Westbrook School Committee v. Westbrook Teachers Ass'n

• Decision Date: 19 July 1979
• Citation: 404 A.2d 204
• Parties: 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2396 WESTBROOK SCHOOL COMMITTEE v. WESTBROOK TEACHERS ASSOCIATION.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 204

404 A.2d 204

102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2396

WESTBROOK SCHOOL COMMITTEE v. WESTBROOK TEACHERS ASSOCIATION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

July 19, 1979.

Gagan & Desmond by James E. Gagan (orally), Michael D. Cooper, Westbrook, for plaintiff.

Sunenblick, Fontaine & Reben by Stephen P. Sunenblick (orally), Portland, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY, GODFREY and NICHOLS, JJ.

McKUSICK, Chief Justice.

The Westbrook Teachers Association (hereafter "Association") appeals from a decision of the Superior Court vacating an arbitrator's award which ordered the Westbrook School Committee (hereafter "Committee") to reinstate Association member Philip J. Dawson to his regular teaching position as full-time guidance counselor and to his extracurricular position as head football coach at Westbrook High School. The questions on appeal are (1) whether the Superior Court erred in finding that the dispute over the nonrenewal of Dawson's coaching contract was not arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement (hereafter "Contract") between the Association and the Committee; and (2) whether, if the dispute was arbitrable, the Superior Court erred in vacating the arbitrator's decision on the merits. Since we answer both questions in the affirmative, we sustain the appeal and reverse the Superior Court's order vacating the arbitrator's award.

Dawson has been employed at Westbrook High School since 1968. In addition to his regular teaching duties as a guidance counselor and, after 1975, as also the part-time athletic director Dawson served until the 1978-79 school year as head football coach under separate single-year contracts for extracurricular assignments. Dawson achieved continuing contract teacher status ¹ in 1971; and in May 1978, in order to protect his teaching job, he signed a continuing teachers contract that covered his employment for two years as guidance counselor and athletic director, each half time. However, the Committee refused to renew Dawson's extracurricular contract for his services as football coach for 1978-79. Dawson protested and, pursuant to Article III(D)(4) of the Contract, the Association submitted his grievance to arbitration. ²

On June 15, 1978, the arbitrator held a hearing for receiving evidence. At the outset of the hearing, the arbitrator overruled the Committee's objection that the dispute over the nonrenewal of Dawson's coaching contract was not arbitrable. In his subsequent decision, the arbitrator ruled that the Committee had violated Articles VI(B) and XIV of the Contract because it lacked "just cause" for refusing to renew Dawson's extracurricular coaching contract. The arbitrator ordered Dawson reinstated to a regular teaching position as full-time guidance counselor and to an extracurricular position as football coach.

Upon motion of the Committee, the Superior Court vacated the arbitrator's award pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 5938 (Supp.1978-79). The Association now appeals the Superior Court's decision.

I. The Superior Court and Arbitration

This case raises in sharp relief the question of what limitations exist on the Superior Court's role in supervising, or reviewing the results of, arbitration an extrajudicial forum for dispute resolution selected by mutual consent of the parties. A generalized review of the applicable law will aid in the proper disposition of this particular appeal. ³

The Uniform Arbitration Act (hereafter "Act"), 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 5927-49 (Supp.1978-79), defines the part the Superior Court is empowered to play in the arbitration process. ⁴ See Lewiston Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Lewiston, Me., 354 A.2d 154, 164 (1976). Under the provisions of the Act, the court may be called upon both to determine substantive arbitrability, I. e., whether the parties intended to submit a particular dispute to arbitration, sections 5928, 5938(1)(E), and also to determine whether in deciding the submitted dispute the arbitrator exceeded his powers, section 5938(1)(C).

The question of substantive arbitrability may be raised at either of two junctures in the arbitration process. First, prior to the grant of an arbitrator's award, either party may apply to the court for an order to compel arbitration where one party refuses to proceed, section 5928(1), or to stay an arbitration proceeding that has been "commenced or threatened," section 5928(2). Second, assuming that the issue has not been adversely determined on a motion pursuant to section 5928 to compel or stay arbitration, a party who "did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection" may raise the arbitrability issue on a motion to vacate an award after it has been rendered by the arbitrator, section 5938(1)(E).

Whenever raised, the issue presented is the same: Did the parties intend to submit the particular dispute to arbitration? It is well settled that the final decision on the question of substantive arbitrability is the function of the court, not of the arbitrator. Lewiston Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Lewiston, supra at 165. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). To hold otherwise would be to give the arbitrator the extraordinary power of determining his own jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the courts or any other authority. ⁵

In determining the question of substantive arbitrability, the court may divine the intent of the parties from all the traditional sources consulted in contract interpretation. However, the Maine legislature's strong policy favoring arbitration ⁶ dictates a conclusion that the dispute has been subjected to arbitration if the parties have generally agreed to arbitrate disputes and if "the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which, On its face, is governed by the collective bargaining contract." ⁷ (Emphasis in original) Lewiston Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Lewiston, supra, 354 A.2d at 165. By an alternative formulation it has been held that a court will find a dispute arbitrable "unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra, 363 U.S. at 582-83, 80 S.Ct. at 1353.

The issue of whether an arbitrator exceeded his powers in making an award poses an entirely different question for this court. This issue, raised by a motion to vacate under section 5938(1)(C), ⁸ relates not to arbitrability of the dispute, but rather to the way the arbitrator decided the merits of the dispute. Most commonly, as in the case at bar, the arbitrator's decision on the merits involves his construction of the contract under which the dispute arose; and for the court to resolve the question whether the arbitrator's award exceeded his powers, the court necessarily must itself construe that same contract. However, unlike the determination of substantive arbitrability, construction of the contract for the purpose of deciding the merits of a dispute is ordinarily a task for the arbitrator, not the court. Lewiston Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Lewiston, supra, 354 A.2d at 165; School Administrative Dist. No. 75 v. Merrymeeting Educators' Ass'n, Me.,354 A.2d 169, 170 (1976). Even though construction of a contract is a question of law and decision of legal questions is archetypically the work of courts, a number of reasons justify giving judicial deference to the arbitrator's construction of the contract. First, as noted in School Administrative Dist. No. 33 v. Teachers' Ass'n, Me., 395 A.2d 461, 462 (1978), the arbitration process must offer "the prospect of finality" to retain its vitality as a "dispute settlement mechanism" in the complex area of labor relations. Second, the interest in achieving a fair resolution of a labor dispute dictates considerable respect for the arbitrator's decision. The arbitrator "is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment. . . . The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed." Lewiston Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Lewiston, supra, 354 A.2d at 165, quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra, 363 U.S. at 582, 80 S.Ct. at 1352-53. Finally, the parties choose the arbitrator and should, except under unusual circumstances, be bound by his interpretation of the contract. "It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his." United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593, 599, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1362, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). See School Administrative Dist. No. 33 v. Teachers' Ass'n, supra, 395 A.2d at 463.

We do not mean to say, however, that the parties have no recourse if an arbitrator acts arbitrarily or capriciously in deciding the merits. The four corners of the contract define the limits of the arbitrator's authority, and, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, it must be assumed that the parties did not intend the arbitrator to go beyond the bounds of the contract. "(A)rbitrators may not travel outside the agreement in reaching a conclusion since, if they did so, they would not be interpreting and applying the contract but basing their conclusion on their own individual concept of industrial justice in the particular area involved." ⁹ School Administrative Dist. No. 75 v. Merrymeeting Educators' Ass'n, supra, 354 A.2d at 170-71.

The standard of review to be...