Board of Assessors of Everett v. Formosi

• Decision Date: 07 December 1965
• Citation: 349 Mass. 727,212 N.E.2d 210
• Parties: BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF EVERETT v. Mary FORMOSL et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 210

212 N.E.2d 210

349 Mass. 727

BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF EVERETT v. Mary FORMOSL et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Nov. 2, 1965.

Decided Dec. 7, 1965.

Sydney S. Rosen, City Sol., for Board of Assessors of Everett.

No argument or brief for taxpayers.

Before SPALDING, CUTTER, KIRK, SPIEGEL, and REARDON, JJ.

CUTTER, Justice.

Michael and Mary Formosi, as tenants by the entirety, owned a building in Everett consisting of two apartments and a store. As of January 1, 1964, it was assessed for $7,500. A tax of $447 was paid. The Formosi family occupied one apartment as their domicil. Formosi, who was born in either 1889 or 1890 and was thus over seventy years of age on January 1, 1964, seasonably filed his 'application for statutory exemption from real estate tax of certain elderly persons,' under G.L. c. 59, § 5, Forty-first (hereinafter called 'the exemption clause'). ¹ Formosi's income consisted of Social Security benefits of $130 a month or $1,560 a year and a net income from real estate of $256.60. He acquired the property in 1927. It does not appear to be disputed that he had maintained his domicil in Massachusetts for over ten years.

The assessors recognized the exemption to the extent of $149, which at the tax rate of $59.60 represented $2,500 of assessed value, i. e. one third of the total assessed value. Formosi then appealed to the Appellate Tax Board under the informal procedure (G.L. c. 58A, § 7A, as amended through St. 1945, c. 621, § 3; see Leen v. Board of Assessors of Boston, 345 Mass. 494, 497, 188 N.E.2d 460) for recognition of the full $4,000 exemption. The board granted a further exemption of $89.40, bringing the total exemption granted up to the full $4,000 mentioned in the statute. The assessors appealed, asserting as ground of appeal that the Formosi family occupy as their domicil 'only one-third of the property, a two family house with an attached store, which property is assessed for * * * $7500 * * * [and] that they were entitled to have an exemption only on that portion which they occupied as their domicil, which in this case would amount to one-third of * * * $7500 * * * which is * * * $2500 * * * rather than the full * * * exemption.'

The pleadings and attached exhibits sufficiently present the facts necessary to raise the only legal issue, viz. whether, where only a part of a parcel of real estate is used as the domicil of a taxpayer entitled to the benefit of the exemption clause, only that proportionate part of the total assessed value is to be eligible for the exemption. The assessors contend that only a proportionate part is to be exempt by analogy to this court's interpretation of other statutory exemptions where only a part of a parcel of land (and the buildings thereon) is used for exempt purposes. See Proprietors of the South Congregational Meetinghouse in Lowell v. City of Lowell, 1 Met. 538, 540-541 (house of religious worship with stores on the property); City of Cambridge v. County Commrs., 114 Mass. 337, 339-340 (upper floors used for college rooms, lower floors, stores); Assessors of Worcester v. Knights of Columbus Religious Educ. Charitable & Benevolent Assn. of Worcester, 329 Mass. 532, 535, 109 N.E.2d 447 (part of building used for exempt charitable purposes of taxpayer, rest of building not so used). See also William T. Stead Memorial Center of New York v. Town of Wareham, 299 Mass. 235, 239, 12 N.E.2d 725 (part of building used for religious purpose, but some rooms used for nonexempt purposes); Nichols, Taxation in Massachusetts (3d ed.) 243 (and Pike and Cohen Supp. 1962, p. 17). No question of constitutionality is before us. See Opinion of the Justices, 324 Mass. 724, 732, 734, 85 N.E.2d 222; Opinion of the Justices, 344 Mass. 766, 181 N.E.2d 793.

The exemption clause seems to us to create an exemption different in purpose and character from that established by the charitable and religious exemptions under G.L. c. 59, § 5, Third and Eleventh, as amended. Those exemptions are based on what the Legislature has considered to be a desirable use, in the public interest, for a religious or a charitable purpose, and not primarily at least upon the financial status and needs of the owner. The exemption clause (§ 5, Forty-first), on the other hand, rests upon the financial exigencies of the elderly owner and his spouse, ² and in some degree resembles the exemptions given to certain deserving and needy veterans, and others (see Opinion of the...