Bob Jones University v. United States Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc v. United States, Nos. 81-3

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtBURGER
Citation461 U.S. 574,76 L.Ed.2d 157,103 S.Ct. 2017
PartiesBOB JONES UNIVERSITY, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES. GOLDSBORO CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, INC., Petitioner v. UNITED STATES
Decision Date24 May 1983
Docket Number81-1,Nos. 81-3

461 U.S. 574
103 S.Ct. 2017
76 L.Ed.2d 157
BOB JONES UNIVERSITY, Petitioner

v.

UNITED STATES. GOLDSBORO CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, INC., Petitioner v. UNITED STATES.

Nos. 81-3, 81-1.
Argued Oct. 12, 1982.
Decided May 24, 1983.
Syllabus

Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC) provides that "[c]orporations . . . organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable . . . or educational purposes" are entitled to tax exemption. Until 1970, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) granted tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) to private schools, independent of racial admissions policies, and granted charitable deductions for contributions to such schools under § 170 of the IRC. But in 1970, the IRS concluded that it could no longer justify allowing tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) to private schools that practiced racial discrimination, and in 1971 issued Revenue Ruling 71-447 providing that a private school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not "charitable" within the common-law concepts reflected in §§ 170 and 501(c)(3). In No. 81-3, petitioner Bob Jones University, while permitting unmarried Negroes to enroll as students, denies admission to applicants engaged in an interracial marriage or known to advocate interracial marriage or dating. Because of this admissions policy, the IRS revoked the University's tax-exempt status. After paying a portion of the federal unemployment taxes for a certain taxable year, the University filed a refund action in Federal District Court, and the Government counterclaimed for unpaid taxes for that and other taxable years. Holding that the IRS exceeded its powers in revoking the University's tax-exempt status and violated the University's rights under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, the District Court ordered the IRS to refund the taxes paid and rejected the counterclaim. The Court of Appeals reversed. In No. 81-1, petitioner Goldsboro Christian Schools maintains a racially discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible, accepting for the most part only Caucasian students. The IRS determined that Goldsboro was not an organization described in § 501(c)(3) and hence was required to pay federal social security and unemployment taxes. After paying a portion of such taxes for certain years, Goldsboro filed a refund suit in Federal District Court, and the IRS counterclaimed for unpaid taxes. The District Court entered summary judgment for

Page 575

the Government, rejecting Goldsboro's claim to tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) and also its claim that the denial of such status violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: Neither petitioner qualifies as a tax-exempt organization under § 501(c)(3). Pp. 585-605.

(a) An examination of the IRC's framework and the background of congressional purposes reveals unmistakable evidence that underlying all relevant parts of the IRC is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common-law standards of charity—namely, that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy. Thus, to warrant exemption under § 501(c)(3), an institution must fall within a category specified in that section and must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest, and the institution's purpose must not be so at odds with the common community conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be conferred. Pp. 585-592.

(b) The IRS's 1970 interpretation of § 501(c)(3) was correct. It would be wholly incompatible with the concepts underlying tax exemption to grant tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private educational entities. Whatever may be the rationale for such private schools' policies, racial discrimination in education is contrary to public policy. Racially discriminatory educational institutions cannot be viewed as conferring a public benefit within the above "charitable" concept or within the congressional intent underlying § 501(c)(3). Pp. 592-596.

(c) The IRS did not exceed its authority when it announced its interpretation of § 501(c)(3) in 1970 and 1971. Such interpretation is wholly consistent with what Congress, the Executive, and the courts had previously declared. And the actions of Congress since 1970 leave no doubt that the IRS reached the correct conclusion in exercising its authority. Pp. 596-602.

(d) The Government's fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs. Petitioners' asserted interests cannot be accommodated with that compelling governmental interest, and no less restrictive means are available to achieve the governmental interest. Pp. 602-604.

(e) The IRS properly applied its policy to both petitioners. Goldsboro admits that it maintains racially discriminatory policies, and, contrary to Bob Jones University's contention that it is not racially discriminatory, discrimination on the basis of racial affiliation and association is a form of racial discrimination. P.605

No. 81-1, 644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir., 1981), and No. 81-3, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir., 1980), affirmed.

Page 576

William B. Ball, Harrisburg, Pa., for petitioner Bob Jones University.

William G. McNairy, Greensboro, N.C., for petitioner Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc.

William Bradford Reynolds, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the U.S.

William T. Coleman, Jr., Washington, D.C., as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below.

[Amicus Curiae Information from pages 576-577 intentionally omitted]

Page 577

Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to decide whether petitioners, nonprofit private schools that prescribe and enforce racially discriminatory admissions standards on the basis of religious doctrine, qualify as tax-exempt organizations under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

I
A.

Until 1970, the Internal Revenue Service granted tax-exempt status to private schools, without regard to their racial admissions policies, under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3),1 and granted chari-

Page 578

table deductions for contributions to such schools under § 170 of the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 170.2

On January 12, 1970, a three-judge District Court for the District of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the IRS from according tax-exempt status to private schools in Mississippi that discriminated as to admissions on the basis of race. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F.Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), app. dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956, 90 S.Ct. 2169, 26 L.Ed.2d 539 (1970). Thereafter, in July 1970, the IRS concluded that it could "no longer legally justify allowing tax-exempt status [under § 501(c)(3) ] to private schools which practice racial discrimination." IRS News Release (7/10/70), reprinted in App. in No. 81-3, p. A235. At the same time, the IRS announced that it could not "treat gifts to such schools as charitable deductions for income tax purposes [under § 170]." Ibid. By letter dated November 30, 1970, the IRS formally notified private schools, including those involved in this case, of this change in policy, "applicable to all private schools in the United States at all levels of education." See id., at A232.

On June 30, 1971, the three-judge District Court issued its opinion on the merits of the Mississippi challenge. Green v. Connally, 330 F.Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997, 92 S.Ct. 564, 30 L.Ed.2d 550 (1971) (per curiam). That court approved the IRS' amended construction of the Tax Code. The court also held that racially discriminatory private schools were not entitled to exemption under § 501(c)(3) and that donors were not entitled to deductions for contributions to such schools under § 170. The court permanently enjoined the Commissioner of

Page 579

Internal Revenue from approving tax-exempt status for any school in Mississippi that did not publicly maintain a policy of nondiscrimination.

The revised policy on discrimination was formalized in Revenue Ruling 71-447, 1971-2 Cum.Bull. 230:

"Both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have long recognized that the statutory requirement of being 'organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes' was intended to express the basic common law concept [of 'charity']. . . . All charitable trusts, educational or otherwise, are subject to the requirement that the purpose of the trust may not be illegal or contrary to public policy." Id., at 230.

Based on the "national policy to discourage racial discrimination in education," the IRS ruled that "a private school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not 'charitable' within the common law concepts reflected in sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the Code." Id., at 231.3

The application of the IRS construction of these provisions to petitioners, two private schools with racially discriminatory admissions policies, is now before us.

B

No. 81-3, Bob Jones University v. United States

Bob Jones University is a nonprofit corporation located in Greenville, South Carolina.4 Its purpose is "to conduct an institution

Page 580

of learning . . ., giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy Scriptures." Certificate of Incorporation, Bob Jones University, Inc., of Greenville, S.C., reprinted in App. in No. 81-3, pp. A118-A119. The corporation operates a school with an enrollment of approximately 5,000 students, from kindergarten through college and graduate school. Bob Jones University is not affiliated with any religious denomination, but is dedicated...

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563 practice notes
  • City & Cnty. of S.F. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Case No. 19-cv-04717-PJH
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Northern District of California
    • October 11, 2019
    ...938, 951 (9th Cir. 2010) (Congress does no "abrogate[] sub silentio the Supreme Court's decision[s]"); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600-01 (1983) (interpretation informed by the fact that Congress had a "prolonged and acute awareness" of an established agency interpretati......
  • U.S. v. Smith, No. 96-1245
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • December 31, 1997
    ...tax dispute, this is not a case in which the Internal Revenue Service has "primary authority." See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2031, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983) ("[T]his Court has long recognized the primary authority of the IRS and its predecessors i......
  • Walker Macy LLC v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Case No. 3:16–cv–995–SI
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Oregon)
    • March 17, 2017
    ...(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Gallenardo , 579 F.3d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009) ); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States , 461 U.S. 574, 586, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983) ("It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that a court should go beyond the lit......
  • Bethel Baptist Church v. United States, Civ. A. No. 84-1586.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court of Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • March 7, 1986
    ...consequences of the legislation which we need not detail for the purposes of defendant's motion. In Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983), the United States Supreme Court summarized the standard to be applied to free exercise claims as fo......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
557 cases
  • City & Cnty. of S.F. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Case No. 19-cv-04717-PJH
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Northern District of California
    • October 11, 2019
    ...938, 951 (9th Cir. 2010) (Congress does no "abrogate[] sub silentio the Supreme Court's decision[s]"); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600-01 (1983) (interpretation informed by the fact that Congress had a "prolonged and acute awareness" of an established agency interpretati......
  • U.S. v. Smith, No. 96-1245
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • December 31, 1997
    ...tax dispute, this is not a case in which the Internal Revenue Service has "primary authority." See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2031, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983) ("[T]his Court has long recognized the primary authority of the IRS and its predecessors i......
  • Walker Macy LLC v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Case No. 3:16–cv–995–SI
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Oregon)
    • March 17, 2017
    ...(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Gallenardo , 579 F.3d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009) ); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States , 461 U.S. 574, 586, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983) ("It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that a court should go beyond the lit......
  • Bethel Baptist Church v. United States, Civ. A. No. 84-1586.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court of Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • March 7, 1986
    ...consequences of the legislation which we need not detail for the purposes of defendant's motion. In Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983), the United States Supreme Court summarized the standard to be applied to free exercise claims as fo......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
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