Board of Education of Carbon County School Dist. v. Bryner

• Decision Date: 11 October 1920
• Docket Number: 3552
• Citation: 57 Utah 78,192 P. 627
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CARBON COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. v. BRYNER et al

192 P. 627

57 Utah 78

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CARBON COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. v. BRYNER et al

No. 3552

Supreme Court of Utah

October 11, 1920

Original application for writ of mandamus by the Board of Education of Carbon County School District of the State of Utah against Albert Bryner and others, County Commissioners of Carbon County, Utah and others.

WRIT ISSUED.

Price &amp Fouts, of Price, for plaintiff.

B. W Dalton, of Price, for defendants.

FRICK J. CORFMAN, C. J., and WEBER, GIDEON, and THURMAN, JJ., concur.

OPINION

FRICK, J.

This is an original application to this court by the board of education of Carbon county school district, hereinafter called plaintiff, for a writ of mandate to require the defendants, as the board of county commissioners of Carbon county and the other defendants as officers of said county, hereinafter styled defendants, to levy a tax for school purposes in accordance with the estimate proposed and submitted by plaintiff as required by law.

The application is based on chapter 135, Laws Utah 1911, and especially on the section designated 1891x27 of that chapter, which, so far as material here, reads as follows:

"The board of education shall, on or before the first day of May of each year, prepare a statement and estimate of the amount necessary for the support and maintenance of the schools under its charge for the school year commencing on the first day of July next thereafter, and for the purchase of school sites and the erection of school buildings, also the amount necessary to pay the interest accruing during such year, and not included in any prior estimates, on bonds issued by said board; also the amount of sinking fund necessary to be collected during such year for the payment and redemption of said bonds; and shall forthwith cause the same to be certified by the president and clerk of said board to the officers charged with the assessment and collection of taxes for general county purposes in the county in which the district is situated, and such officers, after having extended the valuation of property on the assessment rolls, shall levy such per cent. as shall, as nearly as may be, raise the amount required by the board, which levy shall be uniform on all property within the said district as returned on the assessment roll, and the said county officers are hereby authorized and required to place the same on the tax roll. * * * Said taxes shall be collected by the county treasurer as other taxes are collected, * * * and he shall pay to the treasurer of said board, promptly as collected: * * * Provided, that the tax for the support and maintenance of such schools shall not exceed in any one year five and one-half mills on the dollar upon all taxable property of said district; and shall not exceed one and one-half mills additional on the dollar in one year, to be used exclusively for the purchase of school sites and the erection of school buildings, but in case any funds collected for support or maintenance are not used within the school year for which they were raised, they may be used for building purposes; provided, further, that the board of education in each county school district of the first class shall also, on or before the first Monday in May of each year, furnish the board of county commissioners an estimate in writing of school funds needed in their districts for the ensuing year for the payment of teachers, of expenses of the county institute, of compensation of the superintendent of schools, which estimate shall be taken by the board of county commissioners, as required by section 1864, Compiled Laws of Utah 1907, or in lieu thereof when there is no county superintendent, as a basis for the county school tax levy provided for in section eighteen hundred and sixty-five, Compiled Laws of Utah 1907." (Italics ours.)

The plaintiff relies especially on the words we have italicized.

Section 1864, referred to in the foregoing quotation, reads as follows:

"The county superintendent shall, on or before the first Monday in May of each year, furnish the board of county commissioners an estimate in writing of the amount of school funds needed for the ensuing year."

That section was repealed in 1915 (Laws Utah 1915, p. 98).

It will be observed that the subject-matter of section 1864 is contained in what we have quoted from section 1891x27, supra, and has no application here. It will therefore not be noticed further.

The plaintiff sets forth all the necessary facts in its application to which the defendants have interposed a general demurrer. The plaintiff in substance alleges that, in order to raise sufficient funds to carry on the schools of Carbon county school district for the full school year of nine months, it is necessary that a tax of eight and five-tenths mills on the dollar be levied on all of the taxable property within Carbon county, and within said school district, the boundaries of which are coterminous with the boundaries of the said county. The defendants, in support of their demurrer, contend that they are prohibited from levying any amount of taxes in excess of seven mills on the dollar.

Counsel for plaintiff concede that according to the express terms of the statute (section 1891x27) there is a limitation of five and five-tenths mills "for the support and maintenance of schools" and a further limitation of one and five-tenths mills (making seven mills in all) for "school sites and the erection of school buildings," but they insist that the statute provides for an additional levy in what is said in that portion of the section we have italicized. In view of the language of the statute, that the levy "for the support and maintenance of schools" shall be limited to five and five-tenths mills, under ordinary circumstances, we should feel impelled to hold that the several items contained in the portion of the section we have italicized, and on which plaintiff's counsel rely, are all included within the term "for the support and maintenance, of schools." Indeed, we have held to that effect in the case of Woodcock v. Board of Education, 55 Utah 458, 187 P. 181, where the statute did not contain the italicized words, however. The doctrine is, however, also recognized that the same words, especially if found in different statutes, may not always have the same effect. It follows that in order to determine the intention and purpose of the lawmaker, and to harmonize conflicting provisions where such occur, it at times becomes necessary for the courts to expand or to restrict the ordinary and usual meaning of words, phrases, or clauses found in a particular section or statute. In that connection it is also necessary to observe the cardinal rule of construction that every word and phrase must be given some force and effect if possible, and this notwithstanding the fact that in doing so the effect of the particular section or statute may thereby be enlarged or restricted as the case may be. When, therefore, the language of a section or statute is ambiguous and doubtful, and on reading the language there is doubt whether it should be applied in accordance with its ordinary and usual meaning or whether it should receive an enlarged or restricted construction and effect, it is the duty of the courts to look beyond the statute if by doing so they can better determine the intention and purpose of the lawmakers. Moreover, as a means of ascertaining the true intention of the lawmakers, it may also be necessary to inquire into and scan the history of the particular statute in question, and in connection therewith consider the general purpose of the lawmakers in formulating and passing laws upon a particular subject, and that is peculiarly true in cases where different sections or provisions relating to the same subject-matter are conflicting or ambiguous. All of the foregoing rules must likewise be considered where, as here, the lawmakers have changed from one system of school government to another.

With the foregoing observations in mind let us very briefly trace the history and purpose of section 1891x27, supra, and cognate sections. School districts of the first class were first created by chapter 107, Laws Utah 1905. It is in that chapter that section 1891x27 was first adopted. It was passed so as to make the law conform to the county school districts of the first class which were created by that act. In that section, after requiring the boards of education of the several county school districts to furnish an estimate to the county commissioners, as is the case in the present form of section 1891x27 which we have quoted, the language which we have italicized is also incorporated. The same section was carried forward into Comp. Laws Utah 1907, as section 1891x27. As we have seen, the section in its present form is found in chapter 135, Laws Utah 1911, as quoted herein. In all of the different amendments of the section, however, the limitations are the same, except that in one instance the limitation is a little less, but the language we have italicized is substantially the same. In 1913 (chapter 96 Laws Utah 1913) the law was amended so as to fix an arbitrary property limitation, which limitation was...