Board of Educ. of Montgomery County v. Browning
Decision Date | 01 September 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 50,50 |
Citation | 333 Md. 281,635 A.2d 373 |
Parties | , 62 USLW 2483, 88 Ed. Law Rep. 118 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Maryland v. Paula M. BROWNING, Personal Representative of the Estate of Eleanor Hamilton. , |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Roger W. Titus (Elisabeth S. Rubin, Venable, Baetjer and Howard, on brief), Rockville, for appellant.
Christopher L. Beard (Jacqueline J. Judd, on brief), Annapolis, for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, * CHASANOW, KARWACKI and ROBERT M. BELL, JJ.
This case involves the concept of equitable adoption, and in particular, whether a person, if equitably adopted, may inherit by intestate succession from the sister of an equitably adoptive parent.
Eleanor G. Hamilton, a resident of Montgomery County, died intestate in August, 1990, leaving an estate valued at $394,405.57. At the time of her death, Hamilton had no known living blood relatives. Appellee Paula M. Browning was appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of Eleanor G. Hamilton on May 21, 1991.
Paula was born out of wedlock on October 4, 1919. Her natural father, Lawrence E. Hutchison, legally adopted Paula on October 10, 1921. In March of 1922, Hutchison married Marian Estelle Gibson. Paula grew up in the Hutchison's household in the District of Columbia; Marian, however, never formally adopted Paula. Marian, who died in 1986, was the sister of the decedent Eleanor Hamilton.
Because Eleanor apparently died without any heirs, the Board of Education of Montgomery County claimed that it was entitled to Eleanor's estate pursuant to the Maryland escheat laws. 1 Believing that she was a legal heir of Eleanor, Paula filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and a motion for summary judgment in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. In her complaint, Paula named the Board of Education as defendant because the Board had a potential claim to the proceeds of Eleanor's estate through the escheat laws. Paula sought a declaration that she was the equitably adopted child of Marian; and as such was entitled to inherit the Estate of Eleanor G. Hamilton, Marian's sister.
In support of her motion for summary judgment, Paula submitted an affidavit in which she stated that she maintained a normal child-parent relationship with Lawrence and Marian Hutchison throughout her life. She also stated that Lawrence and Marian told her when she was a child, and later when she was an adult, that she had been adopted by them; moreover, Paula stated that Marian specifically told her in 1984 that Marian had adopted her. In 1992, when she was asked to produce proof of adoption for the instant litigation, Paula discovered that she had not been legally adopted by Marian. In her affidavit, Paula also stated that no other heirs had presented or filed claims regarding Eleanor's estate.
The Board of Education of Montgomery County, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-322(b), filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Board maintained that Paula's complaint failed to allege facts which would enable a court to declare that she was the equitably adopted child of Marian. The Board further averred that, even if Paula were adjudged to be the equitably adopted daughter of Marian, she could not, as a matter of law, inherit from the estate of her equitably adoptive mother's sister. The Board therefore argued that because Eleanor Hamilton died without a will and without any legal heirs, it was entitled to her estate under the Maryland law of escheat as set forth in Maryland Code (1991 Repl.Vol., 1993 Cum.Supp.) § 3-105(a) of the Estates and Trusts Article. Specifically, the Board asked the circuit court to grant its motion to dismiss and declare that: (1) Paula is not entitled to inherit from Eleanor's estate; and (2) the estate escheats to the Board of Education of Montgomery County.
After a December, 1992 hearing, the court concluded that the Board of Education had conceded that Paula was the equitably adopted child of Marian. 2 The court therefore framed the sole remaining issue as follows: "whether Paula Browning, as the equitably adopted daughter of Marian Hutchison, may inherit as a collateral heir to the estate of Marian Hutchison's sister, Eleanor G. Hamilton."
Relying on First Nat. Bank in Fairmont v. Phillips, 176 W.Va. 395, 344 S.E.2d 201 (1985), upon the fact that the Board of Education was the only other party interested in the Hamilton estate, and on the close relationship between Paula and her equitably adoptive mother, the court determined that Paula could inherit from the estate of her equitably adoptive mother's sister. Thus, the court denied the Board's motion to dismiss and granted Paula's motion for summary judgment. The Board appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. We granted certiorari prior to consideration of the appeal by the intermediate appellate court to decide the significant issue presented in this case 331 Md. 178, 626 A.2d 967.
Before us, the Board reasserts its view that an equitably adopted child may not inherit from her equitably adoptive parent's sibling. On the other hand, Paula argues that the lower court correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that a child may inherit by intestate succession from the sister of an equitably adoptive parent thereby defeating an escheat to the State.
The Board also contends that the lower court improperly granted Paula's motion for summary judgment because the court failed to consider the elements of equitable adoption and the evidence fell far short of the clear and convincing proof necessary to establish an equitable adoption. We need not address this argument, however, because even assuming arguendo that Paula was equitably adopted by Marian, we conclude that Paula may not inherit from her equitably adoptive parent's sister. Therefore, the trial court should have granted the Board's motion to dismiss and declared that the Estate of Eleanor G. Hamilton escheats to the Board of Education of Montgomery County.
When analyzing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-322(b), we must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint. Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 443, 620 A.2d 327 (1993). Dismissal is only proper if the facts and allegations viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff fail to afford the plaintiff relief if proven. Id.; Berman v. Karvounis, 308 Md. 259, 264-65, 518 A.2d 726 (1987); Sharrow v. State Farm Mutual, 306 Md. 754, 768, 511 A.2d 492 (1986). Moreover, "any ambiguity or uncertainty in the allegations bearing on whether the complaint states a cause of action must be construed against the pleader." Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 321 Md. 642, 647, 584 A.2d 69 (1991) (quoting Sharrow, supra, 306 Md. at 768, 511 A.2d 492).
For purposes of our analysis, we accept as true the factual allegations of Paula's complaint for declaratory judgment and motion for summary judgment. Thus, we will assume that Paula is the equitably adopted daughter of Marian Hutchison, Eleanor Hamilton's sister.
In Maryland, the general rule is that there can be no adoption except under and in accordance with a statute. See In re Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. 39, 43, 591 A.2d 468 (1991); In re Lynn M., 312 Md. 461, 463, 540 A.2d 799 (1988); McGarvey v. State, 311 Md. 233, 236, 533 A.2d 690 (1987). There is a narrow exception to this rule, however; equitable adoption, sometimes referred to as "adoption by estoppel," "virtual adoption," or "de facto adoption," permits individuals to circumvent the statutory adoption procedures for certain limited purposes. See McGarvey, supra; Besche v. Murphy, 190 Md. 539, 59 A.2d 499 (1948). Under the doctrine of equitable adoption, however, no relationship of parent and child is created and consequently, an equitably adopted child does not attain the status of a statutorily adopted child. McGarvey, 311 Md. at 239-40, 533 A.2d 690.
The doctrine of equitable adoption "involves the notion that if an individual who is legally competent to adopt a child enters into a contract to do so, and if the contract is supported by consideration in the form of part performance that falls short of completion of statutory adoption, then a court, applying equitable principles, may accord to the child the status of a formally adopted child for limited purposes." McGarvey, 311 Md. at 234, 533 A.2d 690. We have explained that when there is a valid contract for adoption, although not consummated and given legal effect by adoption proceedings during the lifetime of the adopting parent, the contract may, upon the parent's death, be enforced to the extent of decreeing that the child occupy the status of an adopted child in equity, entitled to rights of inheritance from the adoptive parent where circumstances require such relief as a matter of justice. See Besche, supra, 190 Md. at 547, 59 A.2d 499.
In McGarvey, supra, we stated that "Maryland would likely look with favor upon the doctrine [of equitable adoption] to the extent of permitting an equitably adopted child to take property from an equitably adoptive parent by intestate succession." 311 Md. at 238. 3 The basis of this doctrine, which permits a child to share in the estate of the deceased parent who had agreed to adopt the child, is that it is inequitable and unjust to allow the parent to escape the obligations of an adoptive parent by failing to comply with the agreement. See Thompson v. Moseley, 344 Mo. 240, 125 S.W.2d 860, 862 (1939).
This equitable principle of law has been explained under two different theories. The first theory is specific performance of the contract to adopt. Applying this theory, courts enforce the promise of the adoptive parent provided that sufficient consideration is given in return for the promise of adoption. However, "[c]ourts grant this remedy only against the estate of a deceased...
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