Board of Directors of Maine School Administrative Dist. No. 75 v. Merrymeeting Educators' Ass'n
| Decision Date | 24 March 1976 |
| Citation | 354 A.2d 169 |
| Parties | 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2268, 80 Lab.Cas. P 53,965 BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF MAINE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT NO. 75 v. MERRYMEETING EDUCATORS' ASSOCIATION and Florence Small. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Fitzgerald, Donovan & Conley, P.A. by Mark L. Haley, Daniel R. Donovan, Bath, for plaintiff.
Locke, Campbell & Chapman by Frank G. Chapman, Augusta, for defendants.
Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEATHERBEE, POMEROY, WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, JJ.
Plaintiff has appealed from the decision of the Justice of the Superior Court confirming the award of an arbitrator, which directed the renewal of the teaching contract of the defendant, Mrs. Florence Small.
We deny the appeal.
The Board of Directors of Maine School Administrative District No. 75 (the Board), in support of its appeal contends it is entitled to have the award vacated under the Uniform Arbitration Act, which authorizes a court to vacate an award where 'the arbitrators exceeded their powers.' 14 M.R.S.A. § 5938(1) (C).
Since the award was the result of grievance arbitration, we recognize that the Board's application to vacate the award proceeded under the appropriate statute, namely, the Uniform Arbitration Act. Maine Sch. Admin, Dist #5 v. M.S.A.D. #5 Teach. Ass'n, 324 A.2d 308 (Me.1974); see Superintending School Com. v. Portland Teach. Ass'n, 338 A.2d 155 (Me.1975).
The Board and Merrymeeting Educators' Association (the Association) were parties to a collective bargaining agreement. Mrs. Florence Small was a fourth grade teacher within this system and had earned the status of a continuing contract teacher as opposed to a probationary teacher. 1
Mrs. Small was notified by the Board that her teaching contract for 1974-75 would not be renewed. Deeming this nonrenewal of the teaching contract to be an arbitrable grievance, the various steps for the resolution of grievances specified in the arbitration contract were then followed, to and including binding arbitration. The arbitrator determined that the Board had acted without just cause in not renewing the teaching contract, thus violating the then existing collective bargaining agreement. He directed the Board to renew Mrs. Small's teaching contract for the school year 1974-75. This litigation ensued.
The Board now contends that the arbitrator exceeded his authority because, it argues, 'he has not construed the terms of the contract or even the essence of the contract but has dispensed his own brand of justice and has acted ultra vires.'
The Association and Mrs. Small, on the other hand, argue that the arbitrator stayed properly within the confines of the arbitration agreement and, therefore, acted pursuant to his delegated authority.
The litigants agree that the right of a continuing contract teacher to engage in binding arbitration when renewal of the teaching contract is denied is a proper subject of grievance arbitration.
20 M.R.S.A. § 161(5) mandates the continuation of teacher contracts for those who have served a probationary period. 2 Educational policy in the area of continuing teacher contracts has thus been established by act of the legislature and becomes binding upon all public employers of certified teachers. However, the nonrenewal of the contract of a continuing contract teacher poses an entirely different problem. Empirical facts must exist in each particular case to justify the non-renewal of such a contract. Otherwise stated, public employers of teachers could well adopt as educational policy a probationary period in a given school system of less than three years, and such a policy would not be subject to interest arbitration. 26 M.R.S.A. § 965(1) (C); City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973). However, the same policy considerations do not relate to a refusal to renew a non-probationary teacher's contract since in that situation the issue becomes not one of general policy but whether just cause exists in the individual case to terminate the relationship.
Initially, we should make it clear that we are not here concerned with the issue that might arise where an arbitrator construes a contract otherwise than the court would construe it. Rather, our concern is whether the arbitrator went beyond the terms of the contract to reach the announced result.
We do not reach the problem that might arise in delineating an appellate court's prerogative to interpret the meaning of specific terms in a collective bargaining agreement. We acknowledge that the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and the meaning to be applied to specific terms therein are ordinarily the responsibility of the arbitrator. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). However, we view this generality to be subject to the caveat that arbitrators may not travel outside the agreement in reaching a conclusion since, if they did so, they would not be interpreting and applying the contract but basing their conclusion on their own individual concept of justice in the particular area involved.
If an arbitrator did thus go beyond the terms of an agreement, his conclusion becomes subject to appellate scrutiny since he would have exceeded his power and violated the provisions of 14 M.R.S.A. § 5938(1)(C). We adopted this approach in vacating an arbitrator's award in Superintending School Com. v. Portland Teach. Ass'n, supra, when we determined that the grievance there sought to be arbitrated was not included in the contract as being subject to grievance arbitration.
Having in mind the purpose of our review and having determined that the failure of the Board to renew Mrs. Small's teaching contract was subject to grievance arbitration, we must now determine whether the arbitrator went beyond the contract in reaching his conclusion. Of necessity this requires us to consider the terms of the arbitration agreement and we excerpt certain language therefrom for purposes of this analysis.
'B. PURPOSE
1. The purpose of this procedure is to secure, at the lowest level possible, equitable solutions to problems which from time to time may arise affecting the welfare or terms and conditions of employment of teachers.' (Emphasis supplied.)
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