United States decennial census." However, a requirement that apportionment be undertaken "as necessary" after each census is...
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