Board of County Com'rs of Jefferson County v. Mountain Air Ranch
| Decision Date | 31 January 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 27119,27119 |
| Citation | 192 Colo. 364,563 P.2d 341 |
| Parties | BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF JEFFERSON, State of Colorado, a body politic and corporate, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MOUNTAIN AIR RANCH, a Colorado nonprofit corporation, and HHH Corporation, a Colorado Corporation, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Patrick R. Mahan, Jefferson County Atty., Gail E. Shields, Asst. Jefferson County Atty., Golden, for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynard, Dorwart & Booms, P.C., William F. Reynard, Denver, for defendants-appellants.
This is an appeal from a Jefferson County District Court decision ordering the removal of house trailers from Mountain Air Ranch. We agree with the district court that occupancy of the land by the trailers in question was in violation of valid zoning laws and we therefore affirm the judgment.
Mountain Air Ranch, a private resort facility, leases approximately 150 acres of land in Jefferson County from co-defendant HHH Corporation (hereinafter referred to jointly as Mountain Air). In 1955 the area occupied by Mountain Air was zoned Agricultural-Two (A-2) which permitted agricultural uses and 'amusement resorts' (if approved by the Board of Adjustment) but did not allow mobile homes or trailers. At the time the area was zoned, there were three trailers on the property. When the county brought this action, that number had risen to 20.
After several requests for compliance with the zoning laws had been ignored by Mountain Air, the county filed an action asking for injunctive relief requiring the removal of the trailers. The complaint also contained a request that Mountain Air be assessed penalties as provided in C.R.S. 1963, 106--2--23 and 36--15--9. 1
The district court found that since only three trailers were on the property in 1955 when the area was zoned to exclude trailers, the other 17 trailers must be removed.
Appellant Mountain Air alleges several errors. We will deal with each allegation in turn.
Mountain Air first contends that it was being criminally prosecuted and that therefore it was the county's burden to prove its case 'beyond a reasonable doubt.'
In paragraph five of its second amended complaint, the county requested that if, pursuant to a court order, the violations were not 'corrected' within the proper time, Mountain Air should be found in violation of C.R.S. 1963, 106--2--23 and 36--15--9 and fined $100 for each day of delinquency. On two occasions during his closing argument, the county attorney asked that this paragraph be stricken. It is not clear from the record whether the court granted this motion, but the court clearly did not make a finding based on this charge, nor did it enter any judgment based on it.
If a proceeding substantively involves incarceration or other criminal sanctions, of course, all the traditional criminal safeguards must attach. Mora v. District Court, 177 Colo. 381, 494 P.2d 596 (1972). However, this case proceeded throughout as a civil action and it was not until closing arguments that the issue of paragraph five was raised. It was raised by defendants and, in response, the county attorney asked that the paragraphs dealing with penalties be stricken. It is the substance rather than the form of a proceeding that determines its nature. The issues tried here were purely of an equitable nature and the judgment rendered was strictly a civil one. The reasonable doubt standard pertaining to criminal matters was therefore inapplicable.
Mountain Air argues that even if this were a civil action, the mere presence of the criminal charge prejudiced its defense since it 'chilled' the willingness of corporate officers to testify. While it is true that testifying may expose witnesses to future prosecution, this is the effect of any testimony in any proceeding, civil or criminal. The officers were no more 'chilled' by the presence of paragraph five than they would have been if the paragraph had never been included. Mountain Air's contention of prejudice is, therefore, without foundation.
Mountain Air, citing Combined Communications Corp. v. City & County of Denver, Colo., 542 P.2d 79 (1975), next argues that the zoning laws are an absolute prohibition of a valid property use and not within the power delegated to the Board of County Commissioners by section 30--28--113(1), C.R.S. 1973 to 'regulate' uses.
Section 8: R-T Residential Trailer District Resolution paragraph B(1) provides: 'It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to place, keep, or maintain any automobile trailer or house car upon any lot, piece or parcel of ground within the County of Jefferson, Except in a legal trailer camp or camp ground as approved in accordance with Section 36 of this Resolution. . . .' (emphasis added)
Since this resolution clearly allows trailers to be placed in R-T districts which are zoned for such mobile homes, Jefferson County does not 'absolutely prohibit' trailers and Mountain Air's argument is without merit.
Appellant contends that the zoning regulations restricting trailers to trailer camps is unconstitutional as an abuse of the police power.
Zoning regulations must bear a real and substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals or welfare. Stroud v. City of Aspen, 188 Colo. 1, 532 P.2d 720 (1975). However, as we have noted several times, zoning plans are presumed to be constitutional and it is the burden of one challenging such a regulation to demonstrate its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. Wright v. City of Littleton, 174 Colo. 318, 483 P.2d 953 (1971); Huneke v. Glaspy, 155 Colo. 593, 396 P.2d 453 (1964); Frankel v. City & County of Denver, 147 Colo. 373, 363 P.2d 1063 (1961); Baum v. City & County of Denver, 147 Colo. 104, 363 P.2d 688 (1961).
Mountain Air incorrectly argues that it is the county's burden to show that the trailers constitute a public nuisance or a hazard to public health and safety. Such a view misstates the law.
The burden was upon Mountain Air to show unconstitutionality. The validity of the regulations must be upheld in the absence of evidence demonstrating that they do not foster legitimate governmental purposes.
Appellant also argues that the zoning scheme is an abuse of the police power since it prevents the use of the subject property for any purpose to which it is reasonably adapted.
Zoning regulations which preclude the use of property for any reasonable purpose whatsoever are invalid. Famularo v. Board of County Commissioners, 180 Colo. 333, 505 P.2d 958 (1973); Nopro v. Town of Cherry Hills Village, 180 Colo. 217, 504 P.2d 344 (1972). But it is clearly not necessary that the land be available for the 'highest and best' use. It is only necessary that a reasonable use be available. Famularo v. Board of County Commissioners, supra; Nopro v. Town of Cherry Hills Village, supra.
Mountain Air has failed to show that the removal of trailers will make the area unusable for any reasonable purpose. Absent such a showing, the validity of the regulations must be sustained.
Mountain Air argues that Section 8 of the Jefferson County Zoning Resolution which restricts trailers to trailer camps is overbroad and could result in a taking of property without due process. This argument is based on their contention that Section 8 universally prohibits trailers throughout the county. As we have pointed out, we do not so read Section 8. Trailer parks are permitted in the county as part of the zoning plan.
Assigning certain uses to certain zones is clearly a legitimate exercise of the police power. Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926).
We have stated that:
'The board of county commissioners, as the legislative body, has a wide prerogative under C.R.S. 1963, 106--2--10, in classifying and regulating uses of land for trade, industry, recreation and other purposes, and it is not the function of the courts to determine how uses shall be defined or what uses shall be permitted in various districts under comprehensive zoning resolutions.' Board of County Commissioners v. Thompson, 177 Colo. 277, 284, 493 P.2d 1358, 1361 (1972).
We find nothing unreasonable in restricting trailer homes to Residential-Trailer zones.
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