Board of Ed., Bellmore-Merrick Central High School Dist., Nassau County v. Bellmore-Merrick United Secondary Teachers, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 April 1976
• Docket Number: BELLMORE-MERRICK
• Citation: 347 N.E.2d 603,39 N.Y.2d 167,383 N.Y.S.2d 242
• Parties: , 347 N.E.2d 603, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2244, 80 Lab.Cas. P 54,071 BOARD OF EDUCATION,CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, NASSAU COUNTY, Respondent, v. UNITED SECONDARY TEACHERS, INC., Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 242

383 N.Y.S.2d 242

39 N.Y.2d 167, 347 N.E.2d 603, 92

L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2244,

80 Lab.Cas. P 54,071

BOARD OF EDUCATION, BELLMORE-MERRICK CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, NASSAU COUNTY, Respondent, v. BELLMORE-MERRICK UNITED SECONDARY TEACHERS, INC., Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 6, 1976.

Joseph S. Rosenthal and Edward Cherney, New York City, for appellant.

Eli Wager, Jerome H. Ehrlich, Charles D. Maurer and Eugene S. Ginsberg, Garden City, for respondent.

GABRIELLI, Judge.

The questions posed for our consideration on this appeal are whether an arbitrator may order the temporary reinstatement of a probationary teacher as a remedy for breach of certain procedural guarantees afforded to such a teacher under a collective bargaining agreement and, further, whether a court may limit the remedial powers of the arbitrator prior to the arbitration proceeding.

Petitioner appointed Valerie Merrill to a nontenured position in September, 1970. In March, 1973, she was advised by petitioner that she would not be recommended for tenure, and, in April, 1973, petitioner took formal action denying her tenure. Thus, her employment was scheduled to cease at the termination of her probationary period, June, 1973. Prior to the denial of tenure by petitioner, respondent filed a grievance under its collective bargaining agreement, alleging that Mrs. Merrill was denied tenure on the basis of certain parents' complaints of which she had never been apprised and which she had not been offered the opportunity to refute, in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. Petitioner rejected the grievance on the ground that subdivision 1 of section 3013 of the Education Law and article XX(A) of the agreement conferred upon petitioner the absolute power to terminate the services of a probationary teacher. Respondent then demanded arbitration in accordance with the grievance procedure in the contract and petitioner instituted this proceeding to stay arbitration.

Special Term granted the application on the ground that a board of education possesses plenary power to terminate the services of a probationary teacher. The Appellate Division, however, unanimously reversed and held that respondent had a right to maintain an arbitration proceeding to enforce the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement which had allegedly been violated (43 A.D.2d 706, 350 N.Y.S.2d 12). That court also stated that, if respondent's claim were meritorious, Mrs. Merrill should be given the opportunity to refute the complaints against her and have any false or slanderous material deleted from her record, irrespective of the fact that petitioner could terminate her employment at will. Upon submission of the dispute to arbitration, the arbitrator found that Mrs. Merrill's dismissal was based on parents' complaints and that the 'conferences and confrontations' required by the collective bargaining agreement had not been afforded to her. Consequently, he concluded that there had been a violation of the agreement and ruled that the appropriate remedy was reinstatement without tenure for a period of time sufficient to enable petitioner to re-evaluate Mrs. Merrill in accordance with the procedures specified in the agreement after which time it would be free to exercise its power to terminate her services.

Petitioner then moved at Special Term to set aside the award. That court held that the Appellate Division had limited the arbitrator's remedial powers and that the only remedy available to the arbitrator was the deletion of false and slanderous material from the teacher's file. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, without opinion.

The threshold issue is whether the Appellate Division properly precluded the arbitrator's award of temporary reinstatement to a nontenured position by its recognition of the fact that 'the teacher in question, Mrs. Merrill, could be discharged at will' and 'that conclusion could not be altered by the outcome of the desired arbitration proceeding.' (43 A.D.2d 706, 350 N.Y.S.2d 12.) Petitioner argues that the Appellate Division circumscribed the arbitrator's remedial powers and, further, that respondent's acknowledgment of the ultimate power of petitioner to discharge Mrs. Merrill amounts to an admission which bars the arbitrator's award. Parenthetically, it should be noted that resting unchallenged is the Appellate Division finding that section E of article III, section I of article XVI and section C of article XVII of the collective bargaining agreement combine to afford a teacher the right, with the aid of a representative, to investigate, examine, challenge, dispute and attempt to have deleted from her record, complaints registered against her.

We have repeatedly emphasized that the role of the courts in deciding questions of arbitrability, especially in the labor relations field, is a constricted one and the Legislature itself has provided that a court may not 'consider whether the claim with respect to which the arbitration is sought is tenable, or otherwise pass upon the merits of the dispute' (CPLR 7501). Courts are limited to the determination that a dispute within the import of the arbitration agreement exists (see Matter of Long Is. Lbr. Co. (Martin), 15 N.Y.2d 380, 384--385, 259 N.Y.S.2d 142, 145--46, 207 N.E.2d 190, 192--93; Matter of Howard & Co. v. Daley, 27 N.Y.2d 285, 290, 317 N.Y.S.2d 326, 330, 265 N.E.2d 747, 750). Indeed, we have asserted that public policy prefers arbitration as a device for the resolution of labor controversies and frowns upon judicial attempts...