Bogany v. State
Citation | 661 S.W.2d 957 |
Decision Date | 23 November 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 317-83,317-83 |
Parties | Robert Amos BOGANY, Appellant. v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas |
Gladys R. Goffney, Houston, for appellant.
John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty., Calvin Hartmann, Larry Schreve and Timothy G. Taft, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery. On a finding of one prior conviction for enhancement, punishment was assessed at 60 years and a $10,000 fine. The Court of Appeals found this punishment verdict was unauthorized by law because under V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 12.42(c), no fine was authorized. It then reformed the verdict under Art. 44.24(b), V.A.C.C.P., and overruled the ground of error. We granted the petition for review to consider appellant's challenge to the Court of Appeals' authority to reform the verdict.
Art. 44.24(b) provides:
"(b) The courts of appeals and the Court of Criminal Appeals may affirm the judgment of the court below, or may reverse and remand for a new trial, or may reverse and dismiss the case, or may reform and correct the judgment or may enter any other appropriate order, as the law and nature of the case may require." (Emphasis added.)
In Milczanowski v. State, 645 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), the Court held:
"... reformation of judgment and sentence may be done only to cause those instruments to reflect the true finding of the fact finder when such a finding is reflected in the verdict or, in a bench trial, the pronouncement of the court's finding." (Emphasis added.)
Elsewhere it has been held:
Brewer v. State, 572 S.W.2d 719, 723 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). (Emphasis added.)
The authority of a court on appeal to reform the judgment and sentence does not extend to the situation in this case. Here, the error was not that the judgment was contrary to the verdict. The error was a verdict unauthorized by law.
Reliance by the Court of Appeals on Daniels v. State, 527 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), was misplaced. In that case the issue addressed was an improper charge on punishment. Here the issue is an unlawful verdict. The verdict in Daniels was not unauthorized.
In Smith v. State, 479 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), the conviction was reversed because the punishment verdict returned by the jury was unauthorized by law. In ordering reversal the Court held:
See also Ex parte McIver, 586 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
The controlling law did not authorize the Court of Appeals to change the verdict rendered by the jury. The verdict was unauthorized by law and, under the cases cited, was "void at its inception." The verdict must be set aside.
The judgments of the Court of Appeals, 646 S.W.2d 663, and the trial court are reversed and the cause is remanded.
Over 11 years ago, this Court decided Ocker v. State, 477 S.W.2d 288 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), wherein Judge Truman Roberts, the author of the opinion on Appellant's Motion for Rehearing, expressly pointed out the following: "This Court has long held that it may not reduce the punishment assessed by the jury." (Citations omitted). Since that date, many decisions have been written on that subject by members of this Court, with all repeating the same words that Judge Roberts stated in Ocker. The Legislature has had occasion to meet several times since Ocker was decided. However, it has never seen fit to give this Court or any intermediate appellate court of this State authority to assess punishment or reduce punishment assessed by a jury where the conviction was for a non-capital felony. The Legislature, however, has seen fit to grant this Court authority to reform a sentence of death, but only in the instance where the evidence is found to be insufficient to support an affirmative answer to an issue submitted to the jury under Art. 37.071(b), V.A.C.C.P. In that event, this Court has authority to reduce a sentence of death to life imprisonment. See Art. 44.251, V.A.C.C.P.
In this instance, the jury was granted permission by the trial court to assess a punishment which included a fine. This was impermissible under the provisions of the law that controlled this cause. Because the jury could not assess a fine, in addition to the time assessed, its verdict was void at the inception. Villarreal v. State, 590 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Ex parte McIver, 586 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Smith v. State, 479 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
Appellant's indictment not only informed him of what he was accused of committing, which was the first degree felony offense of aggravated robbery, but it also informed him of the possible punishment that could be assessed if he was found guilty. Pursuant to V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 12.42(c), the State chose to indict appellant as a repeat offender. Ordinarily, when the State acts in that fashion, the punishment is increased from that which is available for the unenhanced offender. However, for reasons known only to those members of the Legislature who voted in 1979 to amend the provisions of V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 12.32, to permit the assessment of both time and a fine for the commission of a first degree felony offense, it failed to amend V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 12.42(c), which provides the range of punishment for one who has previously been convicted of a felony offense and thereafter commits a first degree felony offense. Sec. 12.42(c), as worded at the time the jury assessed appellant's punishment, did not provide for the assessment of a fine. Therefore, the jury erroneously assessed as part of appellant's punishment a fine. This it could not do, and the intermediate appellate court and this Court are without authority to either assess a different punishment, reduce the punishment assessed, or reform the punishment assessed.
There is yet another reason this cause must be reversed. The error in the jury's verdict actually occurred because the trial court's charge was fundamentally erroneous. See Taylor v. State, 549 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). Fundamental error in the court's charge may be raised for the first time on appeal. It can never be harmless error. Ex parte McIver, supra; Taylor, supra; Smith, supra; Batten v. State, 549 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Ex parte Brown, 575 S.W.2d 517 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Coby v. State, 518 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
The majority of the Court of Appeals erroneously reformed appellant's punishment. It was without authority to do that. This Court correctly reverses its judgment.
This is a petition for discretionary review from the Houston Court of Appeals, First Supreme Judicial District. Appellant was convicted of burglary of...
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