Castilo v. State Highway Commission of Missouri

• Decision Date: 30 December 1925
• Docket Number: 25085
• Parties: MITCHELL CASTILO et al., Appellants, v. STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION OF MISSOURI
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

279 S.W. 673

312 Mo. 244

MITCHELL CASTILO et al., Appellants, v. STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

No. 25085

Supreme Court of Missouri

December 30, 1925

Appeal from Cole Circuit Court; Hon. Henry J. Westhues Judge.

Affirmed.

C W. Wilson, W. C. Irwin and Emil P. Rosenberger for appellants.

(1) "That the plaintiffs have no capacity to sue," being the first ground of defendant's demurrer, is utterly without merit. The right of assessed taxpaying citizens to maintain such an action in this State has been beyond question since the decision in Newmeyer v Railroad, 52 Mo. 81. See also: Book v. Earl, 87 Mo. 246; State ex rel. v. Woodside, 254 Mo. 580; Harris v. Langford, 277 Mo. 527; Carson v Sullivan, 254 Mo. 580; State v. Edwards, 244 S.W. 802; State ex rel. v. Buchanan County, 247 S.W. 802; Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601. (2) What we have just said is a complete answer to the second ground of defendant's demurrer. The plaintiffs' right to maintain the action being clear, there is no defect of parties plaintiff. (3) There is no defect of parties defendant. The act creating the State Highway Commission, provides: "The Commission may sue and be sued in its official name, and for the purpose of suit and other legal proceedings service may be had on the secretary." Laws 1921, Ex. Sess., p. 136, sec. 12. The law requires the joinder of no other party. (4) The fourth and fifth grounds of the demurrer, viz: "That the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action," and that "there is no equity in the plaintiffs' petition," we consider together, and submit: (a) The facts alleged in the petition of the plaintiffs are confessed by the demurrer. If a party takes his objection by demurrer to a petition, on the ground that it does not state facts, etc., he is thereby deemed to confess the truth of its allegations, denying only their legal sufficiency. Butler v. Lawson, 72 Mo. 248; Dodson v. Lomax, 113 Mo. 555; Verdier v. St. Louis, 131 Mo. 74. (b) If the facts alleged are true, the petition shows ample grounds for equitable relief. The plaintiffs, as resident taxpaying citizens, suing for themselves and other taxpaying citizens similarly concerned, are entitled to have the Commission restrained from misappropriating or wrongly expending the public funds. And the facts alleged standing confessed, the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief prayed, unless the Act of August 4, 1921, be held to authorize the Commission to ignore the roads established, designated and definitely described in the law itself, as the State Highway System, and to establish entirely new routes for fifteen hundred miles of roads of the higher type. The whole controversy turns upon a proper interpretation of the act, Laws 1921, Ex. Sess., pp. 131 to 167. (5) The cardinal rule for the interpretation of statutes is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature and carry that intention into execution. State ex rel. v. Gmelich, 208 Mo. 159; State ex rel. Marquette Hotel Inv. Co. v. State Tax Com., 282 Mo. 213. (a) The intent of the Legislature is to be determined from a consideration of all the provisions of the act. Grimes v. McReynolds, 188 Mo. 688. (b) Such a construction should be given as will keep all provisions of the law on the same subject in harmony. In re Kinsella's Estate, 239 S.W. 818. (c) And the statute should be so construed as that all parts of it will be given a meaning and effect. State ex rel. King v. Board of Trustees, 184 S.W. 929. (d) The purpose of a law controls its interpretation, where its wording is not plain. Buck v. Union Trust Co., 267 Mo. 644; Lusk v. Public Service Com., 277 Mo. 264.

N. T. Cave, amicus curiae.

(1) To get a clearer conception and understanding of what the Legislature of 1921 meant and intended, it is well to consider the road laws as passed in 1917 and 1919. In 1917 Laws 1917, pp. 485 to 491, the Legislature created a highway department with certain powers and duties, for the purpose of "giving assent to an Act of Congress of the United States, entitled: 'An Act to provide that the United States shall aid the states in the construction of rural post roads and for other purposes.'" This act created our state highway department, and by Section 8 authorized the "highway engineer," subject to the approval or change or rejection of the highway board, to "select and designate not less than 3,500 miles of roads in this State and, when sufficient State funds are available, shall be extended at least 500 miles annually, distributed among the several counties substantially in proportion to their respective areas, population and mileage of county roads, to be known as State roads." This Act further provided for the surveying, platting and construction of said State roads of not less than "3,500 miles." Pursuant to that authority, the highway engineer and the highway board, under that law, did select, designate, survey and build or maintain a substantial part of that state road system, a part of which is the road described in appellants' petition in this case. The court will observe that under this 1917 road law, as above mentioned, there was no legislative designation of routes, but such designation and selection was left to the highway engineer and the highway board. In 1919 the Legislature repealed a substantial part of the 1917 road law above referred to, and enacted in lieu thereof certain provisions relative to the highway department, which are found on pages 650 to 660 of Laws 1919. By the terms and provisions of Section 8 of this law the highway engineer, subject to the approval of the board, had the right and authority to "select and designate approximately 6,000 miles of roads in this State for construction during the years of 1919, 1920 and 1921, distributed among the several counties in this State substantially in proportion to their respective areas, and mileage of county roads, to be known as state roads." That section further provided that "two of the said state roads shall run through each county, connecting with the state roads of surrounding counties and states." And it further provided for the surveying, platting and building of said State Highway System, and under the authority of this law the chief highway engineer and the board did select, survey and plat the state road system as they were authorized to do, and the road in dispute in appellants' petition was a part of that designation. (2) The general purposes and intent of the road law of 1917 and 1919 were to take advantage of and benefit by Federal aid which was being extended to the respective states for the purpose of building and improving "rural post roads," which, of course, radiated from centers of population where a postoffice is located. Most of these roads had been designated by the chief engineer under the above acts, and many of them had been built, or much work and public money had been expended upon them. (3) At the general election in 1920, Joint and Concurrent Resolution No. 9 was adopted by the voters, amending Section 44a of Article 4 of the Constitution, providing for the issuance of sixty million dollars of bonds, "for the purpose of constructing hard-surfaced public roads in each county of the State." It further provided that "the Legislature shall enact such laws as may be necessary to carry into effect this amendment." Therefore, by the constitutional amendment adopted by the people, each county of the State was guaranteed a hard-surfaced public road, and it was the Legislature's duty to enact legislation as would consummate that guaranty. (4) Pursuant to that authority and limited by the provisions of that constitutional amendment, the Legislature proceeded to enact the road law approved August 4, 1921. The great outstanding difference in this road law and that of the 1917 and 1919 acts is Section 29; or is that the Legislature did not leave to the highway engineer or the Highway Commission the right and authority to "select and lay out the State Highway System," but on the contrary the Legislature, in that section, specifically "established and laid out a state-wide, connected system of hard-surfaced public roads extending into each county of the State." (5) Section 14 of this road law sets out in detail the powers, duties and authority of the State Highway Commission, and the fact that this section is wholly silent in giving the Commission any right or authority to "designate or lay out" any system of roads should be indicative of the legislative intent on that particular point. On the contrary, Subsection 11 of Section 14 provides that the Highway Commission shall "have power to construct, under its own direction and supervision, all roads, culverts or bridges, or any part thereof, as hereinafter provided." This would seem to indicate that the Legislature did not intend for the Highway Commission to have any right or authority to designate, lay out or construct any roads that were not provided for in the act. (6) Section 26 of the Act has many provisions which would seem to throw light on the question involved herein. It provides that when the Highway Commission has apportioned and allotted the road funds to each county then that fund "shall be and become immediately available and shall be expended as provided by law for construction work upon the roads and highways designated in each county for construction or improvement as state highways, or for the purpose of refunding where roads have already been constructed." It further provides that "the funds apportioned, allotted and set apart for construction of such state roads, shall be expended only in the county for the benefit of which same are so apportioned, allotted and set apart." It further provides that the apportionment due each county is to be...