Board of Trustees of Policemen's Pension Fund of Atlanta v. Christy

• Decision Date: 12 June 1980
• Docket Number: No. 59616,59616
• Citation: 154 Ga.App. 488,269 S.E.2d 33
• Parties: BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the POLICEMEN'S PENSION FUND OF ATLANTA et al. v. CHRISTY.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 33

269 S.E.2d 33

154 Ga.App. 488

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the POLICEMEN'S PENSION FUND OF ATLANTA et al. v. CHRISTY.

No. 59616.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Argued March 4, 1980.

Decided April 17, 1980.

Rehearing Denied May 1, 1980.

Certiorari Granted June 12, 1980.

Ferrin Y. Mathews, Roswell, Malcolm J. Hall, Atlanta, for appellants.

Robert W. Hassett, Edward T. M. Garland, Atlanta, for appellee.

SHULMAN, Judge.

While en route from his home in Douglas County to the Municipal Court of Atlanta (his duty post as a City of Atlanta police officer), appellee was injured when the police department motorcycle he was operating collided with a truck. When his application for an "in line of duty" pension was denied by the Board of Trustees of the Policemen's Pension Fund of Atlanta on the ground that appellee was not on duty when injured, appellee appealed to the Superior Court of Fulton County. This appeal is from that court's grant of summary judgment to appellee.

1. In their first two enumerations of error, appellants complain that, because appellee did not follow certiorari procedure, the superior court should not have considered the appeal or disturbed the findings of the Board of Trustees. Appellants' arguments on this issue are based primarily on Code Ann. § 19-101: "The writ of certiorari shall lie for the correction of errors committed by . . . any inferior judicatory, or any person exercising judicial powers . . ." See Code Ann. § 2-3305. The fatal flaw of appellants' argument is that this case does not involve an appeal from an inferior judicial or quasi-judicial body. "The power conferred by the statute upon these trustees as related to the matter in question was neither judicial nor quasi-judicial, but was plainly ministerial and administrative. (Cits.)" City of Macon v. Herrington, 198 Ga. 576, 590, 32 S.E.2d 517, 526; Cantrell v. Board of Trustees etc. of Ga., 135 Ga.App. 445(2), 218 S.E.2d 97; Burkhead v. Trustees etc. of Atlanta, 133 Ga.App. 41, 209 S.E.2d 651.

The Act governing the trustees here provides the method of appeal which was correctly observed by appellee and the trial court. See Ga.L.1953 (Nov.-Dec.), p. 2707, Sec. 4. Therefore, there was no requirement that certiorari procedure be followed and, since the appellate process provided by the legislature requires a de novo proceeding in the superior court, there was no necessity that the trial court leave undisturbed the findings of the board of trustees.

2. Since the issue before the board of trustees and before the superior court was whether appellee's injury was received "in line of duty" or "not in line of duty," we must determine the meaning of "in line of duty." Neither party has cited any authority in Georgia which would indicate the meaning of "in line of duty," nor have we found any such Georgia authority. However, the phrase has been considered by the courts of other jurisdictions. We find persuasive the holding in Sjostrom v. Sproule, 33 Ill.2d 40, 210 N.E.2d 209, that that phrase, used in the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, is to be construed to mean the same as "arises out of and in the course of . . . employment." We hold, therefore, that if appellee's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment, within the meaning of that phrase in our workers' compensation law, then the disability arose as a result of an injury incurred while "in the line of duty." That being so, Georgia cases applying our workers' compensation law are analogous and appropriate authority for consideration in this case.

3. Having decided that Georgia workers' compensation cases involving determinations of whether an injury arose out of and in the course of employment are authority for the question of whether an injury was received in the line of duty, we must apply the facts before the lower cou...