Board of County Com'rs of Muskogee County v. City of Muskogee
| Decision Date | 05 November 1991 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 72761,D,72748,I-20,s. 72761 |
| Citation | 820 P.2d 797,1991 OK 115 |
| Parties | The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY, Oklahoma, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY OF MUSKOGEE, Defendant-Appellee. The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY, Oklahoma, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF MUSKOGEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DISTRICTefendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Appeals from the District Court, Muskogee County; G. Bruce Sewell, Judge.
The Board of County Commissioners of Muskogee County brought two separate mandamus proceedings in the district court to compel the City of Muskogee and the Board of Education of Muskogee Public Schools to pay their proportionate share of the costs for the ad valorem tax revaluation program. Upon consolidation of the cases the trial court directed the school board to pay its proportionate share of the revaluation program's cost but denied the same relief against the city. The county commissioners and school board bring separate appeals, which are consolidated for disposition by a single opinion.
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IN MANDAMUS IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT.
Norman D. Thygesen, Asst. Dist. Atty., Muskogee County, Muskogee, for appellant in No. 72,761 and appellee in No. 72,748, Board of County Com'rs of Muskogee.
Steven Cousparis, Robert DuPriest, City Attorney's Office, Muskogee, for appellee in No. 72,761, City of Muskogee.
Julian K. Fite, Muskogee, for appellant in No. 72,748, Board of Educ. of Muskogee Public School Dist. I-20.
J.I.M. Caldwell, Oklahoma City, for amicus curiae in Nos. 72,761 and 72,748, Ass'n of County Com'rs of Oklahoma, Inc.
Robert H. Macy, Dist. Atty., Hugh A. Manning, Asst. Dist. Atty., Oklahoma County, Oklahoma City, for amicus curiae in Nos. 72,761 and 72,748, Board of County Com'rs of Oklahoma County, Okl.
Diane Pedicord, Sue Ann Nicely, Oklahoma City, for amicus curiae in No. 72,761, Oklahoma Mun. League, Inc.
Three questions are tendered in appeal No. 72,761: Does the statute-mandated program of revaluation of taxable county property 1 impose a duty on a recipient municipality of ad valorem tax revenues to pay its share of the revaluation cost? Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then Does the county excise board also have a statute-imposed obligation to make ad valorem millage for payment of these costs available to a municipality? and Do the provisions of 68 O.S.1981 § 2481.4, 2 when applied to a municipality, contravene our constitutional or statutory law? We answer the first question in the affirmative, and the last two in the negative.
The question tendered in appeal No. 72,748 is whether the terms of § 2481.4, which make the recipient entities of ad valorem tax revenues responsible for paying the property revaluation program's cost, violate any provisions of Art. 10 §§ 9, 3 19 4 and 20 5 and Art. 5 §§ 46 6 and 59, OKL. CONST7. Our answer to this question is in the negative.
THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION
In compliance with the statutory regime, Muskogee County proceeded in 1983 with a comprehensive program to revaluate all property within the county. The Board of County Commissioners [Commissioners] billed the City for its proportionate share of the revaluation costs for the 1983-84 fiscal year. The county excise board approved the City's payment of this expense from its excess revenues in the 1983-84 sinking fund budget. When the following year the excise board approved a request to levy millage for the City's 1984-85 sinking fund budget to pay the City's share of revaluation costs, some utility-taxpayers challenged the action by suit. The Court of Appeals held the levy contravened the terms of Art. 10 § 28, Okl. Const., 8 which restrict the sinking fund use to payment of interest coupons, bonds and judgments. See Matter of Protests of Southwestern Bell. 9 Faced with this decision, the excise board ceased making appropriations of ad valorem tax millage to the City's sinking fund budget for the revaluation expenses, although the City continued to be billed for its share of the program costs. The controversy now before us was occasioned by the City's refusal to pay its proportionate share of the revaluation program for three fiscal years--1984-85 through 1986-87.
The Commissioners sought mandamus 10 compelling the City to meet its statute-imposed obligation to pay the revaluation costs for the three fiscal years in contest. 11 The City countered that (a) the excise board failed to allocate any funds to the City's budget for payment of these costs and (b) any legal requirement to pay for the program from revenue independently generated either from city taxes or from the City's sinking fund violates certain provisions of state fundamental law.
The Commissioners also pressed a mandamus claim against the Board of Education of Muskogee Public Schools, District I-20 [School Board] to compel payment of the 1986-87 fiscal-year revaluation costs. 12 The School Board, which had paid its share for the fiscal years 1983-84 through 1985-86, denied liability for the 1986-87 fiscal year. Its position was that (a) the excise board failed to allocate any funds to the School Board budget to defray this expense and (b) any legal requirement to use for the revaluation program funds specifically budgeted "for educational purposes" is constitutionally impermissible.
During the fiscal years in contest the county assessor prepared a special budget for the revaluation costs, which the excise board assessed against the City and School Board in proportion to those entities' share in the total ad valorem tax revenue. Neither the City's general fund nor its sinking fund contained a separate appropriation for payment of revaluation cost. The City submitted only its sinking fund budget to the excise board for review and approval of a share of the millage rates available for sinking funds. 13 The School Board's estimated budget, like that of the City, contained no separate or identifiable appropriation for its share of revaluation costs.
Upon consolidation of the two mandamus proceedings for a single trial, the district court ordered that mandamus issue against the School Board but not against the City. The ruling rests on the legal conclusion that (a) the statute-imposed revaluation program is constitutional and (b) the revaluation program does not constitute a "state purpose". The City was found not liable for its assessed share of the costs based on the judge's view that (a) § 2481.4 14 contemplates the revaluation cost would be paid by ad valorem tax revenues themselves, (b) the City's general fund received no specific millage appropriation for this purpose and (c) the City's use of the sinking fund millage to finance the revaluation program would be constitutionally impermissible. From this order the School Board and the Commissioners brought separate appeals, which stand consolidated for disposition by a single opinion.
The enactment of ad valorem tax revaluation program introduced a comprehensive statewide regime for all taxable properties within every county of the State. 15 Section 2481.1 16 commands that revaluation process be carried out on a continuous basis and be conducted at least once each five years. All county assessors are given the responsibility to ensure that all property is revaluated. They are required to submit a special budget for the revaluation cost to the county excise board, which must review and approve the special budget. 17 The excise board must then apportion the cost among the diverse recipients of ad valorem tax revenues. 18 The apportionment is to be based upon the ratio that each recipient's total tax proceeds (collected from its mill rates levied for the preceding year) bear to the total proceeds of all the recipients' levied mill rates. 19 Every ad valorem millage recipient is required to pay its proportionate share of revaluation costs. 20
Mandamus, an extraordinary legal remedy, 21 is governed by the terms of 12 O.S.1981 §§ 1451 and 1452. 22 Before a writ may issue there must be found (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner, (2) the respondent's refusal to perform a plain non-discretionary legal duty and (3) the writ's appropriateness as a legal remedy and the inadequacy of other relief. 23
THE CITY HAS A STATUTE-IMPOSED DUTY TO PAY ITS SHARE OF THE
The City, which asserts that the legislatively mandated equalization and revaluation program should be viewed as an exclusive state-controlled activity, 24 directs our attention to the statutory text which provides that the program is established, supervised and directed by the State Board of Equalization 25 and is to be carried out as an exclusive duty of the county assessor. 26 Relying on State ex rel. Dept. of Human Serv. v. Malibie 27 and State ex rel. Jordan v. City of Bethany, 28 the City asserts the test of "municipal purpose"--as distinguished from "state purpose"--calls for measuring the municipality's degree of "control" over the program. Any benefit to the City from the revaluation process, the City urges, falls beneath the constitutional minimum gauge for qualifying as a municipal purpose. 29 According to the argument, the duty to fund the revaluation function under review cannot be legislatively imposed on a municipality unless the state surrenders its control over the program. Even if the program did satisfy a municipal purpose, the City claims that neither cities nor towns can be required to fund state or county programs over which the municipality wields no control. For the reasons to be explained, we reject the position advanced by the City.
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