Board of Supervisors v. Vicksburg Hospital, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 September 1935
• Docket Number: 31832
• Citation: 163 So. 382,173 Miss. 805
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, WARREN COUNTY, v. VICKSBURG HOSPITAL, INC

163 So. 382

173 Miss. 805

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, WARREN COUNTY, v. VICKSBURG HOSPITAL, INC

No. 31832

Supreme Court of Mississippi

September 23, 1935

Division A

Suggestion Of Error Overruled October 21, 1935.

APPEAL from circuit court of Warren county HON. E L. BRIEN, Judge.

Proceeding between the board of supervisors, Warren county, and Vicksburg Hospital, Inc. From a judgment setting aside an order of the board, which assessed the real and personal property of the hospital for taxation, the board appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Wm. I. McKay, Leonard E. Nelson, and R. M. Kelly, all of Vicksburg, for appellant.

The Vicksburg Hospital, Inc., claims that, because it has temporarily converted its stock from profit sharing to nonprofit sharing, and added two charity wards, it is entitled to be exempt from taxation; a construction of the statute which demands that the words, "whether belonging to religious, or charitable or benevolent organizations," be stricken out and disregarded as meaningless surplusage, or that after the word "organizations" there be interpolated the words, "or not." Appellee's contention is untenable, its claim to exemption must be denied, and its properties held subject to taxation.

Sec. 3108, Code of 1930.

The rule of strict construction is applied against the exemption.

61 C. J., pp. 391, 392, 395.

Under any construction of the statute, the nurses' home is clearly not exempt.

Under any construction of the statute, the hospital is clearly operated for profit, for the profit of members of the Vicksburg clinic.

Bristline v. Bassett, 62 A.L.R. 323.

While the Bristline case, supra, involved a hospital professing to be a benevolent institution, the basis of the court's decision denying the exemption was the fact that the hospital was one from which a profit was derived. Therefore, it can be safely said that the Bristline case is determinative of the issue involved in the case at bar.

The exemption from taxation was granted in order to serve a public purpose, not to enrich private stockholders.

Leaf Hotel Corp. v. Hattiesburg, 150 So. 779.

Effect must be given to the whole statute and every part thereof. Words therein cannot be considered as surplusage, nor can words be interpolated therein.

59 C. J., pp. 995-998; Grabow v. Bergeth, 229 N.W. 282, 59 N.D. 214; Cohen v. Gould, 225 N.W. 435, 177 Minn. 398; People v. Stewart, 228 P. 57; Castilo v. State High. Co. of Missouri, 279 S.W. 673; Bristol v. Buck, 194 N.Y.S. 53.

Only a religious, charitable or benevolent organization is entitled to the exemption granted by the statute under consideration.

Under section 4131, Code of 1930, a religious or charitable society cannot stock or divide dividends or profits among its members. Subsection (d) of section 3108 permits an exemption of the property of such societies provided such property is not only "used exclusively for such society," but also provided such property is used "not for profit."

Appellant contends that to be entitled to exemption from taxation under subsection (f), a hospital, or property used for hospital purposes must belong to either a religious, charitable or benevolent organization, and that a private corporation, even though its stock is temporarily nonprofit sharing, cannot avail itself of the exemption. Further, that the phrase in subsection (f), "whether belonging to religious or benevolent or charitable organizations," is a limiting and qualifying phrase, restricting the benefits of the section to one of those three organizations.

Mayor and Board of Aldermen of Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Sanitarium, 78 So. 702.

The nurses' home is clearly subject to taxation.

By the plain and expressed terms of the statute a nurses' home can be exempt from taxation only where it is a part of the property used for hospital purposes.

There is absolutely no proof in the record showing that the nurses' home in the case at bar is a part of the Vicksburg Hospital. Manifestly, therefore, the nurses' home is subject to taxation.

C. L. Katzenmeyer and Brunini & Hirsch, of Vicksburg, and Rush Knox, of Jackson, for appellee.

The appellee, Vicksburg Hospital, Inc., is exempt from the payment of ad valorem taxes because, first, the plain provision of the statute itself exempts the Vicksburg Hospital, and second, the intention of the legislature, the object to be secured, the statute's relation to other laws, logic and sound economic principles, clearly show that the Vicksburg Hospital is exempt.

Subdivision (f) of section 3108, Code of 1930.

Clearly it was the intention of the legislature to exempt from taxation all property used for hospital purposes which maintains one or more charitable wards and where the income is entirely used for the purposes thereof and no part for profit.

68 C. J. 254.

If subdivision (f) is read with the addition of the words "or not," it clearly indicates the purpose of the legislature to create an additional exemption to hospitals, and for fear that its intention might not be certainly expressed, it incorporated the clause "whether belonging to religious or charitable or benevolent organizations" in this subdivision (f) in order to show that it intended something other than the organizations included in subdivision (d).

In construing statutes this court has no desire to reach any conclusion except one in harmony with the legislative intent, and its efforts are directed to ascertaining the legislative intent, and if the legislature acts within constitutional limits, we will give effect according to their term and intendment, ascertained according to recognized rules of statutory construction.

Maris v. Lindsey, 124 Miss. 774, 87 So. 12.

It is proper in the construction of subdivision (f) to resort to the whole exemption chapter, and it must be construed in connection with the whole statute of which it is a part, so as to determine the intention of the legislature in adopting it.

Dresser v. Hathorn, 144 Miss. 24, 109 So. 23.

Certainly the legislature did not intend to leave out the word "whether," else it would have done so, and it must be given some value or force.

Kilgore v. Shannon, 60 So. 525.

The word "whether" neither in common parlance nor in legal phraseology has ever had the force of a videlicet.

68 C. J. 254; Stukeley v. Butler, Hob. 168, 171; Voegtly v. Third Ward School Directors, 1 Pa. (1 Barr) 330, 331, 332; 67 C. J., p. 244; Sullivan v. State, 67 Miss. 346, 7 So. 275.

Since the word "whether" never has the force of a videlicet, the statute cannot be limited to religious or charitable or benevolent organizations.

For the purpose of construction resort may be had not only to the language and arrangement of the statute, but also to the intention of the legislature, the object to be secured, and to such extrinsic matters as the circumstances attending its passage, the sense in which it was understood by contemporaries, and its relation to other laws.

59 C. J. 944; 69 C. J. 958; 59 C. J. 961.

The whole history of this subject, that is, the treatment of the needy sick, shows, beyond a question of a doubt, that the primary intention of the legislature was to evolve some system to relieve the state of the direct burden of appropriating monies to private hospitals. Sound economic principles further demonstrate that this solution is logical, and to the best interest of the people.

In seeking to ascertain the legislative intent where the language of a statute is ambiguous, the courts will take into consideration all the facts and circumstances existing at the time of, and leading up to, its enactment, such as the history of the times, the habits and activities of the people, the state of the existing law, and the evils to be remedied by the new act.

59 C. J. 1014, 1047.

It is earnestly submitted that the history of the legislation on this subject, the uniform and consistent purpose of the legislature, the policy of the legislature, and the general course of legislation demonstrate beyond any doubt that the Vicksburg Hospital, Inc., is exempt from taxation.

We concede that statutes exempting persons and property from taxation must be strictly construed, but it is also true that there is a relaxation of the rule in the case of statutes of exemption applicable to religious and educational institutions, and that the supreme test is the intent of the legislature.

State v. Fisk University, 87 Tenn. 241, 10 S.W. 286; Adams County v. Diocese of Natchez, 110 Miss. 896, 71 So. 17.

OPINION

McGowen, J.

The board of supervisors of Warren county appeals to this court from the judgment of the circuit court setting aside an order of the board of supervisors assessing the real and personal property of the Vicksburg Hospital for taxation. The court below heard the case without the intervention of a jury, and held that the property, real and personal, of the Vicksburg Hospital, was, by statute, exempt from taxation.

Prior to December, 1933, the Vicksburg Hospital was a corporation, duly chartered under the laws of the state with a capital stock of seventy-five thousand dollars, which appears to have been issued and paid in. The major portion of the stock was owned by physicians who constituted the management and a part of the staff of the hospital. In December, 1933, the stockholders, at a call meeting, passed a resolution amending their charter, which amendment was subsequently approved by the duly authorized officers of the state. The actual amendment, as approved, is as follows:

"The Purpose for which the corporation is created is to operate a general hospital for the treatment of diseases of the human body, and may provide, build, equip and maintain operating rooms for the purpose of performing surgical...