Board of County Com'rs of Adams County v. City of Thornton
| Decision Date | 08 June 1981 |
| Docket Number | 79SC113,Nos. 79SC112,s. 79SC112 |
| Citation | 629 P.2d 605 |
| Parties | The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF ADAMS, State of Colorado; Peter M. Mirelez, John Campbell and James Covey, as members of the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Adams, State of Colorado; David Berger; Warren A. Moreau; Harry Fukaye; James Fukaye; Isamu Fukaye and Henderson Associates, Ltd., a Limited Partnership; Adams County Planning Commission; Lewis W. Stuckert, Walter Fischer, Pauline Carlock, Ray Romero, Alex Ramirez, as members of the Adams County Planning Commission, Petitioners, v. CITY OF THORNTON, Colorado, a Municipal Corporation of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
S. Morris Lubow, County Atty., Linda Donnelly, John E. Bush, Jr., Asst. County Attys., Brighton, for petitioners Board of County Com'rs of the County of Adams, State of Colo., Peter M. Mirelez, John Campbell, and James Covey, as members of the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Adams, State of Colorado.
Berger & Rothstein, P. C., David Berger, Kent Denzel, Commerce City, for petitioners David Berger, Warren A. Moreau, Harry, James and Isamu Fukaye and Henderson Associates, Ltd., a Limited Partnership.
Daniel, McCain & Brown, Leonard H. McCain, City Atty., Steven N. Koeckeritz, Asst. City Atty., Brighton, for respondent.
We granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in City of Thornton v. Board of County Commissioners 42 Colo.App. 102, 595 P.2d 264 (1979), holding that the City of Thornton (City) has standing to challenge actions of the Adams County Planning Commission (Planning Commission) and the Board of County Commissioners of Adams County (Board) in amending the county's comprehensive plan and in rezoning certain property which is adjacent to the City boundary and to certain City-owned property. We now affirm the Court of Appeals' decision.
The City of Thornton filed two actions in the Adams County District Court, naming as defendants the Board and its individual members, the Planning Commission and its individual members, and the owners of the rezoned land (we refer to all the defendants collectively as petitioners). In the first, brought under C.R.C.P. 57 and 106, the City challenged the action of the Planning Commission in adopting an amendment to Adams County's comprehensive plan to permit development of a "research and development type employment park" as a planned unit development on certain lands in the county adjacent to the City boundary. In the second, brought under C.R.C.P. 106, the City challenged the action of the Board in approving the subsequent rezoning of those same lands from MC (Mineral Conservation) and A-1 (Agricultural) to PUD (Planned Unit Development) for research and development.
In each case the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting, among other grounds, that the City lacks standing to bring the action. The district court agreed and dismissed both actions. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the City's pleaded averments that it owned property adjacent to and in the immediate vicinity of the rezoned property and that the City's property was reduced in value by reason of the amendment of the comprehensive plan and the later rezoning were sufficient to confer standing on the City to contest the legality of the Adams County actions. 1
For convenience, we sometimes refer to the property which was rezoned as the PUD property and to the adjacent City-owned property as the City property. We also refer to Adams County's comprehensive plan as its master plan, the term used in our statutes. See section 30-28-106, C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl.Vol. 12) (1980 Supp.).
An outline of the relevant statutory framework for county planning and zoning will provide a useful general background for consideration of the issues which we must decide.
Each board of county commissioners is authorized "to provide for the physical development of the unincorporated territory within the county and for the zoning of all or any part of such unincorporated territory ..." Section 30-28-102, C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl.Vol. 12). The board of county commissioners is authorized to appoint members of a county planning commission. Section 30-28-103, C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl.Vol. 12) (1980 Supp.).
The county planning commission has the duty to make and adopt a master plan for the physical development of the unincorporated territory of the county, showing the commission's recommendations for such development. 2 Section 30-28-106(1) and (3), C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl.Vol. 12) (1980 Supp.). In the preparation of such a plan, the commission must make careful and comprehensive surveys and studies of the existing conditions and probable future growth of the territory within its jurisdiction to accomplish purposes expressed at length in the statute. Section 30-28-107, C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl.Vol. 12) (1980 Supp.). The commission must certify a copy of the master plan to the board of county commissioners. Section 30-28-109, C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl.Vol. 12).
The commission may, and on order of the board of county commissioners must, make a zoning plan, including a zoning resolution and maps, for zoning all or any part of the unincorporated territory within the county. Section 30-28-111(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl.Vol. 12) (1980 Supp.). The county planning commission then is to certify a copy of the zoning plan to the board of county commissioners, which in turn must give public notice, hold a public hearing, and then may adopt zoning resolutions. Section 30-28-112, C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl.Vol. 12). 3 The board of county commissioners may make no substantial change in the zoning resolution or map originally certified, and may make no change after adoption, unless the proposed change is first submitted to the county planning commission for its approval, disapproval or suggestions. Sections 30-28-112 and 116, C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl.Vol. 12).
Against this background, we consider the issues before us.
The petitioners assert that the trial court was correct in concluding that the City lacks standing to contend that the amendment to the master plan and the subsequent rezoning were accomplished in violation of applicable legal standards and requirements. We disagree and so affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's judgments. 4
In Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977), we held that "(t)he proper inquiry on standing is whether the plaintiff has suffered injury in fact to a legally protected interest as contemplated by statutory or constitutional provisions." Accord, City of Colorado Springs v. State of Colorado, Colo., 626 P.2d 1122 (1980); Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Byrne, Colo., 618 P.2d 1374 (1980); Dodge v. Department of Social Services, 198 Colo. 379, 600 P.2d 70 (1979). The City meets that test in this case.
Thornton is a home-rule city. As such, it has the power to "purchase, receive, hold, and enjoy or sell and dispose of, real and personal property...." Colo.Const. Art. XX §§ 1, 6. In exercise of that power the City owns the City property which is contiguous to the PUD property.
In its complaints in the consolidated cases before us, the City avers that the amendment to the Adams County master plan and the subsequent rezoning of the PUD property have caused the City property to diminish in value. 5 The City further avers that the master plan amendment and the rezoning were wrongful in that they were accomplished in violation of certain applicable legal requirements. 6 The trial court concluded that the City lacks standing to assert the alleged violations and granted the petitioners' motions to dismiss the complaints.
In considering a motion to dismiss, all averments of material fact in a complaint must be accepted as true. E. g., Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 150 Colo. 504, 374 P.2d 691 (1962). Thus, we accept as factual the City's pleaded statements that the changes in the master plan and in the zoning caused the City property to lose value.
It cannot be doubted that diminution of value of the City property constitutes injury in fact. Therefore, if the City's interest in maintaining the value of its property is legally protected, the Wimberly test for standing has been met.
We have held that an owner of property adjacent to rezoned land has standing to challenge rezoning which adversely affects his property. Dillon Companies v. City of Boulder, 183 Colo. 117, 515 P.2d 627 (1973); accord, Bedford v. Board of County Commissioners, 41 Colo.App. 125, 584 P.2d 90 (1978); Snyder v. City Council, 35 Colo.App. 32, 531 P.2d 643 (1974). Implicit in these decisions is the conclusion that a complaining property owner, such as the City here, has a legally protected interest in insulating its property from adverse effects caused by the legally deficient rezoning of adjacent property.
Unless a different result is required because the City property is within the City limits, while the rezoning was accomplished by a separate governmental entity and is limited to property outside the City limits, the City should be recognized to have standing under Wimberly to challenge the County's actions. We now consider whether standing must be denied to the City because of an asserted disability of one governmental entity to challenge the zoning decisions of another or because of an asserted principle that property owners in one jurisdiction lack the right to challenge zoning changes made by an adjoining jurisdiction.
The General Assembly has given the counties paramount authority to provide for the zoning of unincorporated territory within their boundaries. By section 30-28-102, C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl.Vol. 12), the power to zone that territory is granted to the respective boards of county commissioners. Although a municipality may adopt a master plan which includes ...
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