Board of License Com'rs of Town of Tiverton v. Pastore

• Decision Date: 18 July 1983
• Docket Number: No. 80-426-M,80-426-M
• Parties: BOARD OF LICENSE COMMISSIONERS OF the TOWN OF TIVERTON v. Louis H. PASTORE et al. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 161

463 A.2d 161

BOARD OF LICENSE COMMISSIONERS OF the TOWN OF TIVERTON v. Louis H. PASTORE et al.

No. 80-426-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 18, 1983.

Kathaleen Managhan, Patrick O. Hayes, Jr., Newport, for petitioner.

Angelo R. Marocco, Providence, for respondents.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

This case comes before us on petition for certiorari seeking review of a Superior Court judgment that affirmed a ruling of the Liquor Control Administrator reinstating the class-BV liquor license of the Attic Lounge (the Lounge). The only issue before this court is whether evidence obtained pursuant to an illegal search and seizure is admissible in a liquor-license revocation hearing. We find that the trial justice committed no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm.

The facts in this case may be briefly summarized as follows. On March 11, 1977, a Tiverton police sergeant, pursuant to a search warrant, entered and searched the Lounge. He discovered stolen property on the premises. Thereafter, the Board of License Commissioners of the Town of Tiverton (the board), held a hearing at which the Lounge failed to show cause why its liquor license should not be suspended for permitting state law to be violated, pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1976 Reenactment) § 3-5-23. The board voted to revoke the establishment's liquor license, thereby prompting an appeal to the State Liquor Control Administrator (the administrator). During the pendency of this appeal, a Superior Court justice, in a criminal proceeding stemming from the same incident, ruled that the search of the Lounge was illegal.

Pursuant to respondent's appeal, the administrator held a de novo hearing on July 6, 1978. Therein undisputed testimony was introduced establishing that a conviction for possession of stolen property had never been obtained against any individual associated with the Lounge. The administrator therefore refused to entertain any evidence concerning the search of the premises or the results thereof. Accordingly, he found that because a conviction for receiving stolen goods had never been obtained, there was no justification for revocation of the Lounge's liquor license. He therefore ordered that the license be reinstated.

Thereafter, petitioners filed an appeal to the Superior Court, which affirmed the administrator's ruling. The Superior Court justice disagreed with the rationale utilized by the administrator, however, when she found that a conviction was not necessary to revoke a liquor license pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1976 Reenactment) § 3-5-23. Nevertheless, the court held that since the search of respondent's premises was illegal in nature any evidence or testimony concerning the search was properly excluded by the administrator.

The petitioners contend that the exclusionary rule should not be applicable in a liquor-license revocation hearing. Although we have not heretofore passed upon this issue, courts elsewhere have ruled the evidence inadmissible. We agree with that result.

The exclusionary rule, which bars the admission in a criminal trial of evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure, was first promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), and was later extended in application to state criminal proceedings by the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). A precise overall definition of the type of proceeding, other than criminal, to which the rule should be applied has not yet been determined. Indeed, the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the exclusionary rule will be construed to apply to administrative hearings. 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 1.5 at 97 (1978). Nonetheless, by reference to Supreme Court decisions on related matters and to persuasive precedent from other jurisdictions, we feel that there is a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that the exclusionary rule is applicable to a liquor-license revocation hearing. Id., § 1.5 at 97-98.

In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965), the State of Pennsylvania sought to confiscate a vehicle pursuant to a statute that provided for the forfeiture of a vehicle carrying unsealed liquor. However, in criminal proceedings, the owner was acquitted because of the exclusion of the illegally seized liquor. The Court held that although forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature, the exclusionary rule should apply. Quoting with approval language from Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746, 752 (1886), the Court held that

"[i]f the government prosecutor elects to waive an indictment, and to file a civil information against the claimants,--that is, civil in form,--can he by this device take from the proceeding its criminal aspect and deprive the claimants of their immunities as citizens, and extort from them a production of their private papers, or, as an alternative, a confession of guilt? This cannot be. The information, though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal one. * * * As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature, we think that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution * * *." 380 U.S. at 697-98, 85 S.Ct. at 1249, 14 L.Ed.2d at 173.

Thus Plymouth Sedan stands for the proposition that the exclusionary rule should apply to proceedings that are " 'quasi-criminal' in character" in that their object "is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law." 1 LaFave, § 1.5 at 98. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that the exclusionary rule applies in administrative proceedings, wherein a state agency, responsible for control of liquor sales, is empowered to impose fines or declare forfeitures of licenses for criminal acts and other violations by those operating or connected with the establishment. Id. Professor LaFave comments that the Court in Plymouth Sedan indicated that a forfeiture proceeding could result in punishment greater than the criminal prosecution for the underlying conduct. This strongly suggests that a highly relevant factor to be considered is the magnitude of the consequences for the individual involved. Therefore, other courts have appropriately stressed the seriousness of taking away a person's license to operate an establishment selling liquor. Finn's Liquor Shop v. State Liquor Authority, 24 N.Y.2d 647, 249 N.E.2d 440, 301 N.Y.S.2d 584, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840, 90 S.Ct. 103, 24 L.Ed.2d 91 (1969); Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority, 25 A.D.2d 225, 268 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1966), rev'd on other grounds, 19 N.Y.2d 418, 227 N.E.2d 302, 280 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1967); Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Leonardziak, 210 Pa.Super. 511, 233 A.2d 606 (1967). Thus, "it would be anomalous * * * to hold that in [a] criminal proceeding, illegally seized evidence is excludable, while in [a] forfeiture proceeding, requiring the determination that the criminal law has been violated, the same evidence would be admissible." Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 701, 85 S.Ct. at 1251, 14 L.Ed.2d at 175.

In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), the approach of the Court was to balance the potential benefits of applying the exclusionary rule, namely the added deterrence, against the potential damage from such application. Hence, a second important consideration in determining whether the exclusionary rule should apply in administrative proceedings is the extent to which exclusion would deter illegal searches and seizures. Thus, exclusion for purposes of deterrence would be justified if admission of the evidence could be expected to encourage future illegal searches by such agents because of their expectation that in any event the evidence would be admissible in the administrative process.

Various state courts have considered this issue. In Finn's Liquor Shop v. State Liquor Authority, supra, the New York Court of Appeals held that the exclusionary rule, concerning illegally seized evidence is applicable to administrative proceedings before the State Liquor Authority with respect to imposition of penalties on license holders. The court in its opinion stated that if the exclusionary rule is to be effective, it may not be limited to purely criminal proceedings. The court declared that "[i]t is no longer subject to question that [s]tate agencies charged with purely administrative responsibilities, just as those engaged in the enforcement of the criminal law, must conduct their investigative and enforcement functions in compliance with constitutional requirements and, more particularly, within the confines of the Fourth Amendment. (See, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967))." Finn's Liquor Shop, 24 N.Y.2d at 654, 249 N.E.2d at 442-43, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 588.

In Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority, supra, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held that evidence obtained by search warrants indicating that the licensee engaged in gambling activities on and off the licensed premises could not be used by the State Liquor Authority as a basis for the cancelation of an establishment's license when the search warrants in related criminal cases had been vacated for want of probable cause. In so holding the court stated that "the reasons in policy which [support] the application of the exclusionary rule to illegal searches and seizures by public officers in criminal proceedings apply equally to administrative proceedings." 25 A.D.2d at 231, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 440. Such proceedings include those involving penalties, forfeitures or other sanctions for the...