Board of Ed. of State of Colo. v. Spurlin

• Decision Date: 08 February 1960
• Docket Number: No. 18498,18498
• Citation: 349 P.2d 357,141 Colo. 508
• Parties: BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the STATE OF COLORADO et al., Plaintiffs in Error, v. E. T. SPURLIN, Controller of the State of Colorado, substituted for James A. Noonan, et al., Defendants in Error.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 357

349 P.2d 357

141 Colo. 508

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the STATE OF COLORADO et al Plaintiffs in Error, v. E. T. SPURLIN, Controller of the State of Colorado substituted for James A. Noonan, et al Defendants in Error.

No. 18498.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

Feb. 8, 1960.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 29, 1960.

Peter H. Holme, Jr., Keith Anderson, Richard G. Wohlgenant, Denver, for plaintiff in error.

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Patricia H. Maloy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

DOYLE, Justice.

The action here under review was instituted by the Board of Education and several officials thereof against James A. Noonan, the then Controller of the State of Colorado, and the State Civil Service Commission seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to whether the named plaintiffs-officials are exempt from Civil Service. Judgment was for defendants and plaintiffs seek review, contending that the trial court erred in interpreting the relevant statutory and constitutional provisions.

In 1918 Colorado adopted an amendment to Article XII of the Constitution which established the Civil Service System. The particular provision here in question occurs within Section 13 and the clause in question is that which exempts officers and teachers. We shall quote the entire exemption paragraph so that the questionable words can be seen in context. It reads:

'The classified civil service of the state shall comprise all appointive public officers and employees and the places which they hold, except the following: Judges of courts of record and one stenographer of each judge, one clerk for each court of record, persons appointed to perform judicial functions, receivers, jurors, members of boards or commissions appointed by the governor and serving without pay, members of the state industrial commission, of the public utilities commission and * * * the governor's private secretary and three confidential employees of his office, appointees to fill vacancies in elective offices, one deputy of each elective officer, the position involving the duties incident at present to the position of that deputy of the secretary of state, known as deputy commissioner of labor and the incumbent thereof, officers and teachers in educational institutions not reformatory or charitable in character, all attorneys at law serving as such, and the officers and employees of the general assembly.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Originally the supervision of the public schools of Colorado was vested in a Board of Education consisting of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. The Superintendent of Public Instruction was an elected official whose duties were specifically prescribed by statute.

In 1948 a constitutional amendment was adopted which provided for a Board of Education composed of elected officials from the various congressional districts. Article IX, Section 1 of the Constitution provides in pertinent part that:

'* * * From and after the general election of 1948, the office of superintendent of public instruction shall be known as the office of commissioner of education, and from and after the expiration of the two-year term of that office next following said general election, such commissioner shall be appointed by said board of education and shall not be included in the classified civil service of the state.

'The qualifications, tenure, compensation, powers, and duties of said commissioner shall be as prescribed by law, subject to the supervision of said board.'

Following the adoption of the above amendment the Legislature, in 1949, enacted Article 1, Chapter 123, Colorado Revised Statutes. The specific provision here claimed by defendants to be invalid is C.R.S. 1953, 123-1-3(2):

'(2) For the purposes of this article, all positions within the department as shall be classified by the state board of education as assistant commissioners, supervisors or instructors, together with such other positions wherein the duties thereof are primarily those of instructing or teaching, are hereby declared, as a matter of legislative determination, to be educational in nature, and, not under the classified civil service of the state.'

Following the adoption of the Department of Education Act, the relevant part of which is quoted above, and the election of the First members of the Board of Education, the department was organized into divisions for the purpose of discharging the responsibilities of the department. The offices of the individual plaintiffs were classified as 'officers and teachers' and professional educators were employed under contract to fill the several positions.

Involved in this proceeding are the positions of Director of the Division of Teacher Certification, Director of School Plant and Transportation, Director of the Division of Internal Management of the Department of Education, Director of the Division of School Finances, Consultant in School Finance and School Budgets, Director of the Division of School District Organization, Director of the Division of School Lunch Services and State Consultant for Federal Grants. These positions are all administrative in nature and require the exercise of judgment and discretion. Moreover, the individual division heads are required to conduct education programs throughout the state. They hold workshops and conferences in which instruction is given to teachers and administrators in local areas. In addition, all of them are engaged in research and planning with a view to organizing, improving and coordinating the educational system in the state. Each of the plaintiffs is formally trained as an educator and has had extensive experience in his particular field.

In the employment contracts entered into between the Board of Education and the several plaintiffs the salary scales are based upon a professional salary standard adopted by the Board of Education. The contracts were submitted to the Controller who refused to pay the salaries without first obtaining approval from the Civil Service Commission. At the present time the plaintiffs are being paid on a temporary basis pending a determination of whether the Civil Service or Board of Education classifications are applicable.

The trial court held the quoted statute, 123-1-3(2), supra, to be unconstitutional in contravention of Article XII, Section 13 of the Colorado Constitution in that the Legislature was powerless to classify the plaintiffs employees or officers as being excepted from the Civil Service System. The court concluded that plaintiffs do not fall within the exemption of officers and teachers in educational institutions because the Department of Education is not an educational institution as set forth in the constitution. The Court ruled that this term means:

'As I say, I think the implication and import and meaning of the constitution is that those who are exempted and intended to be exempted from civil service classification are teachers or officers in an educational institution as that term is used in the ordinary sense and for ordinary purposes, and that means a school. It means an institution with a schedule for the instruction of the students and pupils regularly enrolled in certain specified, described educational courses--educational in the sense in which we usually employ and use the word 'education."

The court rejected the contention of the plaintiffs that the Civil Service Commission was arbitrary and capricious in classifying the individual plaintiffs as employees subject to Civil Service while at the same time ruling that other employees were exempt. The plaintiffs contend that the trial court's conclusions were erroneous and argue:

1. That the Department of Education is an educational institution within the meaning of Article XII, Section 13 of the constitution; that the trial court gave to this term a narrow interpretation which is contrary to decisions of this Court--that 'educational institution' is not limited to a particular organization within the walls of which teaching is conducted, but includes an agency which administers the educational system of the state.

2. That the trial court erred in holding unconstitutional that portion of the Educational Act of 1949 in which the Legislature designated positions similar to those of plaintiffs as educational in nature and authorized the Board of Education to carry out and implement this designation. It is said that the trial court failed to extend to the statute the usual presumption of constitutionality which normally attends a judicial construction and interpretation of a statute.

3. That the plaintiffs herein are officers and teachers within the meaning of the Civil Service exemption of the constitution (Article XII, Section 13.) They argue that the plaintiffs are officers because of the importance of their positions and because of the fact that their duties are defined by statutes and regulations. It is said that they are teachers because they are engaged in educational efforts in that they are required to improve and develop educational practices and procedures.

4. That since the plaintiffs are within the constitutional exemption, the Commission's attempted classification which denied exemption to the plaintiffs was arbitrary and invalid.

The position of defendants is essentially that adopted by the trial judge. They maintain that the term 'educational institutions' should be restricted to those establishments in which organized instruction is regularly given. They also rely on Article VIII of the constitution which deals with the subject of state institutions and on Article IX, Section 1, the 1948 constitutional amendment creating the office of Commissioner of Education and abolishing the office of Superintendent of Public Instruction and providing that the Commissioner of Education shall be appointed by the Board of Education and 'shall not be included...