Lombardi v. Montgomery County

• Decision Date: 01 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. 854,854
• Citation: 673 A.2d 762,108 Md.App. 695
• Parties: Anthony LOMBARDI v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Maryland. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 695

108 Md.App. 695

673 A.2d 762

Anthony LOMBARDI v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Maryland.

No. 854, Sept. Term, 1995.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 28, 1996.

Kenneth M. Berman (Berman, Sobin & Gross and Eric M. Cotts, on the brief) Gaithersburg, for Appellant.

Charles L. Frederick, Assistant County Attorney (Charles W. Thompson, Jr., County Attorney and Joann Robertson, Senior Assistant County Attorney, on the brief) Rockville, for Appellee.

Argued before CATHELL, DAVIS and HARRELL, JJ.

CATHELL, Judge.

Anthony Lombardi, appellant, was employed as a firefighter and paramedic by Montgomery County Department of Fire and Rescue Services, appellee. In 1988, he was diagnosed with hypertension. Roughly three and one-half years later, in late 1991, an examining physician concluded that appellant's condition stemmed from his employment. He thereafter filed a claim seeking compensation under the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act (the Act). See Maryland Code (1991 Repl.Vol., 1995 Supp.), §§ 9-101 to 9-1201 of the Labor and Employment Article (LE). In an Order dated April 18, 1994, the Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission) disallowed his claim, finding that it was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations in respect to the filing of claims with the Commission and that appellant had not sustained an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment within the meaning of the Act. On appeal to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, the court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee. In this appeal from that judgment, appellant presents three questions, which we rephrase as follows:

1. Did the circuit court err when it ruled that the statute of limitations began to run when the claimant knew or should have known that his occupational disease was caused by his employment?

2. Did the circuit court err in granting summary judgment because the question of when appellant knew or should have known that his illness was caused by his employment was a question of material fact still in dispute?

3. Did the circuit court err in concluding that the statute of limitations began to run in 1988 because appellant was not actually incapacitated or disabled at that time?

Because we hold that the circuit court erred in respect to appellant's first two questions, we shall reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee and remand this case to the circuit court.

Statement of the Facts

Appellant was employed as a firefighter and paramedic by appellee for thirteen years. As a result of an unrelated back injury, he retired from service in April of 1988 on a disability pension. Upon his retirement, appellant was given an exit physical examination, during which no finding of an elevated or heightened blood pressure was made.

Later that same year, appellant was first diagnosed with hypertension in the course of a routine visit to his family physician. According to appellant, it was not until 1991, following a discussion with his attorney, that he realized that there could be a connection between his hypertension and his former occupation. This belief was substantiated when a Dr. Richard Schwartz thereafter reached the opinion that appellant's hypertension did, in fact, result from his work as a firefighter.

Appellant filed a claim with the Commission on September 7, 1991, more than three years after the initial diagnosis, but at approximately the same time as the rendering of Dr. Schwartz's opinion, stating that he had become disabled due to hypertension, an occupational disease, as a result of his employment as a firefighter. ¹ At the subsequent hearing, held on March 21, 1994, appellant testified that it was in 1991, well after he had retired from appellee's employ, that he first realized that his hypertension was related to his former employment. By Order dated April 18, 1994, the Commission disallowed appellant's claim upon finding (1) that it was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for occupational diseases and (2) that appellant had not sustained an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment within the meaning of the Act. From this determination, appellant filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.

Before the circuit court, appellant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, in which he sought a determination that his claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. Appellee, in response, filed a memorandum in opposition thereto and a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. A hearing was held on the cross motions, during which the court remarked on the similarity between this case and a case previously heard by the court. ² The court, consistent with its ruling in that prior case, held that the statute of limitations began to run when appellant had either knowledge or reason to believe that his hypertension was job-related. The court then found that the limitations period began to run when appellant was first diagnosed with hypertension, and, because he had not filed his claim within two years from that time, his claim was barred. See LE § 9-711(a). Summary judgment was, accordingly, entered by the circuit court in favor of appellee. Because of the nature of its ruling, the trial court did not address the second prong of the Commission's findings.

The Knowledge Requirement of LE § 9-711(a)(2)

Appellant avers that the circuit court erred when it ruled that the two-year statute of limitations began to run when he was first diagnosed with hypertension--i.e., when he should have known that his hypertension was causally related to his former employment as a firefighter. Instead, appellant insists, the statute of limitations began to run when he first had actual knowledge that his disability was linked to his occupation.

Section 9-711(a) of the Act, the limitations section at issue, in relevant part, reads:

(a) Filing claim.--If a covered employee suffers a disablement or death as a result of an occupational disease, the covered employee ... shall file a claim with the Commission within 2 years ... after the date:

(1) of disablement or death; or

(2) when the covered employee ... first had actual knowledge that the disablement was caused by the employment. [Emphasis added.]

In undertaking an analysis of this section, we must first set forth the principles that guide our interpretation of a statute. Our end, in this respect, is to determine the intent of the Legislature when it adopted the section now in dispute. State v. Kennedy, 320 Md. 749, 755, 580 A.2d 193 (1990); Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730 (1986). We "begin[ ] with the words of the statute" itself. Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 145, 626 A.2d 946 (1993); Holman v. Kelly Catering, Inc., 334 Md. 480, 485, 639 A.2d 701 (1994); see also State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 92, 581 A.2d 9 (1990) ("When interpreting a statute, the starting point is the wording of the relevant provisions."). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, "we assume that the words of the statute are intended to have their natural, ordinary and generally understood meaning." Brodsky v. Brodsky, 319 Md. 92, 98, 570 A.2d 1235 (1990); Barr v. Barberry Bros., Inc., 99 Md.App. 33, 37, 635 A.2d 64 (1994). Moreover, "where statutory provisions are clear and unambiguous, no construction or clarification is needed or permitted, it being the rule that a plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to extend or limit the scope of its operation." Tucker, 308 Md. at 73, 517 A.2d 730; Barr, 99 Md.App. at 37-38, 635 A.2d 64; see also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. State, 87 Md.App. 287, 292-93, 589 A.2d 569 (1991).

However, "the plain meaning rule of construction is not absolute; rather, the statute must be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body." Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590 (1992); Barr, 99 Md.App. at 37, 635 A.2d 64. In this respect, "pertinent parts of the legislative language [should be read] together, giving effect to all of those parts if we can, and rendering no part of the law surplusage." Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Department of Employment & Training, 309 Md. 28, 40, 522 A.2d 382 (1987); Holman, 334 Md. at 485, 639 A.2d 701.

Furthermore, in workers' compensation cases, "[a]ny uncertainty in the law should be resolved in favor of the claimant." Victor v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 318 Md. 624, 629, 569 A.2d 697 (1990). Nonetheless, while it is true that the "Act is to be construed liberally in favor of injured employees, 'this does not mean that the Act should be construed to provide for compensation beyond that authorized.' " Subsequent Injury Fund v. Ehrman, 89 Md.App. 741, 751, 599 A.2d 875 (1992) (quoting Subsequent Injury Fund v. Thomas, 275 Md. 628, 635, 342 A.2d 671 (1975)); Barr, 99 Md.App. at 39, 635 A.2d 64. With these precepts in mind, we turn our attention to the statutory language at issue.

Although we perceive the language of LE § 9-711(a)(2) to be clear and unambiguous on its face, a review of prior codifications of this section will be instructive, because "[g]enerally, a substantive amendment to an existing statute indicates an intent to change the meaning of that statute." In re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 689, 516 A.2d 976 (1986); Harris, 331 Md. at 146, 626 A.2d 946; C & R Contractors v. Wagner, 93 Md.App. 801, 809, 614 A.2d 1035 (1992), cert. denied, 329 Md. 480, 620 A.2d 350 (1993).

Starting in 1947, ARTICLE 101, § 26 OF THE MARYLAND CODE³ read, in pertinent part If no claim for disability or death from an occupational disease be filed with the State Industrial Accident Commission ⁴ within one (1) year from the date of disablement or death, as the case may be, the right to compensation for such disease shall be forever barred...