Board of Directors of Middle Kittitas Irr. Dist. v. Peterson

• Decision Date: 15 April 1892
• Citation: 4 Wash. 147,29 P. 995
• Parties: BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF MIDDLE KITTITAS IRRIGATION DIST. v. PETERSON.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

29 P. 995

4 Wash. 147

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF MIDDLE KITTITAS IRRIGATION DIST. v. PETERSON.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 15, 1892

Appeal from superior court, Kittitas county; CARROLL B. GRAVES Judge.

Special proceedings by petition of the board of directors of the Middle Kittitas Irrigation District for the examination approval, and confirmation of proceedings had for the issue and sale of irrigation bonds to the amount of $200,000. W. H Peterson contested the proceedings, and contended that the amount for which the district proposed to issue bonds was largely in excess of 5 per centum of the assessed valuation of the property situated within the district; and that the indebtedness violated Const. art. 8, § 6, which provides that "no county, city, town, school district, or other municipal corporation" shall incur an indebtedness in excess of 5 per centum of its taxable property. Judgment for contestant. Petitioners appeal. Reversed.

Parsons & Corell, for appellants.

Ralph Kauffman, for respondent.

HOYT J.

In view of the opinion rendered in the court below, and of the concessions and argument of respondent in this court, but one question is left for decision here: Is an irrigation district formed under the provisions of the act entitled "An act providing for the organization and government of irrigating districts and the sale of bonds arising therefrom," approved March 20, 1890, a "municipal corporation," within the meaning of section 6 of article 8 of the constitution of this state? It is conceded that the scope of said act is such that, if it is held that the districts thus created are such municipal corporations, said act must be held to be unconstitutional and void. When any question involving the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is presented to a court for adjudication, it calls for the utmost care and consideration of such court in determining the same, and, if this is true in an ordinary case, it is much more so in the one at bar, which presents a question of public policy of the gravest nature,-one, in fact, upon which depends to a great extent the prosperity of a very considerable portion of the inhabitants of the state. If the act in question cannot be sustained by reason of such constitutional provision, it is conceded that no act which would be effective for the purpose can be enacted by the legislature until a change is made in the constitution. In view of these considerations we have given this case such careful consideration as the facilities at our hands would allow, and will now proceed to examine the same. But before entering upon such examination, it is deemed useful to say a word in regard to the rule of construction which should govern courts in the investigation of questions of this nature. Our government consists of three coequal branches or departments, each of equal dignity, and entitled to equal consideration; and it must follow that when one of such branches has assumed to act upon a question within its jurisdiction, each of the other departments will give due regard to such action, and will consider it conclusive upon them unless, by reason of some power greater than either of the departments, it is made the duty of a particular branch to review the action of another, and, even then, such action will be assumed to be proper and legal until the contrary is made clearly to appear. When courts assume to pass upon an act of the legislature, and determine whether or not it is constitutional, they do not do so for the purpose of setting up their judgment as against that of the legislature; but from the necessities of the case they are made the final judge of whether or not the legislature has kept within the scope of its authority, as defined and laid down by the constitution, which must control as the supreme law of the land. It follows, from these considerations, that courts will never hold a law to be void unless in their opinion it clearly violates some express provision of the constitution. If, after the fullest investigation, the court is in doubt as to whether or not the law is constitutional, the act will be given the benefit of such doubt, and held valid and binding. The rule, as above outlined, is not only founded upon sound reason, but has been sustained by a long course of adjudication.

Mr. Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations, in sustaining the above rule of construction, quotes the opinion of many eminent jurists, all tending to establish the absoluteness of said rule. He says "It has been said by an eminent jurist that, when courts are called upon to pronounce the invalidity of an act of legislation passed with all the forms and ceremonies requisite to give it the force of law, they will approach the question with great caution, examine it in every possible aspect, and ponder upon it as long as deliberation and patient attention can throw any light upon the subject, and never declare a statute void unless the nullity and invalidity of the act should appear in their judgment beyond reasonable doubt." BEAN, J., states the rule in the following language: "Every court approaches with hesitancy the question of declaring a law unconstitutional, and never exerts its power so to do while doubt exists. Every intendment must be given in favor of the law." See Cook v. Port of Portland, 20 Or. 580, 27 P. 263. Quotations similar to these could be given almost without limit, but it is enough to say that courts of last resort have always adhered to the rule substantially as above stated.

With this rule for our guidance, then, we must enter upon the investigation of the question before us, and, in view of such rule, it will be seen that it is not for us to decide whether or not such districts might not reasonably be held to be municipal corporations, within the meaning contended for but, on the contrary, it is our duty to see if there is any reasonable classification of such districts which will place them outside of the inhibition of such section of the constitution. That they are not "municipal corporations," within the strict and better use of said term, is conceded by respondent, and is, indeed, clear from the authorities; but it is claimed that said section 6 of article 8 has by its language made counties and school districts, as well as cities and towns, "municipal corporations," within the meaning of said section, and that for that reason...