School Committee of West Springfield v. Korbut

• Decision Date: 05 December 1977
• Citation: 373 Mass. 788,369 N.E.2d 1148
• Parties: , 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2447 SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF WEST SPRINGFIELD v. Frank KORBUT et al. 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1148

369 N.E.2d 1148

373 Mass. 788, 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2447

SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF WEST SPRINGFIELD v. Frank KORBUT et al. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

Argued Sept. 14, 1977.

Decided Dec. 5, 1977.

John J. Egan, Boston (Charles M. Healey, III, Springfield, with him), for defendants.

Robert Tassinari, Springfield, for plaintiff.

Sandra C. Quinn, Boston, for Massachusetts Teachers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.

QUIRICO, Justice.

This is an application under G.L. c. 150C, § 11, to vacate an award by the Massachusetts Board of Conciliation and Arbitration (arbitrators) in a labor dispute between the plaintiff school committee and one of its teachers, the defendant Frank Korbut (Korbut). ² The award ordered the reinstatement of Korbut as Coordinator of Language Arts at the West Springfield Senior High School and his reimbursement for lost compensation during the 1972-1973 school year over and above his regular compensation as a teacher. After hearing, a judge of the Superior Court struck the part of the arbitration award that directed Korbut's reinstatement, but otherwise confirmed it. ³ The defendants appealed to the Appeals Court from that part of the Superior Court decree striking the reinstatement award. ⁴ The Appeals Court affirmed the decree, holding that the reinstatement order was beyond the power of the arbitrators in that it invaded the school committee's plenary power to appoint and reappoint academic personnel. School Comm. of W. Springfield v. Korbut, --- Mass.App. ---, ---, ^a 358 N.E.2d 831 (1976).

The matter came before us for further appellate review, and for the sake of expediency in an already lengthy proceeding we entered an order vacating the Superior Court decree without accompanying opinion. ^{5 5} We ordered judgment to enter reinstating Korbut to the position of coordinator for the 1977-1978 school year, and reimbursing him for lost compensation during the 1972-1973 school year. We summarize below the facts taken from the arbitrators' award and detail our reasons for decision.

Korbut, a tenured teacher in the West Springfield Senior High School, was appointed to the additional position of Coordinator of Language Arts ⁶ there for the 1970-1971 school year and reappointed for the 1971-1972 school year. In May, 1972, the Supervisor of Language Arts and the school principal orally advised Korbut that they were not recommending him for reappointment, apparently because his performance in the capacity of coordinator was believed to have been unsatisfactory. Soon, thereafter, the school committee voted not to reappoint Korbut for the position for the ensuing school year. The post of coordinator was vacant for the school year 1972-1973, and remained so up until the time of our order. Although Korbut was not reinstated as coordinator, he apparently continued in his teaching position at the school.

On his nonreappointment, Korbut, acting pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement entered into by the school committee and the West Springfield Education Association, ⁷ started proceedings which resulted in arbitration of the matter. The two issues which were submitted to the arbitrators by the parties were: (1) whether the school committee had violated the collective bargaining agreement in failing to reappoint Korbut, and (2) if so, what the appropriate remedy should be. On September 19, 1973, the arbitrators issued an award finding that the school committee had violated the agreement, and directing that Korbut be reinstated as coordinator "forthwith" and "be reimbursed for lost compensation during the 1972-73 school year." The award was based on Article XIV of the agreement concerning chairmanships of academic departments. The arbitrators interpreted Article XIV to provide that a department chairmanship carried a one-year term, but also required that a chairman, whose failure to be reappointed stemmed from a predominantly disciplinary motive, be given written notice of the decision not to renew his appointment and an opportunity to be heard. Those notice and hearing procedures were not observed.

The defendant did not seek in the Superior Court, nor on appeal, relief from the arbitration award inasmuch as it limited Korbut's reimbursement for lost compensation to the 1972-1973 school year. Accordingly, we consider below only whether the order that Korbut be reinstated was properly struck from the award. Mass. R.A.P. 16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 919 (1975).

1. Availability of Judicial Review.

The provisions of G.L. c. 150C concerning the recognition and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements were, at the time of the award here at issue, applicable to the collective bargaining unit of the teachers' association and the school committee through the operation of G.L. c. 149, § 178K (as amended through St. 1972, c. 375). ⁸ Sections 11 and 12 of G.L. c. 150C set forth the standards by which the Superior Court may review, vacate or modify arbitrators' awards. Of the grounds stated in these sections, the school committee relies on two, namely that the arbitrators' determination exceeded the scope of their reference (G.L. c. 150C, § 12), and that the reinstatement of Korbut exceeded their powers (G.L. c. 150C, § 11). Although we note the narrow scope of judicial review available when a matter submitted to arbitration has been decided, the question of whether the arbitrators acted in excess of the authority conferred on them, as claimed in the present case, is always open for judicial review. Teachers Local 66 v. School Comm. of Boston, 370 Mass. ---, ---, ^b 350 N.E.2d 707 (1976). Trustees of the Boston & Me. Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 363 Mass. 386, 390, 294 N.E.2d 340 (1973).

2. The Scope of the Arbitrators' Authority.

(a) Scope of reference. In seeking affirmation of the Superior Court decree, the school committee objects to the arbitrators' award as being beyond the scope of the question submitted for decision. The committee claims that the issue whether the collective bargaining agreement was violated was "changed" by the arbitrators to an issue concerning whether the nonreappointment of Korbut was for disciplinary purposes. Such inquiry, the committee argues, was in excess of the scope of reference and requires the vacating of the award of reinstatement. We disagree.

Granted that arbitrators must act within the scope of the reference to them, Morceau v. Gould-Nat'l Batteries, Inc., 344 Mass. 120, 124, 181 N.E.2d 664 (1962), we nevertheless think that the arbitrators' consideration of the disciplinary motive behind Korbut's nonreappointment was secondary to and not a separate issue from a determination whether the notice and hearing provisions of the collective bargaining agreement had been violated. The claim that such consideration exceeded the scope of the matter referred seems, in fact, an objection that the arbitrators committed an error of law in interpreting and applying the notice and hearing terms of the collective bargaining agreement to a department chairman not reappointed due to disciplinary reasons. However, we are not to consider whether the arbitrators' interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement was correct. "If an arbitrator has committed an error of law or fact in arriving at his decision, a court will not upset the finding unless there is fraud involved." Trustees of the Boston & Me. Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 363 Mass. 386, 390, 294 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1973). Greene v. Mari & Sons Flooring Co., 362 Mass. 560, 563, 289 N.E.2d 860 (1972). Glenn Acres, Inc. v. Cliffwood Corp., 353 Mass. 150, 155, 228 N.E.2d 835 (1967). Based on such authority, the Superior Court could not vacate or modify the award even if it were demonstrated that the arbitrators made an error of law or in fact in their consideration of the question. Trustees of the Boston & Me. Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., supra at 392, 294 N.E.2d 340. Therefore, the school committee's contentions in this regard are without merit.

( b) Power to order reinstatement. The school committee also claims that the vacating of that part of the arbitration award ordering the reinstatement of Korbut as coordinator was proper in that the arbitrators' action was in excess of the powers conferred on them. The committee argues that the reinstatement award violates G.L. c. 71, §§ 37 and 38, by requiring the school committee to surrender decisions which are predominantly matters of educational policy to the judgment of the arbitrators. The Appeals Court agreed with that contention. We disagree and conclude that the reinstatement of Korbut was an appropriate remedy where the school committee's failure to reappoint took place "without observance of (the notice and hearing) procedures prescribed by (the) collective bargaining agreement." School Comm. of W. Springfield v. Korbut, --- Mass.App. ---, ---, ^c 358 N.E.2d 831, 834 (1976).

General Laws c. 149, § 178I (as in effect prior to July 1, 1974), defined the permissible scope of collective bargaining by municipal employees. Section 178I authorized bargaining as to conditions of employment so long as the bargain reached was not in conflict with other laws. ⁹ The school committee argues that the bargaining agreement conflicts with G.L. c. 71, § 37, which gives the committee general charge of all the public schools, and with § 38 (as amended through St. 1971, c. 507), which provides that the school committee "shall elect and contract with the teachers of the public schools, shall require full and satisfactory evidence of their moral character, and shall ascertain their qualifications for teaching and their capacity for the government of schools." ¹⁰ In holding that the reinstatement decision of the arbitrators interfered with the "plenary" powers of the school committee as above enumerated in §§ 37 and 38, the ...