Blumberg v. Md. Bd. of Physicians, 0211
| Decision Date | 04 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 0211,0211 |
| Parties | ALBERT BLUMBERG, ET AL. v. MARYLAND BOARD OF PHYSICIANS, ET AL. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
UNREPORTED
Opinion by Hotten, J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
Following the receipt of a complaint regarding the referral practices of Sanford J. Siegel, M.D. ("Dr. Siegel"), the Maryland Board of Physicians ("the Board") entered into a Consent Order with Dr. Siegel, resolving the matter. Appellants, several licensed healthcare providers, brought suit against the Board in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, seeking both an administrative mandamus and a declaratory judgment regarding the Board's interpretation of the Maryland Patient Referral Act. The Board filed motions to dismiss the action and Dr. Siegel, not a party before the circuit court, filed a motion to intervene. The circuit court granted the Board's motions and thereafter, denied Dr. Siegel's motion as moot. Appellants appealed, presenting the following questions for our review, which we have rephrased1:
Dr. Siegel noted a cross-appeal, presenting one question for our review, which we have also rephrased2:
I. Whether the circuit court erred in denying Dr. Siegel's motion to intervene as of right.
For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the circuit court's judgment.
The Health Occupations Article of the Maryland Code, , §1-301 et seq., [hereinafter Health Occ.] governs medical patient referrals in the State. Known as the Patient Referral Law, it provides that:
In November 2007, several health care providers, not appellants, filed a complaint with the Board raising concerns that Dr. Siegel and Chesapeake Urology Associates ("CUA"), an affiliate of Dr. Siegel's practice, were violating the Patient Referral Law. In January of 2012, while this investigation was still pending because they were not parties to the original complaint, appellants filed a separate complaint alleging the same violations. Appellants are three entities licensed to provide medical services in Maryland. Albert Blumberg, M.D. ("Dr. Blumberg") is a radiation oncologist, Maryland Hospital Association ("MHA"), is a licensed state regulated health care provider, and the University of Maryland Medical System ("UMMS") is a hospital health system. On March 27, 2012, the Board entered into a Consent Order3 with Dr. Siegel. Appellants sought judicial review of the Consent Order, but the circuit court dismissed the petition, finding that appellants lacked standing. On June 18, 2013, appellants filed a petition for a Declaratory Ruling with the Board, seeking a ruling clarifying self-referrals and fee splitting under Maryland law. The Board denied the petition.
Appellants then filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the circuit court, requesting that the Board be compelled to issue a declaratory ruling because its refusal to provide guidance was arbitrary and capricious. Three months later, appellants also filed a Declaratory Judgment action, asserting similar claims. The Board filed a motion to dismiss as to each action, contending that appellants lacked standing to pursue a remedy through the courts. Up until this point, Dr. Siegel had not been a party. In Januaryof 2014, he filed a motion to intervene in the declaratory judgment action. The circuit court consolidated both of appellants' actions and in an order dated February 25, 2014, dismissed both. The court ultimately found that appellants lacked standing because they failed to establish a substantial right which the Board had prejudiced. In this same order, the court concluded that Dr. Siegel's motion to intervene was moot because it was dismissing the declaratory action.
Appellants noted a timely appeal, challenging the court's dismissal of both actions. Dr. Siegel noted a cross-appeal challenging the court's finding that his motion to intervene was moot. Additional facts shall be provided, infra, to the extent they prove relevant in addressing the issues presented.
In reviewing a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss, "we accept all well-pled facts in the complaint, and reasonable inferences drawn from them, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." Converge Servs. Group, LLC v. Curran, 383 Md. 462, 475 (2004). We then determine whether the trial court was "legally correct in its decision to dismiss." Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Phillips, 413 Md. 606, 618 (2010) (quoting McDaniel v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 400 Md. 75, 83 (2007))." Kendall v. Howard Cnty., 431 Md. 590, 601-02 (2013).
Appellants contend that the court erred in granting the Board's motion to dismiss their administrative mandamus action. Although in their briefs appellants raised all of the allegations of error they advanced before the trial court,4 the court's findings were based exclusively upon appellants' lack of a substantial right as required by Rule 7-403. Therefore, we shall only address that finding.
The Maryland Rules provide guidelines for when a party may seek a writ of administrative mandamus. Specifically, Maryland Rule 7-401 "govern[s] actions for judicial review of a quasi-judicial order or action of an administrative agency where review is not expressly authorized by law." Maryland Rule 7-403, provides:
Additionally, regarding a writ of mandamus action, this Court has explained:
The common law writ of mandamus is an original action and not an appeal. A writ of mandamus is a summary remedy, for the want of a specific one, where there would otherwise be a failure of justice. It is based upon reasons of justice and public policy, to preserve peace, order and good government. [T]he authority to issue mandamus rests within the sound discretion of the court, but that discretion must be exercised under the rules long recognized and established at common law. We have acknowledged that the power to issue an extraordinary writ of mandamus is one which ought to be exercised with great caution.
Homes Oil Co., Inc. v. Maryland Dept. of Environment, 135 Md. App. 442, 455 (2000). (internal citations and quotations omitted). Appellees contend that an administrative mandamus is not appropriate when an agency exercises its discretionary authority. In response, appellants cited State Dept. of Health v. Walker, 238 Md. 512 (1965), in support of their argument that this assertion is incorrect. There, Walker applied to the Department of Health, seeking permits for water supply and sewage disposal in relation to several large tracts of land he owned. Id. at 516. The Department denied his application and Walker petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus alleging that the denial was arbitrary and lacked justification. Id. at 517. The circuit court agreed with Walker, and granted his petition for mandamus. Id. at 519. The Department appealed, challenging in part the court's issuance of the writ of mandamus. Id. Regarding that issue, the Court stated:
In the past, this Court has held that judicial review could properly be sought by a petition for writ of mandamus where there was no statutory provision for hearing or review and where public officials were alleged to have abused the discretionary powers reposed in them. Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 45 A.2d 73; Hecht v. Crook, 184 Md. 271, 40 A.2d 673. While as a general rule mandamus is not proper to review non-ministerial acts of public officials or agencies, this Court has recognized that such will lie to remedy arbitrary abuses of discretion. Walter v. Montgomery County, 180 Md. 498, 25 A.2d 682. . . .
Id. at 522-23. The Court continued, explaining that acts contrary to law or unsupported by evidence are not within the sound exercise of discretion and accordingly, a petition for writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy. Id. at 523.
More than three decades later, this Court reaffirmed the principle that a party may seek administrative mandamus when alleging an abuse of discretionary power. In Homes, supra, 135 Md. App. at 457 we stated:
In [Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130 (1996)], the Court of Appeals stated that "judicial review is...
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