Board of Missions for Freedmen of Presbyterian Church of U.S. v. Dreher
| Decision Date | 13 October 1937 |
| Docket Number | 14547. |
| Citation | 193 S.E. 189,185 S.C. 65 |
| Parties | BOARD OF MISSIONS FOR FREEDMEN OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF THE UNITED STATES v. DREHER et al. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Richland County Court; A. W. Holman, Judge.
Suit by the Board of Missions for Freedmen of the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America against J. B. Dreher and another. From an order overruling the demurrer to the complaint, the named defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
The order of Judge Holman follows:
This matter came on before me for a hearing on the demurrer of the defendant, J. B. Dreher, to the complaint. After hearing the argument of counsel for both plaintiff and defendant, and after reading the briefs submitted by both sides, it appears that the defendant demurred to the complaint on the grounds that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in that (1) It appears from the face of the complaint that plaintiff seeks to recover a debt by an action in equity; (2) that it appears upon the face of the complaint that plaintiff has retained no lien on the property cognizable by an equity court; (3) that plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law; and that a court of equity is without jurisdiction as it appears from the face of the complaint that the action is for the recovery of a debt only. Or, in other words, the defendant claims that the vendor of real estate has no right in a court of equity to seek performance of a contract for the sale of real estate where his redress amounts, substantially, to the payment of the purchase price under the contract.
Plaintiff sets out in its complaint: (1) An oral contract between plaintiff and defendant whereby defendant agreed to purchase certain land as described in the complaint; (2) that defendant promised to pay a certain sum therefor, and has paid a portion of the price; (3) that defendant entered into possession of the land with consent of plaintiff; (4) that defendant has failed to pay the balance of the purchase price; (5) that plaintiff stands ready and willing to convey the land to defendant upon payment of the balance due on the purchase price; (6) asks for performance of the contract and, upon failure of defendant to perform, that possession of the land be delivered to plaintiff.
As I view the complaint, bearing in mind the authorities hereinafter cited, it sets forth a cause of action for specific performance of the contract described therein. As stated in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Berry, 153 S.C 496, 151 S.E. 63, the vendor has the right to ask for specific performance of the contract, even though the substantial part of his relief is the recovery of money. The remedy is a mutual one, open to both vendor and vendee; the latter can seek performance by the delivery of a deed from the vendor to him; the only possible satisfaction for the former is that the contract shall be performed by the vendee, as regards his only duty, to wit, the payment of the purchase price. That is the only thing the vendor can demand. If he cannot demand the purchase money under the contract then the remedy of specific performance is not a mutual remedy. The complaint, therefore, setting out a cause of action, it is not subject to demurrer.
Board of Directors v. Lowrance, 111 S.C. 295, 297, 97 S.E. 830: "A complaint is not subject to demurrer if it contains allegations entitling plaintiff to relief either on the law or the equity side of the court." Huffman v. Owings, 108 S.C. 420, 95 S.E. 78: The effect of defendant's contention, if tenable, would be that if the contract has not been performed, and it has not in this instance according to the pleadings, as the purchase price has not been paid. Singleton v. Cuttino, 107 S.C. 465, 92 S.E. 1046: "Before conveyance, and while there is a contract of sale merely, the vendor has the legal estate in the land, and the vendee has the equitable interest; the former being a trustee of the beneficial interest in the land for the latter, the latter being the trustee of the purchase money for the former." Blackwell v. Ryan, 21 S.C. 112; Gregorie v. Bulow, Rich.Eq.Cas. (9 S.C.Eq.) 235. Sweatman v. Edmunds, 28 S.C. 58, 5 S.E. 165: "One who purchases land, is let into possession, and pays the purchase money, * * * for all practical purposes must be regarded as the owner." Watts v. Witt, 39 S.C. 356, 17 S.E. 822, 827: "The rule, as we understand it, is that, where one goes into possession of real estate under a parol contract to buy the same, he cannot claim to hold adversely to his vendor until the purchase money is fully paid."
That is, defendant contends that if the contract has not been performed, the vendor cannot seek performance of the contract by the vendee, as it involves substantially the payment of the purchase price, and therefore the only redress of vendor is the recovery of judgment in an action at law for the balance due under the contract. This is not my understanding of the law of our state. The defendant further contends that if the vendor has indulged the vendee in the contract for a sufficiently long time so that the vendor cannot enforce payment of the purchase price under the contract by an action at law, that the vendor can neither enforce the contract in equity.
I do not think this position is logical or tenable; it is my understanding of the law of this state that the courts of equity are for the purpose of protecting parties in just such a position as this. That if the vendor has indulged the vendee in the contract for a time so long that the vendor cannot enforce a collection for a breach of the contract at law, he can compel the performance of the contract in equity. By the vendor's indulgence of the vendee in the contract, the vendor is not estopped to seek performance of the contract; courts of equity will entertain the specific performance of the contract by the vendor where the indulgence of the vendor have inured to the benefits of the vendee.
Defendant has submitted...
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